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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the factors that shape political participation and 
perceptions about political choice during and after conflict. Societies that experience civil 
war, and particularly ethnic civil war, are vulnerable to the “conflict trap,” meaning that 
they are likely to experience second or third wars based on tensions exacerbated by 
conflict. Existing literature on group mobilization in post-conflict societies and related 
scholarship predicts that factors like ethnic identity, income, and education best explain 
participation in political violence and likelihood of recurrence of civil war. However, 
countries often defy these predictors, and gaps remain in our understanding of how 
citizens participate in politics during conflict. This dissertation therefore seeks to answer 
the question: What explains citizens’ choices about political participation as they 
experience the turmoil conflict and post-conflict periods?  
To answer this question, this study draws upon the case of Burundi, a country that 
has hovered between post-conflict and conflict statuses since the conclusion of its recent 
civil war. I conduct qualitative analysis of 113 in-depth interviews collected across four 
	ix	 	
provinces in Burundi, examining the variety of choices made in relation to political 
participation both during and after the war. I find that citizens’ choices about political 
participation are fluid, and heavily contingent upon their interpersonal connections, with 
specific contributions in three main areas.  
First, rebel and political groups’ identities hinge upon the values associated with 
narratives they use to garner legitimacy, more so than the division itself (be it political, 
ethnic, or otherwise). Second, interactions that take place between generations and within 
key social networks heavily influence patterns of political participation. These 
interactions explain the wide array of relationships to politics observed within subgroups 
(like youth and women), and provide a better understanding of how they take action. 
Last, in the post-conflict era, non-state actors influence the potential for conflict, 
simultaneously creating space for wider political participation and challenging state 
actors still interested in maintaining legitimacy. These findings challenge currently weak 
predictors of cyclical violence and the assumed mechanisms driving them, highlighting 
the prominence of social ties and roles that shape mobilization and political choice.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONFLICT TRAP AND THE CASE FOR EXPANDING THEORY OF 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Introduction 
After a brutal civil war in Burundi beginning in 1993, the democratic government 
that assumed power in 2005 was a cause for optimism. In spite of a continued battle with 
extreme poverty and lack of resources, Burundians have demonstrated incredible 
progress with reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi, the country’s major ethnic groups 
(Uvin, 2009). However, violent conflict is now reemerging, and the threat of another full-
scale civil war looms over the country’s gains. Surprisingly, this conflict is not ethnic; 
instead, disputes are highly politicized. Stemming from accusations of corruption during 
the 2010 and 2015 elections, political leaders only openly organized escalations of 
violence after an attempted coup d’état in May 2015. There was limited understanding of 
how political parties maintained any stability during this time period, mired by tension 
and political violence between groups.  
This risk of returning to violence in the post-conflict period is not new. A wide 
body of research examines the causes of recurring conflict. Societies that experience civil 
war are likely to get caught in a so-called “conflict trap,” meaning that they are 
significantly more likely to experience a second or third war than other societies are to 
engage in a new war (Collier and Sambanis, 2002). However, not all post-conflict 
countries encounter this trap (Walter, 2004). To explain why some do and others do not, 
	 2	
	
the literature has focused on how identity, organizations, government, and demographic 
conditions shape the continued formation of rebel movements. This literature treats 
violence as a blanket outcome; it fails to accurately capture political action in “conflict-
trapped” countries, most of which is non-violent. Knowledge about the complexity of 
post-conflict politics is limited because most studies – even those that have examined the 
political psychology of warfare – have searched for commonalities and patterns, rather 
than differences, among post-conflict communities. Thus, the informal social fabric of 
these societies remains under the radar, offering little information about how individuals 
may be pulled or pushed into groups that support different types of political action (some 
violent and some non-violent).  
In this vein, Burundi’s case is theoretically interesting because it exhibits many of 
the predictors for a return to violence and it has been forecasted on many occasions that 
this would occur in the country, but it has instead maintained peace thus far. Burundi 
ranks among the lowest in the world for GDP, education, and life expectancy indicators. 
Some opposition parties have created rebel groups to fight the government, and members 
within the ruling party have organized civilians to commit violent acts against opposition. 
Moreover, institutions that support democracy, such as media and civil society, remain 
weak. And yet, in spite of these elements, the country has avoided returning to civil war 
for 10 years, suggesting that there may be important dynamics to uncover that could 
explain this case.  
This post-war context brings to light citizens’ choices about political 
participation, and the need for further analysis of non-violent political participation 
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alongside violent participation. Not all citizens continue to participate in the same ways 
they did before the war. Some participate by voting and joining formal political parties; 
some by participating in demonstrations or forms of political action without being part of 
any party; some continue to participate in violence in support of a political group; some, 
not at all. Furthermore in this post-war context, some violent groups are able to persist by 
maintaining group membership in the present day, creating a situation where the 
country’s stability is constantly renegotiated. How does this happen? What explains 
citizens’ choices to participate and how are political groups able to maintain 
membership? 
An examination of post-conflict political violence necessitates the inclusion of 
micro-level social factors that shape the decision-making processes of individuals. 
Current models explaining post-conflict dynamics do not account for the ways in which 
larger factors connect to and are contingent upon social dynamics that act as catalysts for 
political action. To better comprehend the motivations driving the supply and demand of 
continued violence, we must extend beyond political leadership, institutions, and 
economies to understand the people who do and do not participate in these events. In 
particular, if international communities are to utilize knowledge of the organization of 
violence and predictive models to make decisions about interventions (target groups, 
program designs, prioritization of funds, policy efforts, etc.), there needs to be more 
accurate theorizing around not only the actions and decisions of leaders, but citizenry as 
well. 
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The objective of this dissertation is to highlight the diversity of choice within 
highly constrained circumstances – a diversity that is often deprioritized in order to 
understand the phenomenon of conflict and the reasons for participation in violence. In 
fact, most people do not participate in violence during a war, and those who do often shift 
group membership or leave armed groups altogether. I theorize about violence based on 
the way community members themselves talk about it – not as one choice, but as a series 
of choices that are impacted by group membership and varying constraints experienced 
during conflict. This analysis reorients the understanding of participation in armed groups 
and membership within these groups to explore the continual negotiation of membership 
in these groups (and outside of them). In particular, non-violent group membership and 
political participation are under-theorized in cases of conflict, as the focus has usually 
been on the choice to fight. However, without better understanding the opportunities and 
actions of those who have not fought alongside members of armed groups, the full image 
of participation remains clouded. 
This research also contributes to the social movements literature by examining the 
diversity of political action and widening the scope of the social movements literature 
into the realm of conflict recurrence. While the literature has discussed violence, it has 
not explored how movements and the social networks that comprise them may shape this 
phenomenon of conflict recurrence at the micro-level. Using theories of social networks 
and political mobilization can enlighten how interpersonal relationships shape the 
political choices that individuals have before them. Social movements and social network 
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literature provide a theoretical foundation for examining the fluctuation of membership in 
both violent and peaceful forms of political organization as tensions rise within a country. 
This introductory chapter reviews the existing literature explaining conflict from 
the macro to micro levels, and subsequently the theoretical contributions of social capital 
and social movements literature on violence. It follows with a discussion of the 
methodological approach: the selection of Burundi as a case study and the methods I used 
to collect data on this topic. Last, I make the case for Burundi’s experience with political 
participation and organization – something the country is little known for historically, but 
which has made international headlines in the past year. This summary sets up the 
following chapters, which are outlined at the end of this introduction to conflict literature 
and Burundi. 
 
Literature Review 
This research builds on existing social scientific literature on conflict, peace, and 
reconciliation by drawing on sociological theories in social movements and social 
network literature. A wide body of research has examined the causes of recurring 
conflict. Referenced above, the “conflict trap” poses a conundrum for nations attempting 
to maintain peace following civil war. However, since this literature provides a 
dichotomous understanding of civil war (a country either is or is not in civil war), it fails 
to accurately capture political action in “conflict-trapped” countries, most of which is 
non-violent. Furthermore, even in cases where countries return to war, the process is one 
that builds and shifts over time in a non-linear fashion. Social movements and social 
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network literature provide a theoretical basis for examining the fluctuation of 
membership in both violent and peaceful forms of political organization as tensions rise 
within a country.  
 
Explanations for Political Conflict 
While a number of macro-level predictive models exist for explaining conflict 
(and its recurrence), there is no consensus on which factors most accurately capture why 
conflict happens. Only a few theories have garnered relatively large support within the 
academic community, and there remains disagreement on why these factors have 
predictive power.  
Geographic, economic, and socio-political conditions can function as predictors 
of conflict recurrence due to their impact on grievances, though scholars disagree on the 
mechanisms at work (Claude, 1962; Goldstone, 1991; Scott, 1976; Skocpol, 1979; 
Walter, 2004; Kauffman, 1996, 1998). Those who have access to better living conditions 
and institutionalized forms of political participation have less cause for grievances, and 
are therefore less likely to rejoin rebel movements (Claude, 1962; Skocpol, 1979; Walter, 
2004). Many scholars have highlighted proxy indicators, such as GDP and average 
income, as predictors of likelihood for conflict. A country’s GDP can serve as an 
indicator of state capacity on a structural level (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), while others 
have used income to theorize about the relative advantages and disadvantages of fighting 
for individuals (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998).  
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However, grievances alone cannot explain the resurgence of conflict since they 
are prevalent in many societies that do not resort to large-scale violence (Tarrow, 1994; 
Tilly, 1978). While political and economic grievances are undoubtedly central to many 
civil wars, they alone cannot explain why some countries’ unsolved grievances result in a 
conflict trap. In order to clarify the role of grievances, more research is needed on how 
individuals make sense of grievances and use them to organize themselves politically. 
Researchers have widely considered the state itself to be an important factor that 
shapes political conflict, particularly in Africa. While the literature examines weak states’ 
difficulty suppressing rebellion (Rotberg, 2003; Reno, 2002), some scholars have also 
argued that post-colonial African states are internally weak but have relative judicial 
strength, which renders rebellions unlikely (Englebert, 2009). The role of the state in 
Africa is further complicated by the newness of state-organized democracy on the 
continent. In sub-Saharan Africa, the lack of definitive authority over large swaths of 
territory (Herbst, 2000) is thought to directly contribute to rebel movements. This is 
alluded to in the literature on rebellion in Africa that highlights the split between urban 
centers (the locus of state power) and the rural highlands where most of the population 
lives. 
The process of forming African states was fundamentally different in many ways 
from that of Western Europe. The boundaries of modern African states were determined 
by external colonial powers that were dividing lands and settling boundaries. These 
borders created arbitrary divisions between shared ethnicities, divided pre-existing 
traditional political units, and united disparate populations under one state. Because of 
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this, citizens often still perceive states as arbitrary and historically imposed constructs 
(Jones, 2014). States and their laws, structures, and leaders have often failed to capture 
the masses (Hyden, 1983). These conditions contribute to later patterns of rebellion and 
anti-government sentiment. While some scholars may say this is true for sub-Saharan 
Africa broadly, there are many variations on this narrative. There are strong states in the 
region, such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, whose histories of violence have not resulted in a 
recurrent pattern (in recent years), but rather in the consolidation of power. The strength 
of Burundi’s state is debated, though it could have been called a strong state prior to its 
civil war, due to the consolidation of power within one party. However, the state has had 
a much more precarious relationship with its citizens in the post-war period. Thus, this 
work further explores the organization of rebels and their lasting effect on the political 
and social fabric of nations in order to better understand how loyalties are cultivated 
among structures and identities outside of the state.  
Moving specifically to predictors of conflict recurrence, many disagree on the 
effect that previous violence has on a country’s likelihood of returning to war. The costs 
of war can motivate retribution, encouraging individuals to rejoin conflicts later on 
(Kalyvas, 2000), or can exhaust resources and energy for conflict, making it difficult to 
mobilize in the future (Rosen, 1972). Governments that adequately address the 
grievances of rebels are posited to have a higher chance of stability (Gurr, 1971; Tilly, 
1978). Therefore, governments that are interested in compromise and allocate political 
space for opposition more successfully maintain peace in the post-conflict era. Other 
scholars have theorized that wars that end with a decisive military victory allow for better 
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control of state affairs and consolidation of power (Fearon, 1995; Wagner, 1994; 
Zartman, 1995). When a state is weak in the ways discussed above, it is incapable of 
exercising full power over opposition, thus creating a space for further coups and revolts. 
Based on the assumption that participants rationally weigh the costs and benefits of 
mobilization (Popkin, 1979), this makes recurrence less likely because rebels perceive 
less of a chance of victory.  
The level of disagreement in this literature suggests that it is not yet certain 
exactly which characteristics about previous violence may increase or decrease the 
likelihood of recurrent war. However, this literature inspires an important question: how 
do prior conflicts influence the support for violence in post-conflict societies? There may 
be more effective techniques for answering this question than the creation of a macro-
level predictive model. In many cases, micro-level approaches have helped to trace how 
experiences with previous wars shape participation in ways that provide scholars with a 
more comprehensive understanding of how people’s experiences of past and present may 
interact to foster participation in political violence. 
 Differences between cultural and ideological conflicts have also factored into the 
likelihood of recurrence. Cultural identity can be broadly defined, as something perceived 
as part of an innate identity, while stated beliefs characterize ideology. While the two 
overlap in reality, the way a particular conflict is framed shapes the likelihood that it can 
recur. Cultural identity, and specifically ethnic identity, is an important factor in 
mobilization, and it functions as one of the best predictors for conflict recurrence. While 
many debate the nature of ethnic identities, it seems that they are less flexible than 
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ideological identities. Not only are countries with greater amounts of ethnic stratification 
more likely to engage in war (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Ellingsen, 2000), cultural 
identities like ethnicity are also more likely to become solidified and are more enduring 
than identities grounded in ideology, making it difficult for groups to permanently end 
conflict (Gurr, 2000; Rothchild and Groth, 1995; Kauffman, 1996).  
This evidences that even successful predictive measures fail to capture the 
dynamics that influence participation in conflict and the possibility of recurrence. Macro-
level results highlight patterns between states and offer insight into how states and 
conflicts differ, but it would be incorrect to assume that this type of analysis can reveal 
how conflicts function or provide guidance on how to intervene. The observation that 
ethnic conflicts are more likely to result in recurrent violence assumes that people with 
strong ethnic identities are more likely to act based on ethnicity. However, this 
assumption breaks down at the micro-level. Several scholars have identified confounding 
factors, such as economic and labor divisions, (Bonacich, 1976; Banton, 1983; Olzak and 
Nagel, 1982; Newbury, 1988; Olzak, 1993; Williams, 1994). Others have noted 
competing national and ideological identities that may reshape this process (Greenwood, 
1985; Brass, 1985; Horowitz, 1985; Gurr, 2000). These concepts help to explain why 
ethnic divisions, which function as one of the strongest predictors of conflict recurrence, 
still have relatively weak predictive power.  
Cultural identities are socially constructed, and many people have posited that a 
macro approach that conceptualizes these as factors simplifies the role of identity in 
conflict (Tilly, 1978; Gurr, 2000). Even ethnic identities are culturally fashioned, 
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interpreted, and reproduced. In essence, the meanings associated with ethnic identities 
have the ability to change over time, and their relevance to conflict may change as well. 
Ethnicity is dynamic, and its relationship to ideological and other cultural identities 
cannot be separated so easily (Gurr, 2000). However, even these theories still predicate a 
direct relationship between identity and violence, which may not be the case. Often, only 
a small minority of those who identify as part of an ethnic group actually participate in 
the killing. For example, in the Rwandan genocide, only 14-17% of those who identified 
as Hutu actually participated, thus highlighting the lack of explanatory power behind 
identity alone (Straus, 2006).  
Another set of factors that influence a country’s post-war experience is couched 
within the level and type of international involvement. Current peacekeeping and peace-
building groups rely heavily on dominant knowledge about conflict to address problems 
of war. As such, policies tend to focus almost exclusively on macro-level issues, such as 
problems of governance, state leadership, economic and developmental policies, and 
national reconciliation efforts. However, there appears to be no real consensus on 
whether international peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts help states deter conflict 
reemergence (Fortna, 2004; Grieg and Diehl, 2005). Of all the civil wars since 1944 that 
were not met with peacekeeping aid, 42% of cases were followed by another war 
between the same parties. Of those where peacekeeping was utilized, 39% experienced 
another war (Fortna, 2004). 
Large-scale international organizations such as the UN, other states, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) all work towards peacebuilding. However, scholars 
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who disagree on their importance have employed different measures for the success of 
these efforts. Some have argued that these actors positively impact peace by supporting 
negotiations between parties and contributing to the broader values of human rights and 
peace that can have long-term effects on a society’s ability to develop a culture that 
rejects long histories of conflict and violence (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001; 
Fortna, 2004). Meanwhile, others have asserted that they have no effect (or even negative 
effects) on recurrence outcomes, as well as on the achievement of cease-fires, rates of 
malnourishment, arms reductions, and other indicators of stability (Druckman et al. 1997, 
Diehl 1994, Zartman 1985).  
What constitutes “success” or “failure” in peacekeeping is unclear in itself. 
Although missions often have specific mandates or goals, success does not necessarily 
depend on the accomplishment of all goals. This prompts the following question: what 
should the standard be for peacekeeping efforts, and how do we measure it? A number of 
scholars have acknowledged that peacekeeping efforts may offer the most benefits at a 
sub-national level, where the culture of conflict actually has potential to change 
(Druckman, et al., 1997). Nevertheless, mandates have remained focused on national 
political cleavages and policies. One reason that peacekeeping efforts may be so 
unpredictable in their success is the lack of attention to local conflicts that influence 
national peace, even by most NGOs (Autesserre, 2010).  
In explaining recurrence, conflict literature has shifted from macro-level 
predictive models to a micro-level cognitive identity approach. Each of these theories 
glosses over the variance in participation among group members and neglects the social 
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organization of action at the micro level. While predictive models have proven useful for 
identifying which countries are likely to cycle back into conflict, they still do not fully 
explain why and how mobilization occurs. It is clear that the social organization of action 
plays a major role in the recurrence of conflict, but there is scant research on how 
organization efforts are mitigated and interpreted at the local level to encourage different 
types of political action. These theories do not address the full range of political options 
that are available leading up to (and during) civil war recurrence, nor the networks that 
may structure individual decision-making processes (Viterna, 2006).  
 
Social Capital, Social Networks and Political Mobilization 
Social movement scholars have examined local group interactions to explain why 
people choose to participate in movements. A smaller portion of this literature has 
specifically examined violent revolutions (McAdam et al. 2001, Klandermans 1984, 
Klandermans 1988, Viterna 2006). There is a wide range of evidence that social networks 
shape group identity and mobilization (Calhoun, 1991; Pfaff, 1996; Morris, 1984; Wood, 
2003; Warren, 2001; Wickham-Crowley, 1992). Networks and informal social ties can 
facilitate the preservation of a movement’s ideals, goals, and tactics over time, thus 
enabling the movement to experience a resurgence years after it appears to have 
dissolved (Taylor, 1988). Political action depends on which networks are able to garner 
support based on the number and strength of ties (Viterna, 2006; McAdam and Paulsen, 
1993; Stryker, 2000). However, few studies have traced how individuals often belong to 
multiple networks that may influence them in different ways. There is a need for more 
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research on how local dynamics function and influence action in order to comprehend 
shifts in political mobilization towards violence, rather than peace, in post-conflict 
societies.  
The sociology literature (including work on network theories) does not 
specifically try to explain conflict recurrence. In fact, social network analysis typically 
examines positive outcomes. For example, networks and social capital traditionally 
explain positive forms of political participation, such as grassroots organizing and voting 
(Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; Olsen, 1972; Rogers, et al., 1975), or they may garner other 
positive results, such as status attainment and increased ability for advocacy (Lin, 1999; 
Maman, 1997). Research on networks has showcased how disenfranchised individuals 
can organize to lobby for their rights, but has mostly neglected violent mechanisms of 
political mobilization.  
Literature that has discussed violence has not addressed how networks may alter 
the ability of countries to achieve peace. Social movements and social network theories 
have overlooked many international cases, particularly in Africa. Because of this, it is 
unclear how these theories may apply, or how they might be useful in illuminating other 
cases. Nonetheless, these theoretical contributions can help explain not only why 
individuals identify with political groups, but also how networks shape the choice to 
support violent or peaceful tactics when political tensions are high. By using theories of 
social networks and political mobilization, researchers can begin to understand how 
interpersonal relationships shape the political choices available to individuals. 
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Regional Explanations for Violence 
 Explanations of war in Africa pay particularly close attention to the role of 
corruption in states when accounting for the cyclical nature of violence. Clientelist states, 
which depend on state actors providing jobs and other benefits to supporters, are of 
particular importance because of their prevalence in post-conflict societies. Scholars have 
emphasized the clientelist nature of many post-colonial states in Africa, arguing that the 
structural violence built into states that maintain power through corruption and coercion 
eventually dominates the political field in an overt manner. As groups continue to use 
violence as a form of political negotiation, they engrain violence into the culture, making 
it increasingly difficult to separate from the everyday or the ‘normal’. Thus, political 
violence becomes a cyclical manifestation of a lived experience of violence, making it 
challenging to end (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Allen, 1999). In support of this concept is 
the “greed and grievance” model, which suggests that rebel movements function and 
continue to exist because of the looting that takes place in the process of a rebellion. 
Participants develop a personal interest in maintaining or reigniting wars, and at the 
expense of the overall population (Collier, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).  
 African community and political structures in particular are cast as having 
become so damaged by a history of violence that violence itself becomes the new mode 
of functioning. Scholars have often cited the inability of African communities to form 
productive networks that may foster positive growth; in fact, social networks and 
community ties can even function as a liability for African peace prospects because they 
can serve to organize violence and corruption (Ngau and Keino, 1996; Randall, 1999; 
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Rasmussen, 1992; Waldinger, 1995). Youth – individuals who have not received the 
rights of full adulthood in their communities – join militia and rebel movements through 
networks that can provide protection and resources in contexts where both are scarce 
(Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999; Durham, 2000). Youth are drawn into groups on the basis of 
community or ethnic identity, and then stay for economic and social benefits. These 
militia and rebel networks allow youth to attain wealth (often through looting), which 
they can then use to benefit themselves and their own communities (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 
1999).  
Critics of these explanations for conflict recurrence have noted that in order for it 
to be true that youth are motivated largely by wealth attainment, participants in civil war 
would have to be acting in a purely rational manner and consistently interested in 
individual profit over other possible consequences. This theory also does not explain the 
rationality (or lack thereof) of those who do not mobilize in support of political violence 
(Mkandawire, 2002). Furthermore, this perspective devalues the positive role that local 
networks and communities may play by regarding them as damaged by years of 
clientelist rule (Meagher, 2010). While there is truth to this, it fails to explain why 
clientelist states in Africa have followed different paths; countries may observe organized 
violence in varying levels, and only some have escalated into full-scale civil war 
(Sambanis, 2004).  
The question still remains why those who participate in violence make this choice 
over peace. Here, we see a more nuanced approach to understanding the interactions 
between grievances, state structures, and community networks, but the picture we have is 
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largely devoid of non-violent means of political action. However, despite these factors, 
participation is not uniform. Even among youth – especially young males, who often 
represent the largest category of participants in conflict – only a minority of individuals 
may choose to participate in violence (Mkandawire, 2002; Durham, 2000). In fact, while 
youth make up a majority of participants, this may be because they compose an 
increasing portion of the population (instead of being especially drawn to conflict). 
During the Rwandan genocide, for example, the number of young men participating in 
genocide was actually underrepresented when compared to their proportion in the 
population (Straus, 2006).  
Thus, there is still a need for research that explores violent conflict in conjunction 
with other actions that comprise political life. It remains uncertain why civil war persists 
in some countries and not in others, and research that focuses on connecting macro-level 
factors to individual choice could indicate how groups gain membership and political 
support (Sambanis, 2004). My research supports the reinsertion of individual political 
experience back into discussions about civil war for clarity on these questions. Theories 
of youth mobilization, greed and grievance, and state control all tend to deemphasize the 
genuine political affiliations and complex political tensions by elevating the influence of 
economics, identity, and feelings of deprivation. While these all certainly play a role, 
they remain limited in supporting an understanding of how conflict develops, and how 
people become part of conflicts or avoid participating in them. Unlike existing literature, 
I find that by studying party membership and how social groups shape and support 
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political causes we are better able to explain the diversity found within conflict, and 
therefore why some see violence as a valid option for making gains while others do not. 
 
Methodological Approach 
“I need to tell you something. I told you that I never finished secondary school. 
Actually, I’ve finished my university degree.” 
“Why did you hide that?” 
“Because, I didn’t know you.” – Interview in Bujumbura Mairie, November 2012 
 
My interviews took place during a one-year period between May 2012 and May 
2017, with participant observation between May 2012 and May 2016. The study relies on 
qualitative data from political histories collected in four provinces. Each participant 
engaged in at least two in-depth interviews. This process ensured adequate time to build 
rapport with them and gain insight into the long-term processes that pull and push 
individuals into different political groups. Prior to data collection, I visited Burundi for a 
three-month period to test options for data collection and identify communities. During 
that visit, I realized the importance of building relationships to accurately understand 
choices about conflict. People who have lived through conflict, fought in conflict, and run 
from conflict have deeply personal relationships to those experiences – they are their 
own. During this post-war period in Burundi, interviewees risked being identified and 
targeted if they shared information with the wrong group or person. They also expressed 
a desire for their story to be their own – willing to share, but not with someone they did 
not trust. There was a deliberate time period between interviews to account for this and 
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slowly build on the information we discussed as they came to know my reputation and to 
know me personally.  
 
Case Selection 
	
 
Burundi was chosen as a location for this case study because it fits in many ways 
with existing predictive models, yet defies their underlying logic. This case could 
Figure	1.		Map	of	Research	Sites	
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illuminate why current theories seem to work on the surface, but are weak in explaining 
how violence occurs and reoccurs and the contingency of large-scale conflict. I 
researched countries with long histories of ethnic civil war and deep structural economic 
and social inequality, and which resolved their wars on the basis of peace negotiations 
instead of military victory (all predictors for recurring violence). Because civil wars and 
conflicts are difficult to compare based on varying definitions and criteria, I used the list 
of all UN peacekeeping missions to narrow my cases (for a list of all UN missions, see 
Appendix A; United Nations 2010). This allowed me access to documentation on the 
level of success in peace negotiations, as well as information on the nature of each 
conflict. It also facilitated accurate comparisons of conflict, as reports use standardized 
definitions of civil war, genocide, ethnic conflict, and other important key terms.  
In my research, I examine individual choices for political action in a country that 
has a history of civil war, reached formal peace agreements (indicating that there was a 
time where fighting officially ended, and all parties were making progress towards 
peace), and is now experiencing another rise in violent political conflict. In order to 
execute research through in-depth interviews, which are dependent on memories and 
perceptions, I prioritized research in countries that successfully signed peace agreements 
between 2002 and 2007 (between five and ten years prior to my research design phase). 
This provided a unique window to observe the peace-building process in the immediate 
post-conflict period while mitigating problems with recollections of past events. Burundi 
was the most recent country to sign a peace agreement that fit these criteria. It provides 
the best case to analyze why current predictive models fail to accurately explain 
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recurrence of civil war and why countries that have reached successful peace agreements 
remain vulnerable to violent conflict. We can make inferences about these larger 
questions by examining individual political affiliations and forms of participation at the 
local level. 
 
Geographic Focus 
Individuals were selected in both rural and urban areas in order to account for 
variation in networks, grievances, and political resources in these different environments. 
I used a snowball sampling method, beginning with members who played key political 
roles in each community. In this case, participants were asked to notify other individuals 
who may have been willing to be subjects in this study. I asked them, along with a 
research assistant, to introduce us to people that they trusted on a personal level, but with 
whom they did not participate in politics. This was intended to ensure confidence 
between researchers and participants and that we took advantage of other types of 
networks that did not necessarily function for political action to avoid biasing our 
understanding of how networks and social ties function in this realm. To further ensure I 
gathered data on a variety of groups, I used different starting points in each community: 
members of civil society, members of local political leadership, and members of 
community groups and organizations (this includes churches, local NGOs, and other 
groups not directly associated with politics). Building rapport with these individuals 
facilitated the interview process with others in communities, and they then were able to 
put me in touch with others. Because of time constraints, I limited my sample by drawing 
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from two neighborhoods in Bujumbura Mairie, the country’s capital, and two communes 
each in the provinces of Bujumbura (Rural), Bubanza, and Cibitoke. 
 
Table 1. Site Selection by Province 
Province Site 1 Site 2 
Bujumbura Mairie 
(Capital) Kanyosha Kamenge 
Bujumbura Rural Kabezi Gitaza 
Cibitoke Rugombo Buganda 
Bubanza Bubanza Muzinda 
 
This sample includes the capital, the surrounding province, and the Rusizi Plain 
area to the north of the capital. After initial discussions with organizations, this region 
was identified to be at high risk for violence during this time period since the main 
opposition group, the Forces national de liberation (FNL) had the strongest support in 
Bujumbura Rural and Bujumbura Mairie. Moreover, the group continued to come into 
Bujumbura through Cibitoke and Bubanza into the Kibira forest, east of Bubanza. At the 
same time, these four provinces also boast the highest levels of membership in the 
Burundi Red Cross, indicating high levels of community participation. Rather than 
attempting to sample a group that is perfectly representative of the population, my intent 
was to sample a group that maximized and showcased the diversity of political 
participation. This can reveal how people make these choices differently and highlight 
possible pressures with regard to participation. Because these provinces also exhibited the 
earliest signs of reemerging political violence after the 2010 elections, they were 
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excellent sites for comparisons between those who choose peaceful politics and those 
who participate in violence.  
Since land issues and conflicts pose a major risk in the country, I attempted to 
control for this factor by picking areas dealing with a mix of two main issues in the post-
conflict period.  
1. Returnee populations and competing claims to land (most often inter-
familial): On the one hand, land conflict in the south is highly influenced by 
the large refugee population in neighboring Tanzania and the political 
implications of decisions to return land to these refugees.  
2. Intra-familial claims to land: In the north, on the other hand, conflicts have 
more commonly stemmed from disagreements over inheritance, as 
overpopulation has aggravated tensions and local-level corruption has fueled 
frustration over access to justice. 
 
Semi-Structured In-Depth Interviews 
I lived and worked in Burundi from June 2011 to September 2011, and then again 
from January 2012 until June 2017. During my first three months, I set up plans and 
focused on the research design. I also worked as a program officer for an organization 
called BAHO-Burundi, which advocated for women and children in prisons. As I worked 
in the prison, in the surrounding communities, and with other local NGOs, I began to 
develop connections with key actors in the aforementioned regions. These key actors 
included war victims, refugees, ex-combatants, civil society actors, police, military, local 
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politicians, and clergy, as well as active members of 4 of the country’s 12 largest political 
groups: the Conseil national pour la défense de démocratie-Forces pour la défense de 
démocratie (CNDD-FDD), FNL, Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), and 
Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA). From there, I relied on a snowball sampling 
method to make further connections in these communities in order to capture a wide 
range of political participation in my sample. Ultimately, I surveyed 91 people across the 
four provinces.  
Interviews were essentially “political histories” and included questions about 
experiences with the past civil war, as well as current opinions on politics. Questions 
focused on which factors push and pull individuals into making different choices about 
political action in a post-war society. Each interview took between 30 minutes and two 
hours and each participant was interviewed at least twice, with several months in between 
the interviews to allow for trust to build over time. These interviewees constituted a wide 
range of candidates who could have participated in political violence, though not all of 
them did. Respondents were grouped into four categories based on their choices for 
action:  - Participants in violence - Those who rejected the idea of participating in politics - Participants in politics (affiliated with a group) who do not engage in violence - Those who reject political groups and violence, but remain politically engaged 
I analyzed and compared the experiences of those who fell into these categories. 
This process shed light on how and why different factors (including relationships and 
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social ties) influence choices concerning political action. I also analyzed interviews to 
trace how micro-level incentives and interactions engage with the macro-level factors 
discussed in leading theories on recurring civil war. In addition to asking about past and 
current experiences with political leadership and organizations, I also inquired about 
ethnicity and grievances, hoping to capture how these factors influence choice. Answers 
may illuminate how macro-level factors translate into different types of political action of 
individuals. 
All interviews were conducted with the help of my translator, Gwladys, who is 
fluent in English, French, Kirundi, and Swahili. The main language spoken in Burundi is 
Kirundi, with French as the other official language; however, due to the country’s history 
with war and the large population of refugees and internally displaced persons, many 
people speak a mixture of these four languages. In view of the sensitive subject matter in 
the interviews and the class hierarchy associated with these languagesi, it was important 
that respondents felt they could communicate in whichever language they were most 
comfortable.  
 
Supporting Data: Participant Observation, Key Interviews, and Survey Data 
After outlining my research case, sites, and methods during my initial field visit, I 
conducted fieldwork in the four provinces over the course of a year, from May 2012 to 
May 2013. During this time, I also collected quantitative data on exposure to violence in 
conjunction with organizations in Cibitoke and the Rusizi Plain region, which crosses 
Burundi and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This border is highly porous, and 
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contacting people on both sides of the border allowed me to nuance issues of armed 
violence and fully access perspectives and experience of those who are “living in 
Cibitoke” – even though many of them work or sell goods in the DRC. Working with 
these organizations, I engaged in participant observation while attending community 
meetings and public events, where I could also capture discussions and engagements 
between people on the following issues concerning their communities: women and men 
in communities, police, military, and local government.  
In addition, I identified 22 individuals as “leaders” within their groups, for a total 
of 113 respondents. These were people given specific positions as government 
representatives, party leaders, and civil society and media representatives. Their 
experiences were recorded to give depth and context to information gathered from 
community respondents, to better understand recruitment and the strategies used by 
political groups and civil society organizations to encourage membership, and to capture 
how decisions made by leadership affected and were affected by conflict dynamics. 
 
Burundi’s History of Political Participation 
“I said the time was right for politics to come back to Burundi. We stayed in 
touch until I was convinced it was time to come. And they came. That is how I 
started. We could work on all issues, policies and sensitize people. There was a 
possibility to change things.” 
- Interview with a former political opposition leader 
 
The documentation of popular political participation in Burundi is relatively weak 
compared to other states. It is not typically characterized as a country with communal 
interest in politics (for violence, yes, but the broader spectrum of political action remains 
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weak). Historically, Burundi’s state exercised strong monarchical leadership – though 
less centralized than neighboring Rwanda’s. Many scholars have explained the variances 
in the two countries’ histories through state power and control, ethnic divisions, and 
differing structures of the monarchy. 
 In Burundi, the monarchy was stronger than in Rwanda in the post-colonial 
period, since Rwanda’s monarchy was effectively ousted from power with a vote for a 
Republic. Prince Louis Rwagaswore in Burundi led UPRONA as a nationalist movement 
both before and after independence, maintaining popular support and resisting ethnic 
division he believed was aggravated by the Belgians. However, Rwagasore’s 
assassination by pro-Belgian opposition sparked conflict both between and within parties. 
The state had become an important guarantor of power, resources, and opportunities for 
those in control in the post-colonial period, and Burundi was no exception. A void 
remained in the wake of Rwagasore’s death and the elimination of the royal family 
group, the Ganwa. Burundi’s two largest ethnic groups, further divided by their 
relationships to the royal family, found themselves at odds in the aftermath. Tutsi, who 
traditionally had more wealth and were better connected to royal family lines, housed two 
competing groups that were interested in maintaining their privileges: Tutsi-Hima and 
Tutsi-Banyaruguru.ii Hima Tutsi were pastoralists in the south, while Tutsi Banyaruguru 
in the north traditionally had closer ties to the monarchy. At the same time, a smaller 
group of Hutu elite who had political roles in the previous system saw new opportunities 
for access, while the Twa – Burundi’s smallest ethnic group – remained with few 
opportunities for political power (Uvin, 1999).  
	 28	
	
In Rwanda, the Ganwa ruling family did not exist. Instead, the ruling king was 
Tutsi, and ethnic groups were much more directly separated. Hutu and Twa did not have 
any access to the political system. Colonial administration strengthened this divide, 
particularly in Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1970). Tutsi domination was carried from the pre-
colonial monarch into the modern state structure, contributing to ethnic polarization both 
politically and economically. The post-colonial state inherited this polarized context and 
continued policies that excluded groups on the basis of ethnicity. However, in Rwanda, a 
referendum was held to decide whether it would become a republic or continue the 
monarchy – a decision that ended with a Hutu-controlled republic.  
While many have relied state structure to explain the varying conflicts in these 
two countries, the existence of conflict is prevalent in both. Burundi’s post-colonial 
history was highly unstable; since independence, the country went through six 
governments between 1962 and 1966, the dissolution of the monarchy in 1966, four 
successful coup d’états (1966, 1976, 1987, 1996), three major waves of massacres in 
1972 and 1988, and the catalyst for its most recent civil war: the assassination of the first 
democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye (Daley, 2007). The country 
then experienced another massacre in 1993 that marked the beginning of the violence. 
Rwanda’s government managed to hold power, but not without pushing back Tutsi 
citizens through violent suppression and the use of ethnic quotas (reducing their role in 
and limiting access to education and political power). Ethnicity was politicized and 
resulted in deadly massacres in both contexts in the fight over access to political and 
military power.iii  
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There is a lack of understanding in this context about the communities and their 
relationships to the state, particularly as part of these events. While both countries 
experienced a longstanding struggle for state power, the Rwandan state maintained power 
through suppression of the Tutsi minority, whereas Burundi’s history during the same 
time period is marked by several coups within the same group. In both states, power 
divisions between Hutu and Tutsi became increasingly significant (and brutal) as the 
same ethnic group maintained control of the state into the early 1990s. In fact, despite 
Burundi’s power changes, the country maintained relatively similar national indicators to 
Rwanda, and the state implemented important programs that made them more resilient 
than Rwanda to famine (Manirakiza, 2009). Thus, while Burundi’s instability was of 
paramount importance within these elite groups and the violence that ensued due to 
infighting undoubtedly impacted the population, it is less clear how Burundian people 
reacted to these changes in power: did they see them as relatively inconsequential to daily 
life – distant squabbles among the elite that they hoped to stay out of entirely – or were 
they invested in these power struggles and their possible consequences for rural 
communities? 
I argue that there is an underestimated history of political participation that has 
been largely overlooked in Burundi. In fact, despite the government party’s relative 
weakness in terms of intra-group control, it is the strength of Burundi’s state as a central 
provider of resources and security that spawned the fight for its control. However, 
because formal political opposition groups could not survive under this state, this 
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political action took place through informal avenues – namely, community organizing 
that led to the formation of formal groups outside of Burundi’s borders.  
We must first understand the evolution of political participation and how it has 
filtered into social life throughout history. Without this, we cannot discuss participation 
in its current state. In the pre-colonial period, outside of the aforementioned lineages 
defined through clan relationships, the majority of Burundians engaged in political and 
social life solely at the local level. Social life was organized with strict regulations and 
customs within clans, much of which revolved around surviving relationships with other 
clans. These clans and families recognized that they were subject to rule by the Baganwa 
(Ganwa royal family), and these respected rules between families were organized to 
manage conflicts and relations between groups. However, trade and interaction between 
clans extended beyond those under Baganwa rule to areas outside modern Burundi 
borderlines. Specifically, clan life and decision-making were guided not by the king, but 
by local chiefs and Bashingantahe at the communal level. Still a key part of community 
structure in Burundi today, the Bashingantahe were considered the ones who “tell the 
truth” in communities – not chiefs, but local community leaders who influenced 
important decisions, particularly in managing conflicts. 
Under the rule of Germany, and later Belgium, the organization of this system 
changed. The centralization of the state and the new rules of taxation, regulation, and 
trade reshaped how many clans had organized social and political life. The brutality of 
colonialism, particularly in the transition to Belgian rule, indicated that this structure was 
not a passing change in leadership that could be ignored. The Belgians depended on the 
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royal family to extend their rule to the local chiefs, with whom they had varying levels of 
interaction. Baganwa took advantage of this dependency to exert their own power, and 
chiefs followed suit in order to gain power. This competition was exacerbated by the 
Belgian decision to cut chiefdoms – particularly among the Hutu majority. Some of the 
chiefs began to actively take part in the system and find ways to further their own local 
political ambitions within the larger colonial structure by enforcing tax laws and policing 
borders. This was not passive obedience on the part of chiefs; rather, chiefs and the 
Baganwaiv ruling family themselves used systems like taxation and imprisonment to gain 
power for their own clans over others (Wagner 1991). Only 3 of the original 27 Hutu 
chiefdoms survived the initial cuts, and by 1945, there were none remaining.  
However, there were also acts of resistance to this leadership. In Wagner’s (1991) 
anthropological study of the Baragane, a clan located close to the border of Tanzania, she 
noted that groups often continued to defy the regulations of Belgian rule out of necessity, 
despite the risks. In fact, within some groups, it became a coming-of-age symbol to cross 
the border to trade with the neighboring Ha people, which provided more lucrative gains 
than trade within Burundi. Others, as a result of the continued risk and consequence of 
this trade, decided to leave altogether: 
… to live in Buragane [the area populated by the Baragane]… meant to live 
under a rigorous and Zungu-strengthened Baganwa regime. To move to Buha 
meant to live under less centralized but sometimes less secure (particularly for 
newcomers) Ha rule, with different Bazungu, different obligations and 
constraints. In succeeding years, Baragane continued to choose emigration.v 
 
Burundi clan relationships with the central state were therefore complex and varied. 
Several tactics were employed in responding to this new system, and they were often 
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based on the existing balance of opportunities and relationships. The actual wars being 
fought for control of Burundi may not have concerned chiefs, but their consequences 
certainly did. It is evident from this example that political, social, and economic functions 
were heavily intertwined, all of which influenced how clans reacted to Belgian rule. 
Moreover, the results were not uniform, but rather made up of conscious decision-
making. 
 How did these relationships to the state translate into the post-colonial period? By 
the time Burundi achieved independence and eventually transitioned into a republic, the 
ethnic dimension of the fight had amplified. The power of Burundi’s kingdom was based 
on the ability to provide protection through unity against famine and internal tragedy, as 
well as against those outside of Burundi. As the system was delegitimized under Belgian 
rule, the people of Burundi allied themselves with the king, who actually incorporated 
Hutu leadership into the regime. However, elite groups continued to struggle for power 
among themselves, and when the king was overthrown and the system was declared a 
republic in 1966, Hutu inclusion was no longer a priority. During this time, all exchanges 
of power – including four coups – occurred within the same political party until 1993.  
Meanwhile, those who could not find a place in the system either revolted against 
it or began to leave the country. A series of Hutu rebellions were quashed in 1969, 1972, 
and 1988 and met with violent repression. In 1972, the government killed approximately 
150,000 Hutu citizens in retaliation for a rebellion that resulted in the deaths of between 
2,000 and 3,000 Tutsi. This government’s reaction is known as the 1972 crisis, but 
debated as the country’s first genocide: a planned effort to eliminate Hutu intellectuals 
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and those in any positions of wealth or power, particularly those who worked for the 
government or were in the military. An additional estimated 150,000 refugees left the 
country to neighboring Tanzania, Rwanda, and the DRC (Uvin, 1999; Lemarchand, 
2009).  
 During this time, the state was an apparatus of the elite, largely benefiting trade 
and business in ways that supported those in power. There are competing understandings 
of the function of government at this time. On the one hand, scholars who have 
documented Burundi’s history have often noted that, compared to Rwanda, it had a better 
record in terms of service provision to the people, for example in offering higher quality 
protection against famine (Manirakiza, 2008; Twagiramungu, 2014). However, though it 
was superior to Rwanda at the time, Burundi’s service provision was overall still 
extremely weak. Weakened structures connecting the central ruling unit to the people 
resulted in a reduction of participation at the local level and an increase in the gap 
between these two groups. Much of the infighting rested within a single group, as they 
collectively reduced access to this power for all others.  
Movements instead developed outside the borders of Burundi in neighboring 
countries. The Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu (PALIPEHUTU), characterized as 
an extremist political group for “Hutu power,” began to build their ranks throughout the 
1980s among the mass of refugees in Mishamo camp in Tanzania. At the same time, the 
Burundi Worker’s Party (Umugambwe wa'Bakozi Uburundi; UBU) emerged as a 
clandestine party with communist leanings among a group of refugees in Rwanda. The 
Burundi Worker’s Party later evolved into the Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi 
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(FRODEBU), an ethnically mixed party that set up Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, as their 
presidential candidate in 1993.  
Again, this period witnessed a variety of reactions to an oppressive regime: the 
Mishamo camp stirring an aggressive anti-Tutsi narrative with the intent to “reclaim” 
Burundi, a mixed group of refugees in Rwanda building a peaceful underground political 
campaign, other refugees in Tanzania assimilating fully into communities with no 
intention of returning, and those still in Burundi who supported these movements. Surely, 
there were passive Burundians who were uninterested in politics, but one activist who 
was interviewed made a point to distinguish between inaction and prudence, saying, 
“Waiting for the right moment to act is not the same thing as passivity.” Thus, while 
Burundian political engagement during this time appeared weak and completely 
dismantled at the surface, it was in fact being reorganized and reimagined, both within 
and outside of the country’s borders.  
 
“Maybe violence was not the only way to achieve democracy, but the history of Ndadaye 
made it so.” – Interview with a political activist in Bujumbura 
 
By the 1980s, the two main political movements, PALIPEHUTU and FRODEBU, 
were on the rise. Members of both groups who were interviewed mentioned “education” 
and “sensitization” of the population in Burundi. Their approach was to start with local 
ties to support a change in the vision of the population itself, which was restricted by 
ethnicity in its access to higher education and economic opportunity. However, the two 
groups were fundamentally at odds; while they had a common goal to defeat UPRONA, 
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that was the extent of their commonalities. PALIPEHUTU fundamentally distrusted the 
Tutsi UPRONA regime and believed the only way to defeat them was through a violent 
overthrow; many of the more extreme members promoted the idea that the Tutsi 
population as a whole bore responsibility for the oppressive regime that existed. In 
contrast, FRODEBU believed in negotiation, the formation of a formal party, and 
democratic elections. They also believed they could work with president Pierre Buyoya, 
who seemed to be a more moderate leader than his predecessor, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza.vi 
They were also a party of mixed ethnicity, rendering doubt among PALIPEHUTU, but 
FRODEBU members believed they could be genuine allies to The Hutu people for a 
more equal and just society. One political leader explained:  
When a Hutu complains, he doesn’t have to explain to me because I already know 
what the problem is. You are not able to bury your parents; you don’t have access 
to scholarships. I ended up in a political movement for Hutus, not because I feel I 
am a Hutu, but because I feel the same feeling of oppression. I have empathy for 
what is happening.  
 
These two groups were instead brought together with the help of Burundian civil 
society organizations that were supporting political awareness in Burundi. The Ligue 
Iteka, who received support from both groups to advocate for the freedom of leaders who 
were being jailed at the time, slowly built relationships between the two groups, as 
FRODEBU supported Ligue Iteka in arranging the freedom of key leaders for 
PALIPEHUTU. One of the key organizers for UBU, and later FRODEBU, spoke about 
the relationship between the groups and their manner of mobilizing people in the country: 
By 1993, there was a kind of contract between FRODEBU and PALIPEHUTU. 
When we linked with PALIPEHUTU, I told Melchior that it was dangerous, but 
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he said, ‘No, we will have to manage it … all of those people were inside the 
country; we were in total clandestinity. Melchior was working in a rural 
cooperative, working with peasants, and the project was across the whole country. 
He could circulate the country, and it helped him to create a network and there 
was the sense that there could be a change. 
 
Indeed, Melchior Ndadaye, the Hutu leader of FRODEBU, likely understood the 
tension of this relationship, but without a pact between the groups, there could not have 
been a chance for success in the 1993 elections. Pierre Buyoya allowed FRODEBU to 
run, but political activists agree that he likely did not understand that he could actually 
lose the elections, failing to realize the extent of the grassroots approach to organizing the 
opposition had undertaken. Under international pressure to shift toward democratic rule, 
he believed he was allowing the party to run without having to give up power – but the 
organizing and community campaigning of FRODEBU won. The FRODEBU organizers 
have said that they actually proposed a different model to Buyoya, hoping that he would 
permit a slow integration of Hutu people into political power in order to support a 
stronger and more unified government:  
There were two failures. We had everything. The only weakness we had was that 
we did not have enough Tutsi; they were afraid. Being in a movement led by 
mainly Hutu was a kind of treason, according to them. That was one failure, and 
the second was the fact we didn't succeed to convince Buyoya to postpone real 
democracy for ten years. We suggested this to him, but in vain. He thought being 
elected himself would be easy, and once elected he would ensure that the 
legislative power would also rest with UPRONA.vii We said, ‘okay - you can be 
elected in the presidential [election], and during the campaign we will campaign 
for you and the one elected will have a ten-year mandate. Because we are pretty 
sure we will win afterwards.’ We wanted Buyoya to protect the army and the first 
ministry with Ndadaye in it; but we saw the mentality of the people was not ready 
for a Hutu [president] to change an army to be mixed. That is why it was so 
important to do it slowly. He refused, because he was convinced he would win 
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through UPRONA and the label of extremist. He wouldn’t consider our proposal. 
He was greedy. 
 
Instead, facing pressure to transition to a democracy after himself coming into power 
through a coup d’état, Buyoya agreed that they would run in the elections as a full party 
with no exceptions. Regardless of what Buyoya’s beliefs may have been about his 
chances of winning, once the elections were finished Buyoya respected his agreement 
with FRODEBU. He stepped down as president for Ndadaye to take his place.  
When Ndadaye was abducted and assassinated three months later, it was not clear 
who had orchestrated the events. Members of the army had committed the initial acts, 
targeting Ndadaye and the members of his administration. However, the orchestrators 
remain unknown, and the speeches inciting retaliation began almost immediately. 
Massacres of Tutsi overtook the country one day after Ndadaye’s assasination. Leaders 
within FRODEBU said they tried to gain control of the situation and keep the situation 
calm, but several interviewees believed they supported the organization of the massacres. 
One journalist noted that the most interesting thing about this moment in history was that 
no political leadership seemed interested in finding out the truth about who bears the 
responsibility for the massacres. His remarks bore a similar general mistrust of political 
leadership that was pervasive in many interviews. Scholars generally consider these 
killings to be disorganized, as those participating in the retaliatory killings did not have 
one leader or group to which they belonged; at the same time, they were also organized in 
the sense that speeches launched on the radio incited the violence. In fact, several 
interviewees noted hearing radio speeches that “warned” of a possible coup, telling 
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people to stop the coup if it happened by destroying bridges, cutting trees, and capturing 
and restraining those involved in the coup.  
The grassroots approach to organizing and the lack of control that any one group 
seemed to command in the aftermath of elections display the importance of local 
community politics and participation in the trajectory of the subsequent war. Following 
this logic, it is not surprising that the war did not occur uniformly across provinces and 
communes, but instead manifested across Burundi in drastically different forms. The 
resulting massacres launched a continuing debate about whether these events should be 
considered a planned genocide (particularly considering that PALIPEHUTU’s rhetoric 
and ideology mirrored that of the Rwandan Interahamwe, who committed genocide only 
six months later) or a spontaneous uprising in response to the assassination of the first 
Hutu president.  
In Burundi, the role of local leadership, the power of clandestine organization at 
the communal level, and local forms of resistance are all paramount to understanding 
how the country has maintained peace and fallen into violence. The king’s power 
originated from an ability to collaborate with local chiefs, and these same chiefs and local 
leaders played a central role in shaping the success of colonial rule and the ruling 
structure that followed. Related to the question of war and violence specifically, theorists 
have missed this important element, prioritizing the role of the state and struggles for 
leadership in central positions of power between elites. While these elements are surely 
essential to understanding Burundi’s history, the resulting characterization of the majority 
of Burundians as insignificant to their own history would be incorrect in this case. 
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Literature portraying Burundians as completely removed from these political processes 
has misinterpreted a lack of engagement in formal political processes as apathy. A 
majority of Burundians may have been unconcerned with the personalities in power; 
however, they did employ important narratives about the groups that maintained power, 
which were much more powerful for political mobilization (both peaceful and violent).  
These narratives and accounts clearly convey that political mobilization was not 
formed as one violent opposition to government, but rather as a wide variety of political 
actions under constant negotiation at the individual and group levels. To be a member of 
PALIPEHUTU was to prepare for armed conflict – until alliances between FRODEBU 
and PALIPHUTU necessitated that it meant campaigning for and supporting the 
FRODEBU candidate for the presidency. To be a member of the Ligue Iteka was to 
continuously fight for human rights through legal means, which involved pursuing the 
freedom of opposition groups to organize (though the members of Ligue Iteka were not 
necessarily all members of these political groups). To be a chief or a member of the 
bashingantahe at this time entailed key decision-making about community access to 
information and understanding of their own role in political action. For community 
members not in leadership positions, political action required waiting for these 
opportunities to become apparent. All of these group memberships and types of political 
action were constantly being defined and redefined, and in a wholly non-linear process. 
Political action can therefore present itself in a diverse set of ways, even in environments 
such as Burundi where political action appears to be static.  
In the current post-conflict era, Burundi teeters on the cusp of a devolution into 
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violence again, and has continued in this fashion since all parties signed peace 
agreements. Many political parties today consolidated from the disparate groups that 
originally developed in the aftermath of Ndadaye’s assassination. Namely, CNDD-FDD 
and PALIPEHUTU-FNL were the largest parties to form. In 2000, CNDD-FDD signed a 
peace agreement together with all other groups, except for the FNL. When the parliament 
elected them to power in 2005 as a transitional government, they fought against the FNL, 
who contested the validity of negotiations and the Arusha Accord peace agreement that 
other groups had signed. Once FNL signed an agreement in 2008, opportunities for 
political participation in upcoming elections seemed to expand; however, a highly 
contested 2010 election incited a string of killings of both opposition members and 
CNDD-FDD members, and the possibility of war once again.  
In the following chapters, this dissertation explores the complexity of this time 
period, both during and after the war, in which Burundi has maintained a fragile stability 
following the war. The second chapter shows how rhetoric is used in recruitment and 
mobilization to create competing narratives around identity, which become more 
influential to participation than the identity itself. It examines participants and non-
participants in violence to understand the variety of choices available and how 
individuals explain the choices they made during this time period. The third chapter 
argues that the social upheaval during periods of conflict creates a space where groups 
with other minority statuses (such as women, or smaller ethnic groups) experience 
heightened abuses during war, but also find new opportunities to enter political space. 
The chapter looks at women in particular, as a political minority often under theorized as 
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actors in war and with a new and growing potential to shape the politics of peace and 
conflict as they occupy public space. The fourth chapter posits that “at risk” and 
“vulnerable” groups like youth are much more diverse than theories allow for, and show 
much greater diversity in types of political participation than previous generations. The 
chapter utilizes the theory of generational location to understand A) specific mechanisms 
used to mobilize youth and B) the broadening range of political participation for younger 
generations. The last chapter builds on the previous chapter, arguing that the role of 
media and informal associations in politics has shifted in the post-conflict period, 
engaging the population in new ways, while also triggering predictions of war and 
possible breakdown of the state.  																																																								
i Mastery of languages was highly associated with access to education, which was limited for the 
majority of the population. One of the main tenants of the war was the targeting of educated Hutu 
people and the limitations placed upon them with regards to entry into secondary school and 
University. 
 
ii Tutsi in the middle (those at the royal court, the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, socially higher than the 
ordinary pastoralists, the Tutsi-Hima), the Hutu at the lower level, and the Twa at the bottom. 
Both countries were kingdoms, though they varied slightly in structure. Burundi housed a more 
complex social hierarchy within its ruling structure, with a king and a class of princes at the top, 
Tutsi in the middle with varying levels of power (the Tutusi Banyanguru were part of the royal 
court, located in the north, and of higher social status than the pastoralist Tutsi-Hima, who lived 
more in the south), the Hutu at the lower level (with some groups having access to lower-level 
political positions), and the Twa at the bottom. In Rwanda, the political and social hierarchy 
between Tutsi (who included the king among their ranks), Hutu, and Twa was stricter and lacked 
the overflow and interaction between ethnic groups that characterized Burundi (Uvin 1999). 
iii  In the case of Burundi, the word genocide is debated for some of these massacres, but 1994 in 
Rwanda is recognized as genocide. 
 
iv The term Baganwa refers to the “Ganwa people.” Ba is a prefix used to denote a group of 
people. Similarly, “Bu” indicates “the place of,” such as in Burundi, “the place of the Barundi,” 
or Buragane, “the place of the Baragane.” 
 
v The term “Zungu” in the above quote refers to foreigners, in this case the Belgian 
colonists. The other “Bazungu” in control of the Ha territory were the British, who colonized 
Tanzania. The British had no interest in controlling this trade relationship and therefore 
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provided more space for the Baragane to continue their relationship with the Ha. 
 
vi Bagaza ordered the 1972 genocide of Hutus and implemented harsh restrictions to eliminate 
Hutu political, social, and economic power in the country. While Buyoya upheld many of these 
restrictions, in his response to a 1988 uprising (and again, a subsequent massacre of Hutus), 
Buyoya began to open positions to Hutus within government and military and made a 
commitment to improving relations between Hutus and Tutsis. 
 
vii The legislative elections followed the presidential elections at the time. FRODEBU members 
have argued that Buyoya believed that once he won the presidential elections, all momentum 
would be gone for anyone to vote in the legislative elections for FRODEBU, ensuring full power 
for UPRONA in the upcoming mandate.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
POLITICAL RHETORIC AND ETHIC NARRATIVES THAT SHAPED 
VIOLENCE DURING AND AFTER THE WAR 
 
Introduction 
Conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in East Africa is well documented; the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda and continued fighting in the eastern DRC have garnered 
international attention from both media and academics. However, just to the south, lesser-
known Burundi has also faced decades of ethnic violence, civil war, and a series of coups 
and massacres. Unlike its counterparts, the salience of ethnicity seems to have taken a 
backdrop to another type of conflict: one of interests and competing visions of success for 
Burundi. After five years of relative peace, Burundi is returning to a state of conflict, 
except the conversation has changed. Instead of conflict occurring between Hutu and 
Tutsi, the fighting is within the Hutu ethnic group and between political parties, mainly 
the FNL and the major party in power, the CNDD-FDD. What happened to the ethnic 
conflicts of Burundi’s past, and why are Hutu citizens engaging in violence today? While 
Burundi’s return toward violence is not cause for optimism, its basis in interests rather 
than ethnicity is no small detail. This suggests that current violence is a progression 
towards something new – the consequence of new conflicts and debates, rather than a fall 
backwards towards old tensions. 
In my research, each commune sampled was ethnically, politically, and 
economically diverse and exhibited recent signs of rising political violence. I began by 
approaching the chef de zoneviii in each area, who then introduced me to people in each 
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neighborhood. With my research assistant, I identified two to three other initial points of 
contact in the area once we received approval to continue our work. Interview data 
suggest that individuals had significantly different post-conflict experiences that shaped 
their current political beliefs. However, it should be noted that this does not imply the 
erasure of identity. Instead, Hutu people of all political affiliations remained attached to 
their ethnic experiences, though they do not make the same conclusions from them.  
This chapter first reviews the broader role of ethnicity in conflict and examines 
ethnic and political divisions in Burundi’s case. Following this contextual groundwork, 
the chapter explores the way that the two largest rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD and the 
FNL, used different ethnic narratives to shape the identities of followers, garner support 
and maintain loyalty during the war. I posit that the moral value attached to these 
narratives gave two groups, both fighting under the same ethnic Hutu identity, competing 
sets of standards and goals that set them up for conflict in the post-conflict era. The next 
section focuses on this post-conflict era and how ethnic narratives have been employed 
by both parties to legitimize their own party politics, separating themselves from other 
groups and contributing to political gridlock.  
While ethnicity remains central throughout, what is most important from this 
chapter is that ethnicity is actually a malleable concept that is utilized to evoke ideas 
about a moral and just society. The moral value attached to ethnic rhetoric is utilized to 
develop deeper relationships with people who mobilize as part of a group, and those who 
believe in the moral value of these narratives displayed higher levels of group loyalty. 
Thus, in the present day, ethnic narratives reemerge to support the legitimacy of different 
	 45	
	
political groups relying on popular buy-in of these competing visions for Hutu liberation 
and emancipation.  
 
Literature Explaining the Role of Ethnicity in Conflict 
The literature on ethnic conflict is wide-ranging and difficult to engage with, as 
there is not even an agreed-upon set of questions that concepts of ethnicity can help us 
answer (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). Approaches to understanding conflict vary from 
examining macro-level data of nations to conducting surveys at the individual level. As 
stated previously in Chapter One, ethnic conflicts are much more likely to recur than 
other types (political conflicts, for example), and several scholars attribute this likelihood 
to the less flexible nature of ethnic identity. Some of the major theses that I address in 
this paper concern the role of ethnicity as a motivating factor in conflict. 
Even so, cultural identities are socially constructed, and many posit that this kind 
of research oversimplifies the role of identity in conflict (Gurr, 1993; Korpi, 1974, 
Lindstrom and Moore, 1997; Tilly, 1978). Even ethnic identities are culturally fashioned, 
interpreted, and reproduced. In essence, the meanings associated with ethnic identities 
have the ability to change over time, and their relevance to conflict may change as well. 
Many theorists have suggested that ethnicity is dynamic, and its relationship to 
ideological and other cultural identities cannot be separated so easily (Gurr, 2000).  
However, this argument assumes that those who wholeheartedly adhere to their 
ethnic identity will also adhere to the terms of its construction, rather than differing 
greatly within a given group. In short, this body of work posits that ethnic identity is 
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difficult to escape and tends to “stick.” Many studies that reject this argument focus on 
other factors that may construct ethnic divides rather than analyzing the changing 
dynamics of ethnic identity itself for those who maintain such an identity. Often, only a 
small minority of those who identify as part of an ethnic group may actually agree with 
the political parties and leaders that make choices on the basis of identity. In the 
Rwandan genocide, only 14-17% of those who identified as Hutu actually participated 
(Straus, 2006).  
Burundi’s case is an example of ethnic divisions between two groups that share 
the same language, history, and religion, and which lack more obvious physical 
distinctions (such as hair color, eye color, skin color, etc.). Some have argued that these 
are not real ethnicities in the traditional sense, but rather smaller divisions within a larger 
ethnic group, thus making them more malleable than “real” ethnic groups. Nevertheless, 
these identity-based divisions have been structured over time as ethnicities that are 
functionally rigid and dependent upon familial and regional divisions.ix  
This chapter demonstrates that while Burundi’s conflict may have shifted from 
ethnic division, this does not mean that ethnicity itself has become less salient in today’s 
society, or that this shift is related to changes in the structure of group belonging to Hutu 
and Tutsi ethnicities. Instead, I posit that regardless of the level of rigidity of ethnic 
divisions, within a group of people who identify as one ethnic group, there can be 
division and disagreement over the political significance of such an identity. This aspect 
of ethnicity – the divided interpretation of identity – is overlooked, yet vital to 
understanding participation in political violence. One must not reject the idea of being 
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Hutu to make different political choices than Hutu party leaders, and a sustained common 
Hutu identity should not suggest that individuals would not create new conflicts with new 
debates. 
Literature concerning African conflicts is particularly static in this regard. The 
clientelist state structure often referenced in conflict literature concerning Africa is noted 
for its maintenance of power through corruption and coercion, which eventually 
entrenches structural violence in the political field. Thus, ethnic and tribal divides are 
continuously “constructed,” promoting this cycle (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Allen, 1999).  
Youthx are said to be particularly vulnerable to this process, as they lack other 
networks and opportunities to draw upon for economic and social security (Bazenguissa-
Ganga, 1999; Durham, 2000). Unfortunately, this argument fails to explain why 
clientelist states in Africa still observe a wide diversity of opinion, (though citizens may 
be sanctioned for expression of these opinions). Furthermore, citizens continue to also 
disagree within their given ethnic groups on the value of using violence as a political tool 
(Sambanis, 2004; Cerwonka and Malkki, 2008).  
While some theorists have acknowledged the internal dynamics that shape and 
transform ethnic conflicts over time (Williams, 1994; Azar and Burton, 1986), theories 
still treat this evolution as random and unpredictable, rather than something that actors 
influence through their choices. Williams (1994) has noted that there are only rare 
accounts of interactive processes shaping interpretations of ethnic group membership. 
Social movements literature highlights some of these processes, including McAdam’s 
(1983) portrayal of “measures and counter-measures” between black civil rights activists 
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and their opponents. Morris (1984) has also discussed the strategies and tactics that shape 
mobilization and maintain membership. Political process theories emphasize how 
collective action evolves through the interactions between groups and a series of political 
opportunities (Gurr 1968, Boswell and Dixon 1990, Jenkins and Schock 1992), providing 
the initial theoretical foundation for Burundi’s case. 
Overall, this literature lacks in research that gives in-depth attention to the 
diversity within ethnic groups. Insufficient theorizing on the subject has led to the 
incorrect conclusion that wars in zones of ethnic conflict will remain based in ethnic 
conflict – a problematic assumption, particularly if the construction of new identities can 
no longer address current debates, which now require serious attention to disagreements 
on political, economic, and social policies. 
 
 
 
 
Wartime Ethnic Narratives and their Impact on Political Division 
Somewhat ominously, René Lemarchand wrote the following of Burundi just 
before the assassination of Ndadaye:  
One aspect of the emerging reality in Burundi is the vision of a multi-party 
democracy drawing its strength from a civil society free of ethnic conflict; another 
is that of a singularly fragile polity undermined by the instinctive fears and violent 
reactions of a Tutsi minority that sees itself at the mercy of a ruling Hutu majority 
(1994:187).  
 
In the same years, just across its northern border, Rwanda’s Hutu-led government 
was setting the stage for the 1994 genocide. Tutsi feared the reality of being a minority, 
both in terms of population and political power. When Pierre Buyoya stepped down after 
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losing the 1993 election to Ndadaye, people described this as a hopeful moment for the 
country. Buyoya, considered a Tutsi moderate for his measures integrating Hutu citizens 
into government, was the country’s first president to voluntarily transition from power. 
Unfortunately, with Buyoya gone, the fears of Tutsi extremists took control of their 
politics, and after just three months in office, Ndadaye and his staff were murdered. 
Killings following Ndadaye’s death seemed to be at least partly spontaneous, 
though political parties were also making use of the events to encourage killings 
(Reyntjens, 1995). Tutsi claimed they were victims of genocide – an attempt to wipe out 
the economic and educated elite – saved only by the Burundian Army. While this remains 
a point of debate, both sides were engaged in political violence; Tutsis were responsible 
for killing Hutus in the capital city and elsewhere. Strict segregation of neighborhoods on 
ethnic lines only encouraged separation, mistrust, and violence between the two groups 
(Uvin, 2009). One former member of the sans échec (“without failure”), a Tutsi youth 
militia group, remembered the experience:  
We acted without thinking. We would go into neighborhoods and kill people if 
they were Hutu… I was young, and I saw things to be much more simple than 
they were. I wouldn’t do the same thing, if I could do it again.  
 
Similarly, a Hutu ex-combatant commented on the segregation of neighborhoods 
and killings between them in the capital city: “At first, it was easy. The Hutu lived in 
their own quarters and Tutsi lived in their quarters. It was easy for Hutu people to 
continue to join the rebellion.”  
 
	 50	
	
Intra-ethnic Divisions in Burundi 
Despite the clear ethnic divisions in Burundi during this time, it would not be 
prudent to assume that Hutu and Tutsi were homogenous groups. Each group was 
comprised of both moderates and extremists. The two communities also included families 
and individuals who did not fit into a clear category like inter-married families, Twa 
ethnic minorities, and Swahili immigrants who helped weave the social fabric of the 
capital and other parts of the country at this time. Estimates placed the total amount of 
Hutu rebels at well over 20,000 (Daley, 2007). These rebels broke into separate groups 
during the war, the largest being the CNDD-FDD, followed by the FNL (Uvin, 2009). 
While individuals appear to have joined based on ethnicity, they became factionalized 
because of ideology. One of the founding members of the FNL and former chief of 
operations spoke of his disillusionment with the CNDD-FDD: 
We were supposed to fight against the Tutsi military. When we began to see how 
CNDD kept land for themselves, raped women, attacked buses and ordered 
people to take off their clothes…. forcing them to stand like the day they were 
born, we couldn’t stay with their fight.  
 
The FNL took hold of Bujumbura and the surrounding area, the province of Bujumbura 
Rural, in 1997, leaving the CNDD-FDD to fight in other parts of the country.  
In 1996, Pierre Buyoya staged a coup in order to restore order and begin 
negotiations between parties. He began to appoint Hutu citizens to office, preparing for a 
democratic transition to the next presidency. Negotiations began in 1997-1998, leading 
into peace talks in 2000 that the CNDD-FDD were not invited to attend. By August 2002, 
the government of Burundi and CNDD-FDD signed a ceasefire to begin talks, and after 
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some setbacks the Arusha Accords were signed in 2003. After the 2005 election of Pierre 
Nkurunziza, the leader of the CNDD-FDD, fighting continued for another year before all 
parties signed a peace agreement due to mistrust between groups (Daley, 2007). The 
result was a consociational democracy, wherein the government required representation 
of both Hutu and Tutsi groups. Today, Burundians do not harbor the same levels of 
ethnic suspicion that they once did for each other; at the local level, they have made great 
progress (Uvin, 2009). Even during current political tensions, studies have revealed that 
the population’s fear of an overall deterioration of ethnic relations is much stronger than 
their personal negative experiences with members of other ethnic groups (Search for 
Common Ground, 2016). 
The 2010 elections, deemed relatively free and fair by the international 
community, marked a clear shift (one that had already been growing in previous years) in 
the dynamics of conflict. While technically in a peaceful, post-conflict period, tensions 
developed between once-allied rebel groups, resulting in a string of assassinations of 
local leaders in the major political parties. The assassinations, combined with claims by 
opposition groups that the government tampered with the electoral process, resulted in a 
challenge of the ruling party’s legitimacy, a curtailing of free speech, and an unexpected 
rise in killings between members of political parties (United Nations, 2010). These 
dynamics were no longer shaped by rhetoric against opposing ethnic groups, but rather by 
rhetoric against formerly allied groups. These divisions continued to pose a challenge to 
the ruling party and devolved into a crisis in 2015 following protests against 
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Nkurunziza’s third term as president, a failed coup d’état, and the cordoning off of 
neighborhoods associated with protests.  
 
The Relationship between Ethnicity and Politics (1993-2006) 
 During interviews, many participants discussed the salience of ethnicity for them 
during the war, but almost always by distinguishing past beliefs from current ones. For all 
respondents, the ethnic narrative was marked by a wave of change. Two main Hutu 
narratives recurred consistently across members of all groups concerning the nature of the 
conflict during the civil war: 1) fear and mistrust of Tutsis was based on repeated 
discrimination of Hutus and threats against their well-being, and 2) participation in the 
war served as a way to reclaim a disenfranchised Hutu identity and regain control from 
an oppressive Tutsi regime. 
Most respondents became aware of their Hutu identity at very young ages. Their 
parents, friends, and primary school teachers told them about the differences between 
Hutu and Tutsi. One respondent remembered that she was not allowed to visit her Tutsi 
friends at their houses: “I didn’t think they were bad, but their parents might have been. 
My mother said it was not safe to go play with them.” Respondents indicated that Tutsis 
were those who could obtain government jobs and be educated. Jean-Claudexi grew up as 
a refugee in Rwanda with his family after the 1972 massacres. He returned to Burundi in 
1993, when his father believed there was potential for Hutu liberation. However, after 
Ndadaye’s death, the situation began to change: “People began to treat each other 
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differently. I was very uncomfortable as a student in school, surrounded by military 
barracks. Hutus and Tutsis were separate.”  
Other respondents, including many who were women and young children when 
the war broke out, discussed the fear, anger, or mix of the two that they felt by being 
forced to hide from the Burundian military. Many consistently migrated between 
provinces, hoping to avoid instances of conflict. Those who lived in the capital city could 
not leave their neighborhoods for fear of being killed. Emmanuel remembers being 
trapped in the city between 1994 and 1997: “If you left to go to the central market, you 
could be killed easily by groups like the sans échec. They would kill you easily. During 
the time I was there, many Hutus were killed in the streets.” 
The segregation between groups and fear of demise at the hands of the opposing 
ethnic group became a factor in mobilization. Respondents’ narratives of the past indicate 
that the political importance of Hutu and Tutsi identities were embedded in a struggle for 
political power, and specifically a fear of the consequences if they could not maintain it 
for their own group. Patrick, an ex-combatant with the FNL, expressed his belief that any 
Tutsi who had the potential to wield a weapon (or grow up to do so) was a threat, saying, 
“Before, if I heard any Tutsi’s name, I thought they were bad. Since being in the 
government, I’ve reduced my anger. I don’t care anymore. But then, I thought they were 
dangerous. They could kill me at anytime, Tutsi soldiers and young Tutsis, because they 
were active.“ On the other hand, there were some who believed that any Tutsi was a 
threat. This was representative of many ex-combatants who stated that they joined in 
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order to avoid being killed in their homes. The perception was that people of the 
opposing ethnicity could not be trusted to share power, even if it were a possibility. 
Joining the war brought about the mindset that people could take control of their 
lives instead of submitting to oppression and violence against their group: “Tutsis were 
arrogant; they thought that Hutus should accept their condition. What they forgot was that 
refugees could study, and they wanted nothing more than to come back to their country. 
They came back to change the mindset of the people – people had a slave mentality here. 
Ndadaye’s slogan was Hagarara Bwuma. It means you should stand straight – like an 
iron bar, not hunched over and afraid. Try to imagine what the future could bring. He 
came as a liberator.” Many ex-combatants from both FNL and CNDD-FDD cited the 
Tutsi oppression and their desire to take control as a main reason for joining.  
Several people repeated this concept of Hagarara Bwuma in interviews – 
particularly those who joined a rebel movement during the war. Ndadaye first capitalized 
on the phrase to convince people to vote, using the Hutu experience (and the chance to 
change it) as a motivator for Burundians to become involved in politics. The call to action 
was ethnic, but was a call to vote, to be counted, and to regain dignity – not a call for 
anger or violence. However, following Ndadaye’s death, the same phrase was repeated 
on the radios as a call to everyone who placed their hopes in the elections. Hagarara 
Bwuma called for people to “rise up,” except they were instead encouraged to cut off 
access to the bridges leading in and out of cities and target Tutsi people in their 
communities.  
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This was not merely a generalized motivator for action, but a process through 
which Hutu citizens felt they could reclaim their identity. Another ex-combatant claimed, 
“The fighting was good, for me, because we had a purpose – we achieved our aim.” 
Many of the fighters in the rebellion, particularly those in the CNDD-FDD, repeated this 
claim that by fighting, they were creating and achieving a purpose as a Hutu militia. 
When asked to identify this purpose, one man said that rebels went into the field to fight 
for peace. The FNL rebels often repeated sayings they were told while fighting. “If you 
must be a dog, it is better to be a tomb” suggests it is better to fight and die than to live 
and be treated as less than human. “The milk of thunder can be drunk by a pigeon” 
evokes the image of a blade of grass in a crocodile’s mouth, as one respondent explained; 
even a pigeon, if it is intelligent and quick, can overcome what seems most powerful. 
These demonstrate that by joining the fight, Hutus believed they were actively instilling 
pride into the Hutu identity and changing the lived experience of Their people for the 
future. 
 By 2005, when Pierre Nkurunziza won the presidential election, there was a clear 
divide between CNDD-FDD and FNL. CNDD-FDD’s party won the elections in a 
landslide victory, and saw themselves as offering a new beginning for Burundi (Uvin, 
2009). However, serious divides had already been created between groups, as indicated 
by respondents’ narratives of the war. Members of FNL and CNDD-FDD blamed each 
other for killing people who were incapable of fighting back (only three respondents in 
my sample admitted to killing indiscriminately based on ethnicity – one Tutsi and two 
Hutu respondents). Members of the FNL were blamed for hindering negotiations; 
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members of CNDD-FDD were criticized for agreeing to negotiations that made a 
mockery of the Hutu struggle by allowing for the overrepresentation of Tutsis in the new 
government (Daley, 2007). Nevertheless, with a ceasefire signed by the CNDD-FDD, the 
FNL finally agreed to drop arms in 2006. 
  
Organization of Current Political Divisions (2010-Present) 
The 2010 elections were expected to result in a large victory for the CNDD-FDD, 
including the reelection of Pierre Nkurunziza. However, there were major challenges for 
the elections early on. Opposition parties claimed there were witnesses of suspicious 
power outages during elections, tampering with ballot boxes, bribery, and threats, all of 
which might have pushed the results of the election in the CNDD-FDD’s favor. In 
protest, 12 of the country’s main opposition parties boycotted the elections, expecting the 
government to negotiate. Instead, the government continued the elections with only a few 
parties, resulting in huge victories for the CNDD-FDD, especially in the country’s 
interior (United Nations, 2010). As stated before, the FNL fought more heavily 
(particularly towards the end of the war) in Bujumbura and surrounding areas. As a 
consequence, there was more support for opposition parties there than the ruling party, 
and this is where claims of election tampering were most vocal.  
 Regarding politics today, respondents did not talk of Hutu or Tutsi identities as a 
direct motivation for their choices. While they most often discussed these groups 
unprompted when talking about the previous civil war, almost no one mentioned the 
words “Hutu” or “Tutsi” when discussing present-day politics. Rather, individuals 
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highlighted the corruption of the state, the insatiable ambitions of opposition parties, or 
the corruption of all major parties and the need for entirely new people to enter the 
political sphere. There was a marked change in how they described politics of the past 
and politics of the present.  
This change did not indicate a rejection or devaluation of ethnicity as part of 
respondents’ identities. People continue to clearly identify themselves as Hutu or Tutsi. 
They do not reject their ethnic categories in favor of those of national identity, as has 
been the case in Rwanda. They openly discuss their cultural and ethnic backgrounds, 
couching these in a history that expresses their roots in specific regions of the country or 
their marginalized experiences during war (Malkki, 2008). However, ethnicities today do 
not contain the same social meanings that they once did. Presently, disenfranchised Hutus 
often characterize other Hutu supporters of the government party similarly to how they 
once characterized Tutsis in ruling power. This raises questions of how this set of 
divisions between Hutu groups manifested and which factors explain this shift in ethnic 
dynamics and the dynamics of the conflict overall. In order to examine these questions, I 
trace the mobilization tactics of the two main rebel groups during the war: the CNDD-
FDD and the FNL.  
 
Ethnic Identity and the Onset of War 
When asked what caused the violence that erupted in 1993, respondents 
overwhelmingly referenced ethnicity and ethnic tensions between Hutu and Tutsi groups. 
Regardless of the choices they made in terms of political participation or the region 
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where they lived, almost everyone cited the ethnic organization of violence and histories 
of separation between groups based on their ethnicity. Jean-Claude, a Hutu from Kabezi 
who joined the FNL as a young boy, remembered, “There was a word, gusurutsa. It was 
the period when the Hutu were oppressed by the Tutsi. They took revenge by stealing 
what belonged to the Tutsi.” Many respondents combined these explanations with almost 
Marxist references to the class differences experienced between ethnic groups, describing 
the degradation of human value by these systems. 
In Bujumbura Rural, a local community leader named Jean-Claude described how 
he experienced the war as a child. He was 10 years old when the war began:  
I can’t say what date it was when the war broke out. When it happened, it was 
Hutu against Tutsi. They killed each other. It started at maybe 7 a.m., and at 9 
a.m., they began throwing stones. Then they began throwing spears, and at the 
same time, someone took a shot. I remember at the same time I heard a weapon 
cry. So people began to run. They were telling us, “We are going to make you 
drink Tanganyika!”xii People were running. We took everything we could and ran 
from one town to another. People from Batoza continued to Mubanga (in the 
Mirwa), they destroyed everything. They took everything, burned houses. We 
thought this was the end of life. 
 
Jean-Claude continued to describe the developments of the day, noting when help 
arrived from people who had organized themselves in a Hutu neighborhood in 
Bujumbura:  
This was the beginning. They collected young people to train in the military, 
collected money to buy the weapons. People were forced to give money to these 
groups. People started to leave to Congo. At the time, it was just people defending 
themselves. Then, it became more political. Politicians came back from Rwanda, 
especially in Kibira forest. There was communication. They recruited.  
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His own relationship to these events began in primary school. He said, “I used to 
listen on the radio where politicians discussed: politics, good governance, all of those 
things. …I hoped for something better – Ndadaye said this was important.” He also 
heard the news of Ndadaye’s capture on the radio, which troubled him: 
We have three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. In all the time after 
colonization, Burundi was ruled by Tutsis. When Ndadaye came, we were very 
very happy. “We are free now” – that’s how my father described it. We had a 
party the whole night. People were very happy to have a Hutu president. After 3 
months, the president we elected was killed. It was so frustrating; we were 
unhappy, very angry.  
 
Waiting for news on the radio, his source of information became a source of fear: 
 
I remembered the situation of 1972. Many of us were killed by soldiers, and many 
of them were Tutsi. …On the Burundi radio channel, they played military songs 
for the coup d’état. Other politicians fled to Rwanda, spreading the news by radio. 
In our region of Muhuta, we didn’t have many ethnic problems because there 
were not many Tutsis around us. We heard in Kayanza and others that Hutu were 
very angry and jumped on Tutsis and began to kill them. …Later, we heard about 
people being seen floating on the water, covered in blood. I don’t remember the 
date, but it was kind of sunny. Hutus didn’t have weapons, but Tutsis were 
protected by soldiers. Hutu said they would make arrows in case the Tutsi came to 
attack. We made spears bought machetes. It was somehow funny. One day, when 
we got up, we were listening and something was very wrong. We heard people 
crying, “Get up! Get up! All men! Tutsi are coming!”  
 
Jean-Claude’s account is emblematic of the way that Hutu and Tutsi alike blended 
ethnicity, fear, and disillusionment with the political system. Even those who described 
the war as ‘genocide’ against the Tutsi acknowledged the injustice of Ndadaye’s murder 
and government actions against Hutu citizens during this time. These thoughts are not 
organized, but blended together – experience with identity, stories shared with them 
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about their history with stories from the war. It displays the construction of ethnicity 
through oral histories, political experience, and the geographic organization of social life. 
It also displays how seemingly meaningless separations become salient in the context of 
war and force decisions about political participation. His account demonstrates that the 
ethnic experiences shared by a community had varying results for different families; 
some ran to their other family members for protection, some decided to fight, and others 
fled or were killed. As the war continued and became more organized, people were faced 
with the decision to support rebel groups, and many refused (or could not), choosing 
instead to flee to the DRC.  
“People create their own law and order where there is none,” said “King,” an arms 
trafficker who worked in Bubanza with the CNDD-FDD during the war. When asked 
why he joined, he put it simply: “To kill Tutsis.” There is no discernable difference in 
how respondents described the overall causes of the war, indicating a shared common 
narrative among all Burundians – people who joined rebel groups, people who fled, Hutu, 
and Tutsi all spoke about ethnicity and the unpredictability of rule of law as primary 
causes of the war itself. Interviewees described the increasing salience of ethnicity 
leading up to elections and into the war as a political climate of fear, anger, and 
oppression took hold. This does not mean, however, that this narrative drove the 
motivations of all participants who joined the war. Motivations for joining political 
groups were much more complex; some did not even mention ethnicity as a motivating 
factor when asked why and how they joined. Others spoke of ethnicity acutely, 
describing the degradation of their ethnic identity in a way that displayed conscious 
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intention to fight as a Hutu against Tutsi (or the contrary). Chapter Four compares the 
breakdown of motivations for joining violent groups to those motivations for peaceful 
participation in politics and decisions to flee. 
Despite these complexities, both the CNDD-FDD and FNL used ethnicity and a 
narrative of exclusion to catapult their groups into fully armed and trained rebel groups. 
They heavily organized strategies for gaining and maintaining membership with their 
own specific sets of rhetoric and management of community relations throughout the 
war, establishing the basis for two large rebel groups with different tactics and 
justifications for violence, and unique relationships to this common ethnic identity. 
 
CNDD-FDD Mobilization during the War 
Community members remembered the CNDD-FDD as an unpredictable force 
during the war. Rebels were permitted to gain money and community support by force, 
and they often lashed out against individuals with little consideration for whether families 
were supportive of the cause. However, as erratic as their tactics may have been, the 
CNDD-FDD was not a haphazard collection of people, but instead a highly organized 
effort intended to unite several groups that formed in reaction to Ndadaye’s death and 
cultivate a full rebellion.  
CNDD-FDD utilized a variety of tactics to convince and coerce people into 
joining their group. They targeted youth and adolescents in schools, conducted 
community outreach, promised money and benefits, and took some individuals by force. 
While all former CNDD-FDD rebels that I interviewed described themselves as willing 
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participants, many also explained that they felt they did not see any other choice they 
could have made. Seemingly paradoxical, many Burundians describe this process as 
political manipulation: sets of push and pull factors employed by armed groups and 
political groups to encourage participation by narrowing the political and social choices 
available to targets. The aim of manipulation, in this sense, is to create a kind of pressure 
that makes people feel like there was no other choice but to participate in a violent 
rebellion.  
 The exploitation of local social networks was key to fostering the perception of 
constrained choice. In many cases, individuals were not targeted, but rather entire groups 
of friends. This was particularly effective in schools, where adolescents would engage in 
conversations about politics together. For some, it was the only time they were able to 
talk about the uncertainties and problems they were witnessing around them. Several 
people mentioned that they could not talk about these issues with family, nor could they 
openly do so in public. Jeanine, a woman from Kabezi who joined the CNDD-FDD while 
in school, remembered how she first became involved with them. She said, “I knew them 
because of debate. You would talk with someone; hear about their ideas and beliefs. Most 
of the time they did this in secret.” She added that this process led to her joining, but not 
because she was personally convinced about the war: 
I didn’t join because I wanted to; I joined because of others. They told me to join 
because there was money to be made, but I went because of their influence. We 
were from the same school. 
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CNDD-FDD recruitment notably wove an ethnic narrative and blended it with 
pragmatic aims, such as money and access to resources. Blaise, a former combatant who 
was recruited to fight for the CNDD-FDD as a teenager, made the following comment: 
In any political group, there is something called recruitment. No one takes you by 
force. In the CNDD-FDD, they told us they wanted people. Said they wanted a 
huge number to get people in the Burundian Military and others as demobilisés.xiii 
 
CNDD-FDD’s emphasis on the need for adequate numbers to gain enough 
political power to ensure availability of demobilization resources and entrance into 
institutions, such as the military, was a feature of the CNDD-FDD that distinguished it 
from its counterpart, the FNL. The idea of “Hutu liberation” was connected to concrete 
steps, and directly connected to reclaiming a stake in important political, social, and 
institutional realms. The promise was of money and a new system in which Members of 
the Hutu ethnic group could access power and opportunity in a way that was never 
previously available to them, in exchange for sacrifices that everyone should make to 
achieve these goals.  
You are fighting for the country, and you are sacrificing yourself for others. They 
[CNDD-FDD leaders] would even tell that, “You see the president has been 
killed, so what are you waiting for? You have to go and save others.” 
 
 This results-focused aspect of CNDD-FDD mobilization is often characterized as 
“more moderate” than the FNL’s narrative, which emphasized an ideological 
commitment to “equality,” including Marxian notes of proletariat overthrow. Many have 
argued that the FNL also displayed genocidal ideology, targeting Tutsi as the group 
responsible for their oppression and retaliating against anyone who did not share their 
	 64	
	
beliefs. Nevertheless, CNDD-FDD rebels were also brutal, and the way they treated 
people in communities was violent and unpredictable, partially because they were less 
concerned with “whom” the enemy was as long as the objective was being met. This 
unpredictable quality of their group was a direct result of their mobilization and 
membership retaining practices, which focused on a shared Hutu experience and identity 
that required action to achieve change. Aside from this broader duty to participate, 
participants were allowed to interpret the deeper meaning of these concepts and exploit 
them for themselves.  
Respondents who participated in the war described horrible living conditions and 
difficulty maintaining morale. Camps often did not have food for everyone and lacked 
any kind of medical facilities for the wounded. Many wanted to leave almost immediately 
after joining, but were aware of the serious consequences of doing so. The message was 
clear: the CNDD-FDD cared little about how rebels conducted themselves, as long as 
they did their part. If they were meant to fight, they should fight; if they were asked to 
collect taxesxiv from communities, they should not come back without money, supplies, 
and food. Leaving or failing to perform duties was not permitted. Overall, CNDD-FDD 
leadership cared little for how these goals were achieved, and they relied on an organized 
chaos to maintain their members. Many rebels quickly became aware that they were 
above any kind of law, except for that enforced by their peers. Rebels often attacked 
families who could not pay and exploited their power to exercise revenge on people and 
families with whom they had disagreements, or those who had something they wanted. 
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Not only did the CNDD-FDD’s “access to power” narrative play out on a national 
playing field, but it also came to fruition at the communal and interpersonal levels. 
The CNDD-FDD’s mobilization narrative portrayed the idea that the “ends 
justified the means,” and in fact that the means were unimportant as long as the end goal 
was achieved. It was a model that attracted numbers, and some participants were less 
concerned with achieving the national end goal of accessing the education system, the 
political system, and the military. More important to these groups was the feeling of 
personal liberation achieved as a Hutu who now had access to power; the narrative gave 
space to these personal endeavors, provided the person continued to fight for the CNDD-
FDD. 
The importance of this narrative and the strategies employed by CNDD-FDD to 
maintain membership should not be underestimated. The differences in groups along 
these lines partially explain why the CNDD-FDD – with younger roots than the 
longstanding PALIPEHUTU-FNL movement – was able to attract a wider pool of 
participants and make political gains that the FNL was unable to achieve. They were 
perceived as the more moderate of the two groups, albeit no less violent, and lacking an 
ideology that would drive them away from eventual compromise. Because they also spent 
less energy controlling their participants, they were able to appeal to a wider audience, 
particularly in the early years of the war. 
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FNL Recruitment, Mobilization and Membership 
The PALIPEHUTU-FNL, later referred to as the FNL when they became a 
political party, has different origins than the CNDD-FDD. PALIPEHUTU existed before 
Ndadaye’s assassination. Instead of grouping several smaller armed groups together in 
response the assassination, PALIPEHUTU was started by refugees after the 1972 
massacre and following smaller massacres that occurred during UPRONA’s regime. 
Building outside of Burundi’s borders with no access to the political system, they did not 
desire to become part of it; they desired to overthrow it entirely. Tutsi, and the leadership 
in particular, could not be trusted to make compromises and sign agreements, as they 
were the oppressors. PALIPHUTU believed they would always maintain the relationship 
between Hutu and Tutsi groups (with Tutsi in control) as long as it was possible. For 
them, Ndadaye’s assassination was confirmation of this belief. 
While many participants of FNL did join in the later years of the war, hoping to 
“demobilize” and gain the benefits associated with doing so, FNL’s recruitment and 
membership strategy was markedly different from that of CNDD-FDD. First, the FNL 
did not emphasize possibilities for demobilization as part of recruitment in the same 
pronounced way – it simply became a fact that for those hoping for demobilization funds, 
FNL was the only armed group left to join after CNDD-FDD and all other groups signed 
the Arusha Accord Peace Agreement in 2000. Instead, FNL exercised almost extreme 
discipline among its members, with Bible verses and highly structured rhetoric linking 
empowerment to a more radical uprooting of the entire system. Participants feared both 
the consequences of leaving and the consequences of being caught abusing their power, 
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as the expectations were, again, clear: stealing, raping, and attacks on civilians without 
cause were not permitted, and would warrant punishments that could result in death.  
 Nevertheless, FNL were said to be even more brutal to communities and people 
they considered to be “against them” than the CNDD-FDD had been. While not all 
members held extreme beliefs about Tutsi, the FNL encouraged and fanned the flames of 
anti-Tutsi ideology, resulting in some of the most egregious violations of human rights 
documented during the war. Even Hutus living in FNL territory feared the possibility that 
rebels would think they had supported another group (Tutsi or later Hutu). At the same 
time, the FNL protected those loyal to them and fostered a much stronger sense of group 
and community loyalty in this way. When respondents talked about the FNL, this loyalty 
factor was often mentioned as both a negative and positive element. The FNL, who were 
smaller and mostly covered Bujumbura and Bujumbura Rural during the later years of the 
war, were considered to have an extremely loyal group of supporters who were unwilling 
to compromise.  
The Hutu narrative in the FNL is one of a history of oppression by a specific 
group of people. Liberation is therefore not about occupying space within this system, but 
about changing the system so that oppression cannot happen again. Some interpreted this 
as elimination of Tutsi, and some believed in a radical transformation of the political 
structure. One of FNL’s specific draws was this ideological grounding. In the late 1990s, 
CNDD-FDD began to lose some participants to FNL. Both groups were still growing in 
numbers and reaching their peak, and many who had been with the CNDD-FDD since the 
early and mid-1990s became disillusioned with the lack of message and purpose in the 
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CNDD-FDD. While the FNL had older roots, it gained ground slightly later and always 
remained smaller than the CNDD-FDD; their message and discipline became a draw for 
people who felt that they had lost direction with the CNDD-FDD’s narrative, 
experiencing four and five years of war with no results and countless abuses.  
This pattern of defection between groups went in both directions, as life in the 
FNL was too disciplined and harsh for some rebels. Defection from a group was not 
tolerated, so many found this to be their only way to change something about their lives. 
They could not go back to their communities, but they could join another rebel group. 
Only one respondent in my sample switched groups more than once (CNDD-FDD to 
FNL, then back to CNDD-FDD), and he had an incredibly difficult time doing so because 
he was unable to gain trust within the group. The two groups were happy to take 
members from each other, but it was different once a person had left their group and 
wanted to return. Abandoning the values important to one group to adopt another’s was 
cause for suspicion.  
This rift deepened as negotiations continued, and it was clear that the CNDD-
FDD was willing to make compromises to end the war that the FNL was not. An 
originally cooperative relationship between the two groups became adversarial. FNL 
provided an important counter-play for the CNDD-FDD during negotiations – they were 
seen as the larger, moderate and pragmatic option compared to the FNL, who were 
smaller, ideologically extreme, and covered key areas: Bujumbura and surrounding 
Bujumbura Rural. Likewise, FNL was able to control these important areas while relying 
on CNDD-FDD to fight across Bujumbura. The two groups did not necessarily support 
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each other’s views, but they co-existed with a common enemy. However, once the 
CNDD-FDD signed agreements, they defended a new order, aiming to end the rebellion 
and FNL’s stronghold.  
Jamie, a member of the FNL, remembered how this shift occurred: 
After the cease-fire, it was bad. The CNDD-FDD and FNL began to fight each 
other. Agathon Rwasaxv refused to sign, and Nkurunziza said he would hunt him 
until he was killed. Our leader said to fight and we did it. I was shot in the head 
and the leg…. I remember where we fought against the CNDD-FDD; it was near 
Gatumba. The road to Gatumba leads all the way into Congo. They [CNDD-FDD] 
came in and took me, but I stayed strong, mentally, because of the training we 
received. I fled with one of their guns and I passed by my home. I didn’t stay the 
night, but came to Rukoko instead. There was so much fighting - airplanes and 
helicopters flying above us. 
 
Jamie’s description of the CNDD-FDD’s transition into a political party, and the 
ensuing shift in the relationship between the FNL and CNDD-FDD, describes the 
moment that the two parties broke any informal alliance they held previously between 
them as rebel groups with a common cause. Following the signing of the ceasefire, 
the CNDD-FDD focused on eradicating existing threats to stability of the new 
transitional government. 
 
Ethnic Relationships in the Post-Conflict Era 
 Relationships between ethnic groups have not been forgotten nor completely 
repaired, but they have improved. Respondents tended to talk about ethnicity as a concept 
that was utilized around the time the war began. While it always existed, it was part of 
the social backdrop, and its meaning changed over different time periods. Rhetoric about 
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ethnicity became more salient as tensions grew leading up to and following Ndadaye’s 
election to power and assassination. After the war, power sharing between all ethnic 
groups again placed this “conversation” into the political and social backdrop. While no 
less important to people’s history, they found they were no longer actively fighting for 
access to power, and were instead waiting to see how new policies would play out. For 
Many Hutus, the question became, “Was this the right path to liberation?” For Tutsis, that 
question became, “Can we trust these new people in power?” 
 Rebuilding was not an overnight process; Burundians often explain the shift in 
ethnic relationships as if it happened overnight. Conflict was previously between Hutu 
and Tutsi, and now it is political. However, when asked to describe the transition and 
their feelings about intermarriage, they provided more nuance and reflected on these 
experiences. Rene, a Tutsi living in Bujumbura, offered the following explanation:  
You cannot imagine what it was like. When I was young, it was so divided – I 
believed that Hutu wanted to kill me, and so anytime I heard that one was killed, I 
celebrated. It’s true! It didn’t matter who they were. When we heard that the 
CNDD-FDD took power, we were afraid to leave our house for days. These were 
people who wanted to kill us, and now they were guarding our neighborhoods as 
part of the army. There was a solider on every corner, maintaining order, but we 
did not know who they were or what they would do if they saw us. The first time 
we left our houses, we avoided even making eye contact with them. And, I 
realized, some of them were just as afraid of us as we were of them – no one 
knew what to expect. Eventually, after passing them for a week, then two weeks, 
you could say ‘Hi’ as you passed them. It changed so slowly. We were so afraid, 
at first.  
 
Both Hutus and Tutsis who were sampled considered the occupation of neighborhoods a 
significant marker of ethnic relations. One Hutu CNDD-FDD participant spoke of ethnic 
divisions in neighborhoods as a sign of progress: 
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By 2007, there was no longer any tension between Hutus and Tutsis. I don’t think 
there are problems now. In Kanyosha, in 1996 or 1997, there used to be 
neighborhoods for Hutus and Quarters for Tutsis. But in 2005, none of these 
neighborhoods was occupied by only one ethnic group; they were mixed. I came 
to the conclusion that there is no tension. Of course, people are frustrated by what 
happened. But what can we do? We have to live with it.  
 
 At the same time, despite the repeated narrative that Burundi has progressed and 
developed beyond ethnic divides, some residents still harbored suspicions about people of 
different ethnic groups. Many young Burundians do not talk about ethnicity in the same 
way as their parents discussed it. A few respondents in Bujumbura even said they were 
unaware of the ethnicities of their friends, and could not guess. While they considered 
this to be positive, displaying the reduced significance of ethnicity, one respondent 
explained that it was better that she not know, because it would change the way she 
related to her friends: “For some people it doesn’t matter and we can even talk about it 
openly. But for many friends, it’s better not to know. We can be friends without knowing, 
and I don’t think I would want to because asking this question could change your 
relationship.”  
The consensus was that if a Burundian already knew a person’s ethnicity, they 
could openly talk about it; however, not knowing a person’s ethnicity and asking about it 
would change people’s perceptions of how they related to you. This can be connected to 
the results of the war. For a majority of Burundians, ethnicity was significant precisely 
because of its connection with accessing opportunities and representation. Once these 
elements were achieved, the rhetoric that followed from leaders in power suggested 
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ethnicity should no longer be significant. A person raising questions about ethnicity 
unnecessarily could be creating problems.  
The delicacy of ethnic relationships in post-war Burundi reveals itself best in this 
paradox: people talk about being able to joke about ethnicity while simultaneously 
finding cause for concern when people bring it up without cause. Rene, the man who was 
afraid to come out of his house after the war, returned from a wedding in 2013 and said 
he would never attend another wedding, if he could. When asked what happened, he 
explained that it was an inter-ethnic marriage, and the father of the groom tried to hide 
his frustration with the decision, but was unable to do so. Rene explained, “He kept 
pulling the son aside and arguing with him; he didn’t want to give the blessing. It was so 
terrible, because we knew what was going on, but everyone tried to keep the ceremony 
going.” 
 Despite many competing explanations of ethnic identity, it remains oversimplified 
in the context of violence, civil war, or ethnic fighting. Displayed in the above discussion 
of modern-day ethnic relations in Burundi, there is a need for theoretical understanding of 
the tension between resilience and fragility of ethnic and identity-based relationships. 
Furthermore, there is a need to understand that the fragility of these relationships results 
in many complex interactions that do not necessarily lead to violence on their own. A 
man who is not fully at ease with relationships between Tutsi and Hutu may, at the same 
time, bless his son to be married to someone of another ethnicity. A person who is angry 
and does not trust someone of another ethnic group may still choose to walk outside their 
door and say “hello,” rather than to walk out armed and ready for a fight.  
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As ethnicity shifts away from being a main factor of social organization, it still 
shapes personal relationships, suspicions and fears. The fear or risk of ethnicity regaining 
a place as a defining element of social organization replaces ethnicity itself, in some 
ways. Ethnic identity and its relative importance vary based on personal experience and 
history, but the political significance of personal identity is reduced in the post-conflict 
era. Rather, this new era is one where the overarching factor becomes how important 
people find ethnicity – the fear of a return to previous ethnic tensions replaces fear of 
people from other ethnic groups, making this post-war stage at once more resilient to 
divisions along simple ethic lines and extremely fragile to divisions and mistrust based on 
the rhetoric that gives significance to ethnicity in any way.  
Tensions and divisions were reignited in the prelude to and aftermath of the 2015 
elections, which included an attempted coup d’état after Pierre Nkurunziza declared his 
candidacy for a third term as President of Burundi. Many refugees who fled during this 
time claimed they were personally targeted for their ethnicity, while the government 
made claims about the use of ethnicity by opposition members to divide the country. 
Citizens had been clear about their opinions on ethnic tension in interviews leading up to 
this moment: the divisions of modern-day Burundi are political, not ethnic. However, 
doubts about the potential for old divisions to be reignited emerged, voiced by 
international actors, media, civil society organizations, and activists. The concerns of 
communities became cyclical, particularly in Bujumbura, where many of the strongest 
protest sites against Nkurunziza’s third mandate and opposition membership were also 
historically Tutsi neighborhoods. The government’s targeting of these neighborhoods was 
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interpreted by many as being potentially ethnically driven; at the same time, government 
rhetoric slowly shifted to increasingly threatening and targeted attacks on those who 
opposed the CNDD-FDD. They also claimed that Rwanda was training soldiers to return 
to Burundi and fight, eventually shutting borders of trade, even across provinces for the 
“protection” of communities. The narrative harkened to that of the Interahamwe in 1994 
during the Rwandan genocide, where the government claimed that Tutsi troops were 
building a rebellion against them.  
This rhetoric, combined with incremental measures to stifle travel and trade 
between communities and the government’s continuous “blind eye” toward the violent 
acts committed in these neighborhoods by members of the Imbonerakure, the CNDD-
FDD youth-wing, conjured speculation about the potential for history to repeat itself: a 
government exercising another genocide against its people in the Great Lakes Region.xvi 
Thousands of refugees left Burundi, some claiming government supporters directly 
threatened them for being Tutsi. However, these claims are difficult to verify, and most 
people reported that they had heard about threats to Tutsi or the problems between Hutu 
and Tutsi ethnic groups on the radio (Nemecek and Lemon, 2016).  
This evolution in the rhetoric of government and other parties is discussed in 
greater detail below, but ethnic relationships have not yet fully devolved. The country’s 
social fabric continues to suffer from extrajudicial killings; the risk of becoming a target 
at once binds Hutu and Tutsi who stand together in opposition to the government and 
divides Hutu and Tutsi, who become increasingly worried that each may be turning 
against the other in preparation for armed violence. The effects are not experienced 
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uniformly across communities – much of this has to do with the specific historical 
dynamics, which vary by commune, and even by hill in the countryside.  
While the risk of ethnic violence continues to play a role in politics, this lack of 
uniformity and the relative resilience to ethnic violence is incredibly important given the 
massive economic and social instability experienced in the past year. The key difference 
between the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the developments in the past year in Burundi 
is that Rwanda’s government systematically infiltrated all institutions, using media as a 
propaganda tool to popularize hate speech and teaching children in school about the 
dangers of Tutsi children. Years before the genocide in Rwanda, Tutsi children were 
being kicked out of school and Tutsi families were becoming increasingly concerned 
about the possibilities of a large-scale massacre. The construction of ethnicity as a 
primary defining factor in determining who to trust and how to define ties of loyalty was 
deeply rooted, and the message was highly controlled. Burundi does not mirror this level 
of ethnic construction. Identities are not as easily split between Hutu and Tutsi as they 
once were, and this remains true across the country (though ethnic tensions are more 
palpable in some areas). While many fear that ethnicity may return as a defining factor in 
social life, the lines are not linear and remain unorganized by the state.  
A major risk to this progress was the question of land distribution and land 
conflict. The government established the National Commission on Land and Other Assets 
(the CNTB, by its French acronym) in 2006 with a mission of Truth and Reconciliation. 
The CNTB exclusively presided over land conflict cases related to returnee claims to 
land. However, in 2012, the mission switched from Truth and Reconciliation to Truth and 
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Justice, which had specific policy and decision-making implications for families 
concerning land, arguably the most important resource in Burundi. Where decisions often 
included land-sharing in the past, the Truth and Justice approach gave land entirely over 
to which ever family had the “right,” and refugees of different time periods were 
considered to have greater claims to land than those from other time periods. Again, the 
fear and criticism related to CNTB’s decision-making was not that they overtly and 
openly organized favoritism towards Hutus, but that they did so implicitly through 
decisions about “true claims” to land. However, the strength in progress in Burundian 
identity politics could be seen in the adverse reaction to CNTB’s shift in policy, which 
crossed ethnic lines. The CNTB was widely accused of becoming highly politicized and 
corrupt, and shut down proceedings in March 2015 before elections to ease tensions 
relating to land conflicts (which were happening at that point both between and within 
members of given ethnic groups). 
Because the politics of ethnicity is understood as something that Burundians are 
not “supposed” to find important anymore, it is challenging for people to speak openly 
about the ways in which they currently experience ethnicity. However, the fragility of the 
progress made between ethnic groups in Burundi does not suggest that it will return 
easily to divisions that allow for genocide, despite cases of abuse of power and ethnic 
targeting that have occurred in recent months. The reshaping of ethnic identities into 
primary identities that motivate violence against a group of people is evidenced to take 
time and is accompanied by acute and sustained personal experiences that uphold ethnic 
divides and suspicions between groups. To date, this is not the case in Burundi, but the 
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government has taken extreme measures to consolidate power that – if left unchecked – 
could bring back the fear and mistrust between community members that enables mass-
violence.  
 
Political Usage of Ethnic Narratives 
When I entered Kajiji for the first time in the Kanyosha neighborhood in 
Bujumbura, I met a subgroup of internally displaced families who were politically and 
socially disconnected and never able to return home after the war. They settled in the city 
with minimal access to resources; many were barely able to buy the bricks to make their 
houses, and most were unemployed. They had a sense that no one in politics had their 
interests at heart, and thus it would not matter which group won. When asked about her 
political beliefs, Nadine said, “I don’t know why I would be interested in politics. I am 
old. What does it do for me?” When asked about her children, she replied, “They are not 
ministers. They did not go to school. Politics is for someone who has an interest in it.” 
Another stated, “Politics concerns people who are in power. I’m not educated; I’m not in 
politics. They have something that makes them not get along. We just see what happens, 
we never see it coming.” For Adissa, a woman living with her two daughters and their 
children, peace was directly related to having her land back. “Before the war, I was poor, 
but I had a way to support myself. I had land, and I could grow crops. Now, I cannot go 
back to my land. I live here with nothing. How can I be at peace when I cannot feed my 
family?” 
	 78	
	
 Because of the lack of social ties due to displacement, this group was completely 
disconnected from society – and even from what happened across the street from them. 
During the violence following the 2010 elections, which stretched well into 2011 and 
2012, assassinations happened regularly in Bujumbura Mairie and Bujumbura Rural, but 
displaced residents in Kajiji had little access to information about these events. One 
woman in the neighborhood, who lived at the edge of Kajiji, mentioned that a person had 
been killed across the street from her house, but that she did not find out for two weeks. 
Thus, a group that arguably remains one of the most disenfranchised in Bujumbura, with 
no ability to return home even years after the war, had a bird’s eye (and outsider’s) view 
of how tensions between political groups led to polarization of the community. Many 
people felt similarly; both in and outside of the capital, people felt the fighting between 
opposition and government parties helped no one but the parties themselves. Some 
actively rejected party politics because of the damage they believed was inflicted by 
parties’ inability to find any common ground. 
 The rhetoric and the deepening gridlock between parties began prior to the 2010 
elections and continued through 2015 into the present. At the time, following the 
elections in 2011, the international community largely believed that even if there were 
cases of tampering with elections found, the CNDD-FDD had not altered the overall 
outcome of the elections.  
“There was no comparison to the kind of fraud I’ve seen in elections in other 
countries – I still don’t believe [challenging the results] would have been the right thing 
to do,” said a woman who worked on election monitoring in Burundi at the time. Election 
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monitoring was heavily focused on the events of the election themselves, of which there 
was little proof of tampering that would have thrown the election results, but the 
opposition argued that evidence of tampering needed to be acknowledged and that the 
wider problem of intimidation of opposition party members was being ignored. There is 
no evidence that anyone had the specific mandate to monitor the intimidation aspect of 
the elections, nor the devolving relationship between the CNDD-FDD and opposition 
parties, mainly the FNL. The results of this breakdown brought communication between 
parties to a halt. Opposition parties withdrew from the presidential election in the midst 
of extrajudicial killings carried out by government supporters and retaliations by 
opposition (mostly FNL). Human Rights Watch later published a 2012 report detailing 
these developments, and the government blocked their press conference on the findings 
in Burundi.  
 During this time, rhetoric evolved between the parties utilizing ethnicity to 
conjure ideas about party loyalty. In early 2012, government supporters felt that peace 
had been achieved through the negotiations following the war, and they expressed this 
repeatedly as justification for Nkurunziza as the country’s rightful leader. “We had a 
purpose, and we achieved that purpose,” said one supporter of CNDD-FDD, who fought 
in the civil war and continues to support this group. The Radio-Television Nationale du 
Burundi (RTNB), the country’s national public radio station, consistently denied the 
violence between parties as political, reporting violence as “banditry” or “based in old 
divides between neighbors.” There was a subtle language used by government supporters 
throughout 2012 and 2013 that suggested those who remained in opposition “could not 
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let go” of old divisions in society, and which was used in reference to both Hutu and 
Tutsi opposition. In relation to ethnicity, most people I interviewed expressed that they 
were no longer angry, explaining that progress has been achieved and they are now able 
to work with Tutsi in the government. Although they were still Hutu and retained 
narratives of pride for the fighting in which they participated, they argued that there was a 
lack of pragmatism in remaining fixed to old identities. The problem lay with opposition 
members who refused to accept the results of the 2010 election. One member explained, 
“Imagine you have a plate, and you hand everyone something from that plate. Some 
complain they are not getting enough, but that is unfair because you have to feed many.” 
This is the current challenge for the CNDD-FDD. Another said, “When you have power, 
someone always wants to take it from you.”  
However, despite the fact that the largest opposition group was the FNL, 
opposition to the government came from many sources, including many vocal civil 
society members. Civil society was a space characterized as “Tutsi-dominated” by many 
respondents, though it is well understood to be an ethnically (and ideologically) mixed 
group. Like many other public domains, Tutsi historically controlled civic space. 
Following the war and power-sharing agreements, Tutsi remained well represented in 
civil society and civil rights groups – even more so than in the government, which was 
formally controlled by quotas for different ethnic groups. As civil society began to 
organize and become more active in civic life (alongside the increasing polarization of 
political groups), they were met with stony responses from government officials. 
Following Bujumbura’s organized strike in 2012 protesting the rising costs of food, the 
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government’s reply was shared on the radio: “Remember what civil society has done for 
you in the past.”  
The population was warned against letting civil society ‘manipulate’ them into 
setting themselves up to repeat history. The warning was a reference of little consequence 
to most in the international community, but almost all Burundians I spoke with knew 
exactly what it meant. Jerome, a civil society leader, explained that the government was 
referencing Tutsi organization of strikes called “villes mortes” during the war, which 
became synonymous with widespread massacres of any Hutu residents who were found 
outside during that time. “They are saying, you know, don’t let civil society manipulate 
you into carrying out their agenda for them.”  
The government used this language inconsistently throughout their 2010-2015 
mandate. In times of political tension, thinly veiled language referencing ethnic tensions 
and the importance of not letting these tensions return seeded fear in many that the 
government would begin targeting opposition systematically, beginning with ethnicity as 
a defining factor. However, the narrative worked against both Tutsi and Hutu opposition. 
It focused on the achievements of the government (mostly based on gaining access for 
Hutu citizens to important political, economic, and institutional spaces), and the 
importance of not letting this achievement fail or be undone by those who wanted more 
for themselves. Every single CNDD-FDD supporter interviewed cited the achievements 
of the government – Hutu access to education, the military, and the parliament – as the 
reason they support the CNDD-FDD, which displays the intermingling of political beliefs 
and ethnic identity. More than half of supporters cited access to jobs and income as 
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important factors, as well. The CNDD-FDD gained control of several economic sectors 
following the war, and was better able to assure Hutu citizens access to jobs in the public 
sphere.  
Government supporters believed these achievements for The Hutu ethnic group 
merited protection at all costs (or, at least the costs that were being endured at the time). 
Likewise, critique or displays of dissatisfaction with these achievements were typically 
downplayed as “greed” or blind ignorance. Therefore, unsurprisingly, political and ethnic 
identities became enmeshed early on during the war, and continued to intertwine 
throughout the post-conflict era. After achieving their aim as a Hutu rebel movement, 
CNDD-FDD members self-defined as a group able to move past ethnic division. 
Not only were they able to do so, the scrutiny around never forgetting where the 
country came from (and celebration of having moved beyond that stage) was a defining 
factor of the party through rhetoric of political leaders and members. The achievements 
of 2000, with the signing of the Arusha Accord Peace Agreement, served as the primary 
sources of legitimacy for the CNDD-FDD as a governing body, with few obvious 
achievements in the years to follow. The party itself, comprised of several disparate 
groups that joined together to fight, lacked unity from within. Thus, the party clung to the 
most powerful call that could bind its supporters. 
It was this same idea that became controversial, as opposition leaders and civil 
society leaders challenged why the government continuously limited space for opposition 
and government critique. They questioned if it was possible to recognize the importance 
of past achievements and still expect the country to continue to progress. As tensions rose 
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further between political groups, rumors emerged about the possibility of the FNL 
forming a rebel group outside the country. To gain control of reporting on such subjects, 
the CNDD-FDD began to limit space for journalists, passing a new law requiring them to 
reveal sources when asked in cases of “national security,” or face a fine and possible 
imprisonment. Killings continued into 2013, and several radio stations accused the 
government of having an undercover operation called ‘Safisha’ to kill all known 
members of FNL. 
In this environment, Hutu opposition members fully rejected the narrative of 
political achievement that the CNDD-FDD posited. They regarded modern politics as 
corrupt and full of scandal and the government as oppressive, as it was under Tutsi 
control. Jean de Dieu, an FNL supporter living in Kanyosha, explained: 
Tutsis are no longer the problem, because our own Hutus have taken their place in 
government. They buy themselves houses, do projects for their homelands, and 
they do nothing for those who need help. You cannot get a job unless you know 
someone in government, so how have things changed?  
 
Several FNL supporters echoed the idea that the current governing body’s actions ran 
contrary to entire purpose of the war, and this disillusionment with the current system 
extended beyond FNL to many other opposition groups, civil society organizations, and 
media outlets. However, given FNL’s notoriety for their years as an extremist ant-Tutsi 
armed group, other opposition members were hesitant to work with them as a political 
group. FNL was also uncompromising, believing that because they had the most 
supporters outside of CNDD-FDD of any group, their ideas were the most legitimate. The 
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groups failed to unify and quickly develop an alternative platform, creating opportunities 
for the government to maintain control over political rhetoric during this time.  
 Faustin, an FNL supporter living in Kabezi, regretted the inability of opposition 
groups to unify. He explained, “People who don’t get along well, it’s because they have 
something they share. They share this country. Even our grand fathers fought over this 
country, saying, ‘It’s me who should lead.’” FNL’s justification of this refusal to 
negotiate harkened back to reasons they fought in the war. Members spoke of radical 
equality and justice as a motivation for joining the fight as Hutu citizens, goals that they 
believed remained unachieved. Unlike the CNDD-FDD, the FNL was much more unified 
within its ranks; the group followed one common leader, Agathon Rwasa, who went into 
hiding shortly after elections in 2010 along with many other opposition party leaders. In 
2013, he returned from hiding with a message that had clearly shifted from prior years. 
While the message of FNL previously gave space to anti-Tutsi rhetoric and beliefs, 
Rwasa focused entirely on the idea of equality and freedom for all Burundians upon his 
return: 
If the government CNDD-FDD wants us to remain static – wants us to remain in a 
situation like the one that we were in in the 60s – really, I would say they've lost 
their compass. Let's help them recover it and lead the country in a better direction. 
These restrictions - for us, it's a tool of our struggle. 
 
Rwasa’s reference to the past and the party that lost its way again reflect the great and 
lasting divisions between the two main rebel groups due to their different beliefs and 
goals. FNL fighters echoed Rwasa’s concept of “struggle” and believed that this struggle 
was part of an ideology that defined them. It was the reason to fight, and until they were 
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able to achieve true freedom, they would continue. Adrien, another FNL supporter in 
Kabezi, spoke of Rwasa’s return: 
We will do everything it takes to get our party back, even if it means going back 
to war. The government does not give us any other choice. We still follow 
[Rwasa’s] ideology, not the one made up by the government. It was a strategy to 
delegitimate and disorganize our party and disorient our followers. … 
 
His return is a revival of our vision. The party was dormant for the last couple of 
years. After the elections in 2010, some of our members were persecuted and fled 
the country; others were killed. Him being back means there is still a chance for 
us to be part of change in this country. 
 
 However, this very idea of the struggle, which appeared to be completely 
malleable based on charismatic party leadership, bred mistrust of the FNL on behalf of 
other parties. The message may have evolved for now, but at its core the party remained 
composed of unpredictable, uneducated radicals who could not be trusted. Without 
concrete measures of success, the struggle could continue indefinitely and might never be 
satisfied. Rwasa’s own account upon returning evidences how the party evolved from a 
rebel group into political group, but that the Hutu experience of oppression remained 
central to FNL’s message. In particular, Rwasa seemed to be acutely aware of the role he 
played in shaping this narrative, given the strict organization of the FNL. As a leader of a 
movement that had the potential to return to violence, he was very careful to show a 
commitment to participation in the political system while justifying the use of violence in 
cases of gross injustice: 
Maybe you may find it strange, but I was surprised to see that I became involved 
in the military struggle. I was so disgusted by the Army and whatever was related 
to the Army from 1972 – even until the very day I decided to join the military 
wing of the party. So, it isn’t something which - for which I was prepared. It’s just 
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how the situation was. I left my country; my fellow kinsmen from the side of my 
mother and father were both killed by different regimes. I was personally targeted. 
I just escaped a few minutes before they came to catch me. When I got to 
Tanzania, I didn't have any asylum rights, because the government propaganda 
was just to say we were the ones who were responsible for what happened – even 
though the Army was massacring our fellows. I can tell you, the military of this 
country killed my aunt, my nephews, and my cousins - little children who were in 
primary school. Were they doing politics, or fighting?  
 
I was in a situation where I wasn’t moving forward. Without asylum rights, I 
couldn’t go to university, I couldn’t apply for a job. So, I said, ‘this kind of 
injustice is enough. Let me go fight for my rights, and for the rights of other 
fellows.’ We came into this struggle in the 90s, but as the situation evolved, the 
mentality of Burundians changed – but hardly. We were claiming for a national 
debate, a national conference, which could lead the country to democracy. So, we 
had to struggle, and everyone was free to choose between joining the army, or the 
police, or to be demobilized and enter life as a civilian like others. So, what I 
wanted was achieved. Now, those who wanted to join the army could join it and 
those who wanted to join the police did. So, I went into politics. I think I must 
play my role as a politician and not something else. Even, I’m too old to do 
fighting. I’m old and I’m tired. 
 
 During the 2015 election period, ethnicity continued to play an important role in 
relations between the parties, though the dynamics shifted. The government portrayed 
protesters as disenchanted Tutsi youth located in Bujumbura, with little connection to the 
rest of the country. Protests took place in Nyakabiga, Cibitoke, Ngagara, Musaga, and 
parts of Kanyosha – ethnically mixed, but historically Tutsi neighborhoods. Protestors 
rejected the claim that they were majority Tutsi, and said that their objections to Pierre 
Nkurunziza’s third mandate for President were widespread. Rwasa and the FNL were 
notably quiet; they were rumored to support protests, traveling from Bujumbura Rural to 
protest in neighborhoods such as Musaga. However, the extent to which they participated 
and whether these efforts were organized from the top-down remain unknown. In July 
2015, Rwasa joined the government after being elected to the position of Vice President 
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of the National Assembly in the national elections, startling many FNL supporters who 
thought he would boycott with other parties. In doing so, the strongest and most unified 
opposition group remained in limbo during the electoral period.  
 The atmosphere of the 2015 elections was mired by a failed coup d’état, weeks of 
protests, and nightly raids of neighborhoods suspected of harboring people the 
government referred to as “terrorists.” Trust between groups of government supporters 
and opposition dwindled to a five-year low. Citizens heard about Imbonerakure being 
hired as police officers; police received weekly reports of grenade attacks on their 
precincts. By the end of the summer, certain neighborhoods were emptied out as families 
either fled the country or stayed with people in other neighborhoods.  
Rhetoric between political groups became heated. For the CNDD-FDD, anyone 
supporting the opposition at that point supported terrorism and merited harsh and swift 
treatment by the government. Their speeches showcased this, as they accused the 
opposition of trying to upset the country’s security. The CNDD-FDD seemed prepared 
with a unified sentiment, as the President and several other key leaders repeated the 
message that protestors’ violent behavior and the stockpiling of weapons to use against 
the police would not be tolerated. However, the characteristic flexibility that gave 
CNDD-FDD such strength during the war was now more difficult to control because of 
technology. Speeches that once took place among a closed group and would not have 
been publicized or abuses that occurred five years ago that would not have been visible 
could be shared easily via Twitter, Whatsapp, and Facebook. Stories that might once 
never have left a room were being shared as quickly as possible, even internationally. The 
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CNDD-FDD’s approach to mobilization and membership originally gave them flexibility 
in 1993 to cast a wide net, accepting anyone who would support their end goals. 
However, as a ruling political party in a new climate with increased access to evidence 
and information sharing, restricting media could not hide the more radical members of 
the party.  
In early 2015, the CNDD-FDD was forced to decide how to proceed as a party. 
Many unhappy party members considered breaking off from the CNDD-FDD in response 
to actions and rhetoric against opposition groups and media. The party chose to shuffle 
members in key positions and consolidate power within a group loyal to the CNDD-FDD 
leadership. The resulting dynamic in the coming months led to increased radicalization 
and government dependent on a variety of “personalities” in leadership positions who 
remain free to say what they want to say in support of the party. In truth, they were likely 
always free to say what they wanted, particularly during the war and in the years 
following the peace agreements. Given the openness of CNDD-FDD members in talking 
about ethnic motivations, it is clear these were not secret discussions. However, the new 
documentation and sharing of speeches via mobile phones has shifted isolated events 
onto a national platform; in a new development, they are now shared via radio and the 
Internet with national consequences.  
At the same time CNDD-FDD closed ranks, the internationally recognized 
primary opposition members became a much more diverse group. In 2012, the CNDD-
FDD and the FNL were the two main political groups with potential for significant 
positions in government. Other opposition groups either did not represent a political 
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threat to the CNDD-FDD (groups like UPRONA – which agreed on power-sharing as 
part of the negotiation process, or like MSD – whose members were not realistically 
numerous enough to threaten CNDD-FDD’s stronghold even at the communal level). 
However, the “opposition” now in question claimed to be ethnically mixed, but also 
emphasized the targeting of them as a group of Tutsi and Hutu moderates. The language 
here was unmistakably designed to recall the horrors of the Rwandan genocide; many 
advocates believed that an unchecked CNDD-FDD was capable of resorting to any means 
necessary to stay in power. So, the opposition movement in 2015 was not only political, 
but framed as being about survival against tyranny and possible extermination – this 
could have served as a unifier between opposition groups, and did function that way early 
on. Opposition claimed that they were unified, and that ethnicity did not factor in their 
movement – it was a movement for everyone. However, the leadership fragmented on the 
basis of platforms, advocacy, and mutual trust. As citizens saw this process, they began to 
identify with ideas about liberation, but in more fractured ways not always aligning with 
the interests of political groups, including opposition parties. These dynamics are 
discussed more in Chapter Five.  
 The messages shared by each group in official statements and speeches were 
clearly designed for an international community – to appeal to legitimate claims in the 
international realm, justifying action and requests for international support. However, 
both of these streams of messages damaged trust and rekindled identity-based fear when 
they trickled down to the broader population. In research conducted through Search for 
Common Ground’s conflict monitoring, ethnicity was a secondary overall trigger shaping 
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decisions to flee. Refugees and residents genuinely feared for their lives, but they were 
not all personally targeted nor did they receive direct threats. Instead, many heard of 
these incidents happening and decided to leave before they became targets. The majority 
of residents cited radio and rumors – not personal experiences – as their main sources 
informing them that ethnic relations were worsening in the country. The new wave of 
information accessibility through programs like Whatsapp and Facebook has 
fundamentally changed how rhetoric and advocacy tactics work within nation-states. 
Threats and fears reach communities almost immediately, but in states like Burundi 
where media institutions are weak, these messages are shared with little context, nuance, 
or clarity. In Burundi specifically, media institutions were all but destroyed following the 
coup d’état, with RTNB as the only functioning nation-wide Burundian radio station 
during the election period.  
Because of the limited access to information, reliance on word of mouth and the 
limited information available enhanced fears and tensions between ethnic groups. While 
it has led to a greater potential for violence to develop again between groups, the violence 
experienced remains largely based on political lines for the time being. However, 
political differences have been shaped over time based on fundamental differences in the 
interpretation of identity, which makes them durable and linked to ethnicity. What is 
incorrect to assume is that ethnicity would create rifts solely between Hutu and Tutsi in 
the wake of a war that also fundamentally split the Hutu ethnic group. Even with 
increased targeting of Tutsi people, neighborhoods, and ex-military, the majority of 
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opposition members (those who were arrested, disappeared, and have been killed) was 
Hutu and remains Hutu.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 When comparing the construction of ethnic messages during the war and today, 
the process bears remarkable similarity, but the circumstances have changed. The use of 
ethnic rhetoric in mobilization strategies was purposely broad for a group like the 
CNDD-FDD, aiming to attract members with a wide variety of interests, fears, and 
motivations. For the FNL, which was smaller and more ideologically based, mobilization 
was focused on a narrower group that was lured by the idea of cohesion, guiding 
ideology, and clear (strict) leadership. The FNL did not bear a stronger ethnic identity, 
but attached it to a strong ideological and moral narrative of transformation, whereas the 
CNDD-FDD attached the transformation of ethnic identity to specific goals. These were 
essentially competing visions of emancipation – one about the journey, and the other 
more concerned with certain end goals.  
 As the war evolved and eventually came to an end, different strategies for 
mobilization and recruitment seeded a rift between the groups that only grew. FNL 
members, especially those who left the CNDD for the FNL, described the CNDD-FDD as 
a group that had lost its identity and vision. They compromised in exchange for power 
and were motivated by personal gain – a consequence of which was a group of rebels 
lacking unity and respect for their cause. Meanwhile, the CNDD-FDD purposely set 
themselves apart from FNL, as did their members. To many of them, FNL rebels were 
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extremists and zealots, and their leaders had no interest in ending the war with pragmatic 
compromise. CNDD-FDD supported the Arusha Accord Peace Agreement in 2000, and 
eventually turned their efforts against the FNL to end the war.  
 These dynamics led into the 2010-2015 period, wherein members of the parties 
echoed the mistrust of these competing visions for Hutu emancipation and the country at 
large. For CNDD-FDD members, ethnicity became something that reminded them of 
their achievements. Rejecting or diminishing these achievements was regarded with 
suspicion, and the party continued to reference their “roots” in public speeches. 
Nkurunziza often appealed to the nation to remember what civil society did for them in 
the past. In his speech for the country’s 50th anniversary of independence, he was met 
criticism from those who regarded his words with skepticism. Nkurunziza’s choice to 
say, “Levons-nous donc et tenons-nous biens droits!” (Let us stand up and hold ourselves 
straight) seemed to harken back to Hagarara Bwuma – a call for all to support the 
government’s achievements, and a warning to those who did not.  
 Meanwhile, while Rwasa’s FNL actively tried to distance themselves from the 
image of genocidal extremists, their rhetoric still echoed a desire to upend the inequalities 
in society by any means necessary. Rwasa claimed efforts were being made to join the 
political system as a real party, but without inclusion maintained that violence would be 
an inevitable consequence. Supporters of the FNL repeatedly said they were ready to 
continue the fight if progress could not be made peacefully, in accordance with this 
overall message. 
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It was not so much the approach of these two groups in terms of identity that 
changed in 2015 and into the year following elections, but rather the ways in which the 
message was utilized and the circumstances that allowed for control of the narrative in 
the two parties. Opposition was always a diverse group, but in the wake of the protests 
and attempted coup, other elements of the opposition became much more visible. The 
government, which had always allowed for a certain level of “diversity” in their overall 
message, was pushed into a corner, looking for new ways to blame outsiders and radicals 
in an effort to prove they were the group that truly represented what Burundi was and 
strived to be. This led to increasingly vocal movements calling out abuses committed by 
the government and its civilian supporters. Because of the lack of control CNDD-FDD 
actually had over the individual leaders in the party, the party became more radical, 
speech became more radical, and members of groups such as the Imbonerakure became 
bolder in their speech and tactics. 
The developments in the past year display that the importance of ethnicity never 
really left Burundi, but instead has been reframed over time and within different political 
bodies. Hutu and Tutsi are enduring identities and have continuity, but their meaning and 
significance change with circumstances laid out in the present moment. Most 
importantly, the past five years (and the decades prior) evidence that when ethnic conflict 
subsides, ethnic relationships and meanings can transfer to other identities as situations 
evolve. Class divisions and political divisions with ethnic history can bring with them the 
same level of risk for conflict and mass violence, and they need to be understood as this 
complex if we are to comprehend how ethnicity weaves in and out of histories of 
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repeating violence and why cycles of violence do not always result in ethnic divisions 
along the same lines as they have in the past.  
While some may argue that this is more a question of national identity and 
competing visions for a nation, this would subvert interviews in which respondents 
themselves noted intricate connections for them between the meanings of nationality and 
ethnicity. Almost all respondents could accept the idea that “we are all Burundian,” but 
conflict is inherently linked to groups that feel they have been left out – not due to 
national identity, but to inequality and oppression linked to ethnic divides and divisions 
in the deeper meanings found in ethnic experiences. The newest generation of 
Burundians (children, adolescents and young adults) do not all have personal experiences 
of the war to shape their identities, but many of those interviewed adhered to narratives of 
the past that in turn shaped their political affiliations. They did not even all know which 
of their friends are Hutu, Tutsi, or of entirely different ethnic groups, such as Twa and 
Swahili. With increased intermarriage, many do not hold linear definitions of these 
identities for themselves. However, this does not prevent them from identifying with 
ethnic narratives – the fear they may be targeted for being part of a group that does reflect 
inter- and intra-ethnic division in society. These fears are voiced overtly, locked in by 
political affiliations and socioeconomic statuses. 
To better understand cycles of violence, particularly in terms of predicting mass 
violence and genocide, it is necessary to reframe ethnic identities and their meanings. 
Currently theorized as “more static” than assumed identities, such as political 
membership, the majority of theorists continue to connect identity to violence, assuming 
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that if political divisions are the most significant, propensity for mass violence will 
decrease, and vice versa. Burundi’s case demonstrates that this is not necessarily 
inevitable. In fact, it is possible to achieve stability, however fragile, without ethnicity 
becoming less important; instead, the meanings attached to these identities are reframed. 
Moreover, the risk of violence can escalate specifically because of intra-ethnic divisions 
based on the political meaning of ethnic struggle and the political divisions and beliefs 
within a group.  
History in Burundi is continuously evolving, and its devolution into violence or 
maintenance of peace will likely be based on the meanings given to identities and the 
space afforded to people to coexist with these different meanings. To comprehend 
cyclical conflicts, ethnicity needs to be understood as not inherently linked to violence 
and as a tool for ascribing meaning to actions and decisions of many types. Political 
action and perceived choices will depend on these more complex factors, and examining 
conflict based on the endurance of historical divisions between groups is not helpful for 
understanding trajectories of violent conflicts in the future.  																																																								
viii The chef de zone is an administrative leadership role at the sub-communal level.  
 
ix While there are historical cases where individuals moved from Hutu to Tutsi status, interviews 
very clearly indicated that people considered their status to be a non-negotiable ethnic reality.  
 
x While the term “youth” evokes the idea of adolescence and the years surrounding this age, 
“youth” in Africa can be much older. In Burundi, youth in political groups refers to members 
between 18 and 35 years of age. 
 
xi All names have been changed to preserve confidentiality. 
 
xii Jean Claude described the geographic separation of Hutu and Tutsi families. Tutsi lived at the 
top of the hill in the Mugamba, in the colder hilltops. In the middle, a mixture of Hutu and Tutsi 
(mostly Hutu) lived on the Mirwa, in the cooler lower levels of the hills. At the bottom near the 
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shores of Lake Tanganyika was the Imbo, dominated by Hutu families. He referenced the feeling 
of entrapment between the hills and the lake, leaving only the choice to fight, flee, or die. 
 
xiii Demobilisés is the term used for those ex-combatants who are formally demobilized through 
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programming. Several respondents noted 
that the advantage of having more people to become demoblisés was linked to the bargaining 
power the CNDD-FDD had in negotiations. 
 
xiv Taxes were described in several ways, taking the form of money or actual goods from families; 
however, the concept was clear that families were expected to support the CNDD-FDD regardless 
of what they had or did not have available.  
 
xv Agathon Rwasa was the leader of the FNL, head of both the rebel movement and the political 
party. The FNL later branched into two parties: FNL-Rwasa and FNL-Miburo. Rwasa, who went 
into hiding after the 2010 elections, was unable to function as the head of party while absent, 
though FNL loyalists continued to recognize him as such. He returned in 2013, shrouded in 
controversy over his eligibility to be head of a political party due to his absence and allegations of 
human rights violations, and he faced several blocks by the government. When people speak 
about the rift between FNL and CNDD-FDD, it is always about Rwasa’s FNL. 
 
xvi The claims of history repeating itself refer to Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, rather than the most 
recent civil war in Burundi, which was not organized by the government.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EMPOWERMENT AND DISEMPOWERMENT OF CONFLICT:  
WOMEN AS MINORITY ACTORS 
 
Introduction 
Many social norms and community structures are overturned or suspended during 
civil war, creating opportunities for social change – a change that can empower some, 
while severely disempowering other groups who are unable to seek protection from the 
state or stable governing bodies. This chapter focuses on how the war shaped 
opportunities and decisions for women during this time. In particular, women stood out 
as a subgroup that showcased the paradoxical nature of social upheaval. In response to a 
quickly shifting social, political, and economic context, they were able to successfully 
transform women’s roles and open up public space for women’s participation. However, 
at least some of them did so by contributing to the violence that victimized, brutalized, 
and disempowered so many other women. Many women even experienced (and continue 
to experience) both sides of this story simultaneously.  
About an hour outside of Bujumbura in the commune of Gitaza, Gloria sat on a 
small chair in a back corner of her new house, making a meal of ugali,xvii fish, sauce, and 
vegetables. Children swarmed the house to view the spectacle - a foreigner dining in their 
small community on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Her house was still unfinished, with 
only the brick structure and the roof completed. She cooked over a small fire in the 
kitchen, occasionally bustling out of the house to yell at children to give us space. They 
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scattered in all directions, slowly congregating again in the spaces that doors and 
windows were meant to occupy.  
Gloria’s previous home was blown up in a grenade attack just a few weeks prior 
to our first meeting. A prominent member of the CNDD-FDD in Gitaza, Gloria became 
the target of FNL radicals engaging in the quid pro quo violence that defined the 
atmosphere following the 2010 elections. Luckily, neighbors warned her that she was a 
target, so she switched the rooms where she and her children slept just two days prior to 
the attack. Her new house was guarded by a member of the Imbonerakure, situated 
among several families of CNDD-FDD supporters. The children of the neighborhood 
regard Gloria with a mix of respect and fear; they all know she fought in the war, giving 
her an almost mythical status in the community. Gloria’s experience as a rebel held many 
consequences for her and her two children, but she said she would never take it back. She 
is a leader in her community and an ex-combatant, and she believes her life is all the 
better for it.  
For many male ex-combatants, being targeted in the wake of the 2010 elections 
felt like a trap they could not escape. For Gloria, it symbolized the power she possessed – 
and for that reason, it was a burden she chose to bear. Gloria’s experience, along with 
those of so many women I interviewed, represents the complexity that minority identities 
add onto one another. Exploration of political choice and the opportunities for 
empowerment of groups with multiple minority identities can shed light on several 
questions. How does war shift cultural norms to create spaces for disempowered groups? 
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What are the consequences to these normative shifts? What did this process look like for 
women who joined armed groups and those who did not join?  
These questions contribute to an understanding of the relationship between 
conflict and empowerment. Crisis and moments of volatility often propel groups to 
action, but specifically in war, the expectations, consequences, and rewards of a previous 
movement can feed into the potential for future violence. In the case of Burundi, as 
discussed in Chapter One, mobilizers constructed the ethnic narrative during the war to 
compel a response in a moment of crisis. This narrative and others used in the process of 
mobilization were accompanied by a promise of empowerment and used to encourage 
mobilization and wide-scale participation and support for rebel movements. Historical 
accounts of the civil war highlight participation of largely young male Hutu (and 
conversely, Tutsi) populations, but deemphasize the role of other members engaged in the 
rebellion who also hoped for better access to political and social structures.  
Thus, this chapter focuses on the narratives and constructs for political choice 
specifically available to women during the civil war, to better understand how narratives 
resonate differently (or not) with this group – theoretically included under the umbrella of 
liberation narratives, but functionally omitted and even especially disempowered by the 
realities of war. Because other chapters focus on broader narratives and the sample is 
more heavily represented by men overall, this chapter focuses on the ways that women as 
a population evoked unique experiences that would otherwise not be represented in the 
patterns identified in other chapters. It highlights the experience of women as a minority 
group that gave them different relationships to the ethnic conflict and visions of liberation 
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from that of men. While there are of course other minority groups that could have been 
studied, for example the ethnic Twa minority, women represented a large enough portion 
of my sample that they could be studied accurately. The ways that women take on or 
reject these narratives is important, as a political and economic minority that makes up 
roughly half the population and has increasing influence in politics. 
First, this chapter begins with a note on limitations of studying the political 
participation of women in Burundi, to set up a clearer understanding of the arguments 
made. It then moves into a discussion on mobilization and empowerment, which is 
relevant for all types of collective action, but poses a particular conundrum to women’s 
support in a struggle for liberation like Burundi’s. The chapter then outlines the historic 
roles that set men and women up leading into the war, in order to lay the groundwork for 
conceptualization of women’s decision-making during the war itself. The next two 
sections detail women’s navigation of conflict within the private roles and spaces they 
occupied, positing that women were no less actors and decision-makers in conflict, but 
their roles gave them unique limitations and opportunities that funneled their patterns of 
participation in different ways than men. Namely, they were much more likely to seek 
(and receive) support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and much less 
likely to receive reinsertion support as ex-combatants. Overall, they had much less 
autonomy over their protection and well-being, and were less likely to seek that 
autonomy if they had men their lives able to support them. The section that follows 
examines women who rejected the limitations of these private roles and joined groups as 
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public actors, then documenting the growing space (and accompanying limitations) for 
the empowerment of women throughout the conflict into the post-conflict period.  
The chapter concludes by highlighting why the case of women in Burundi 
remains significant. First, the chapter highlights a need for further exploration of minority 
groups in conflict, as women have been specifically misunderstood, underestimated as 
political actors in conflict (particularly in the rebellion itself), and interventions have in 
some cases inadvertently reinforced disempowering structures that maintain their 
political and economic marginalization. Second, the experiences of women highlight how 
minority status can funnel subsets of the population into unique sets of networks with 
important consequences for empowerment in the aftermath of war. Third, unfulfilled 
narratives of empowerment lead to gaps that create pockets of both apathy and activism, 
which have the power to shape future narratives. Women’s stories are important in and of 
themselves, but also for their power to help us understand how minority status affects the 
uptake of mobilization narratives and buy-in for political action in the post-conflict 
period. 
 
Studying Women’s Political Participation 
 Researching women’s political participation in Burundi was more difficult than 
working with male respondents. They were more difficult to access, and many of them 
did not feel comfortable discussing experiences during the war or their current positions 
on key political issues. While snowball sampling was effective for accessing a variety of 
political affiliations and experiences among men, snowball sampling yielded very few 
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women unless we asked specifically to speak to them – men we were interviewing simply 
did not think of women as political actors who might be useful to interview. Moreover, 
women’s networks were shaped much more densely; women’s recommendations within 
their networks often led us to the house directly next door, or the one beyond that, while 
men often recommended people who lived further away with whom they interacted 
outside of home life. 
 To address these issues, we asked a variety of men to introduce us to women who 
were not in their families but who they knew to be trustworthy, slightly modifying our 
description in a randomized fashion to ensure that we were introduced to women across 
all provinces. We chose to delve deeper into two specific networks of women to gain 
deeper insight into the ways that networks shaped (or did not shape) female experiences. 
The first network was within a neighborhood of internally displaced persons living in 
Bujumbura Mairie who came from many different parts of the country and have not been 
able to return. We first accessed the neighborhood to listen to experiences of people who 
were internally displaced, but found that the neighborhood was almost entirely occupied 
by women, most of whom had lost their husbands or other male family members during 
the war. We selected more heavily in this area in order to better understand these 
experiences. The data also is slightly skewed due to the fact that it was more difficult in 
this neighborhood to isolate people for interviews, as they often automatically offered to 
have family members or neighbors talk to us as well, and we accepted. Fourteen women 
and two men were included in interviews in Kajiji. 
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The second network was of women who fought during the war. We accessed 
women who fought during the war in Cibitoke, Bubanza, and Bujumbura Rural, a sample 
of six women in total. Given the rarity of finding these women and having opportunities 
to develop strong relationships with them, we were only able to find one in Cibitoke and 
one in Bubanza, both in the FNL. However, in Bujumbura Rural, we were able to 
develop relationships strong enough to access multiple women in the same network (all 
three joined CNDD-FDD), and one outside of this network who joined FNL. 
 
Mobilization and Empowerment 
 Mobilizers often experience what Vasi and Macy (2003) have called the 
“mobilizer’s dilemma” when seeking ways to encourage participation in a social 
movement. The dilemma refers to two well-known problems in mobilization: the free-
rider problem and the efficacy problem. The free rider problem happens when those who 
contribute to a movement are not the only ones to benefit from the movement, therefore 
discouraging personal responsibility in contributing to the movement. If everyone can 
benefit regardless of their input, motivations to actively contribute diminish, creating 
“free riders.” On the other hand, if the perceived benefit is too diluted in terms of 
personal gain (only small benefits directly connect to the contributor’s participation), 
people may be less inclined to participate in a movement as well due to a lack of 
perceived “efficacy” for themselves. Therefore, the logic of collective action leads people 
to believe that they may still receive benefits overall if they do not participate in a cause, 
with no added personal benefit to participating. 
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 To address this issue, mobilizers often encourage participation with rhetorical 
narratives that appeal to groups in ways that balance both collective and personal 
interests. There are two competing narratives that help groups to achieve participation 
and reduce the free rider and efficacy problems: narratives of crisis (to address free 
riders) and narratives of empowerment (to address efficacy issues). These two approaches 
often go hand in hand. For example, the ethnic narrative that rebel groups employed in 
Burundi during the war served both as one highlighting the level and urgency of the crisis 
but the call to action related to ethnic mobilization and promised opportunity to Hutus 
who felt otherwise marginalized. The crisis narrative was widely accepted – to the point 
that Burundians often refer to the period between 1993 and 2005 as la crise (the crisis). 
The war itself is widely debated still, framed as a civil war by many Hutus and a 
genocide by many Tutsis in interviews; however, both groups claimed the events that 
followed Ndadaye’s assassination resulted in a national moment of crisis wherein 
interests of the two groups were too polarized to move forward together in the 
government. 
 In addition to the construction and use of crisis/empowerment narratives, 
mobilizers employed the use of violence to force direct action. As discussed in previous 
chapters, all groups – including the military, CNDD-FDD, and FNL – used violence and 
the threat of violence to get communities to comply with them. Therefore, groups 
actively created parallel “crises” of war to instill compliance with their movement in 
different ways. Both men and women spoke of their exposure to violence and related 
stories of acute violence that influenced decision-making. However, these types of 
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violence were different. According to interviews about wartime, men were most often 
targeted as potential members of rebel groups; women, on the other hand, most typically 
recounted stories of being harassed for information about men in their family or being 
sexually abused by soldiers and rebel militia who used rape to exert dominance over 
families and communities.  
  
Historical Roles of Burundian Men and Women in Political and Public Space 
Patricia Daley (2007) has argued that while Burundi traditionally had separate 
roles for men and women, ethnicity and clan more strictly defined the pre-colonial 
structure of social life and power than did gender roles. One’s political power rested on 
one’s role within family lines, meaning that a woman’s political power was tied to her 
family’s power. Men delineated this “family” power, as women’s power in social and 
political life was linked to their husbands’ or fathers’ power, and there were scant 
opportunities for them to gain political or official roles in public life. However, colonial 
rule introduced a masculine power structure that reinforced male domination, both legally 
and formally. Laws that formalized women as subordinate to their husbands with regard 
to legal matters placed strict limitations on a woman’s place in social life that further 
reinforced by the Catholic church’s idealization of the role of “housewife” as the epitome 
of femininity and morality – a concept that previously had not existed (Mianda, 2002).  
 In fact, despite Burundi’s patriarchal structure, the concept of being a housewife 
was quite incongruous with the life most women led in communities, and particularly 
contrasted with notable women in the history of the Great Lakes region. While women 
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were tied to their husbands economically and socially, the queen mother and 
Inamujandixviii served as prime examples of the political power that women wielded 
within traditional structures. Colonialism eliminated opportunities for this more flexible 
interpretation of power in Burundi by strictly limiting access to public roles and public 
life that heightened the subservience of women to men.  
 By the time colonial rule ended and Burundi’s independent government began, 
women were legally subjugated as property of men. Women had no rights under the law 
to inherit property, and where laws did protect women against violence (such as in cases 
of rape), the legal framework did not translate to protection for women under the law. 
Women had minimal representation in government during this period and into the early 
1990s.  
During these years, however, women did engage in political resistance alongside 
their male counterparts in PALIPEHUTU. The leader of PALIPEHUTU created youth 
and women’s leagues to support and attract a broad following, a movement designed to 
be the antithesis of the undemocratic government in power at the time. The structure 
would later carry on into the creation of CNDD-FDD and their women’s and youth 
leagues. In particular, as CNDD-FDD attempted to separate itself from the FNL and 
establish itself as a party, they relied on these wings to develop a wider base and move 
away from ethnic rhetoric (Jones 2014). So, the process of democratization and the 
period during negotiations (though still marred by violent rapes and abuses of women) 
created an important shift wherein women actively participated in the design of future 
priorities and platforms and ensured female representation in political space. The new 
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constitution developed between 2003 and 2005 required 30% of Senate and National 
Assembly seats go to women per party representation, formalizing gains for women in 
the public arena (Gasana and Boshoff, 2003).  
 
Women as Private Actors: Decision-Making Shaped by Family and Social Networks  
Social networks and relationships are exploited to encourage participation in 
violence, which partially explains why members of demographic groups are not always 
targeted equally. In Burundi, the small size of communities and strength of social 
relationships within these communities created pockets in which rebel movements could 
intervene and target people together. The majority of those who participated in a rebel 
movement explained that they were introduced through secretive gatherings at which 
recruiters explained the importance of joining. Walker and Lynn (2013) have explained 
this in social movements literature through the concept of role-based identities that feed 
into self-image or personal identity, attempting to bridge the individual to the social. 
Roles, which are defined through social expectations and social relationships, feed into 
one’s self-understanding. A social movement exploiting these ties effectively can 
encourage individuals to picture possibilities for self-transformation and capitalize on 
values associated with the roles people play in society to encourage them to join. In 
Burundi, this again rings true, as people’s societal roles dictated how they evaluated their 
options. 
Prior to 1993, subjugation and violence was primarily designed to target those 
who were deemed political threats. During the Tutsi government following independence, 
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attempts to rebel were quelled violently and through massacres targeting (mostly male) 
educated and elite Hutu citizens. Most women were not seen as major political threats, 
given the lack of access for Hutu women to education and high-level positions. In line 
with this, most women recounted the risks they saw during early years of the 1993 civil 
war in terms of the men in their lives, such as husbands, brothers, and fathers, private 
relationships that linked them to public life, and the national crisis at hand. Indeed, much 
of the violence they experienced was related to rape committed by all groups or their 
association with male family members who were being targeted (Tutsi by Hutu rebels, or 
Hutu by Tutsi military) or pressured to join a rebel group. Since it was not considered 
tactically useful to kill women, women were violated and raped as a display of power and 
control in the community (sometimes done as a collective act of war, and often done by 
individuals gaining “their reward”). Rape as a part of war was not exclusively linked to 
the ethnic conflict; in addition to Tutsi soldiers raping Hutu women and rebel fighters 
raping Tutsi women, both CNDD-FDD and FNL raped Hutu women during the war, 
many of them under the age of 15. 
Coralie described the extreme violence to which she was subjected by people in 
her community who wanted the men in her family dead:  
I was the first in the family to wake up in the morning. I opened the gate, and 
there was a coffee plant in front of our house – someone had driven nails into the 
plant all over it. The people who put those nails in the plant knocked on my 
father’s door. They took him, and they beat him; they beat all of us. He was killed 
on Friday, at dawn – at 4 a.m. My younger brother was killed on Saturday at 4 
p.m.  
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Coralie’s decision to flee was therefore a direct result of having no option to stay and 
very few resources. Following the death of her father and brother, her mother was also 
killed, leaving her and her youngest siblings with no options. As the oldest daughter, she 
sought the support of NGOs that she heard were providing land and support for housing 
to women who had been displaced: 
We fled to Ngagara, because we heard they were giving property to families, and 
we build our home, bit by bit. I can’t return home, but I know who killed my 
family, because they were our neighbors. I couldn’t even get water – they called 
me a cockroach. When I was young, I believed that Hutu and Tutsi were the same. 
But then, I learned from this… I had to leave. 
 
Although Coralie’s mother was also beaten to death in the same attack, she first 
spoke at length about the deaths of her father and younger brother as the primary targets 
before explaining how these impacted her opportunities. Her account portrays the 
relationship that women had to the ongoing violence – often targeted because of their 
relationships with men, or by circumstance of being present. Her options also signified 
the ways in which gender shaped the choices available to women. She could not opt to 
stay independently in the community with no property of her own and young siblings to 
care for. Moreover, her freedom of movement was limited, her ability to collect water 
being an important signifier of this. Instead, she capitalized on one opportunity she had 
heard about from other women faced with similar choices: NGOs providing resources 
specifically to women to build homes in the city center. Coralie’s example highlights the 
effect that private roles had on women’s choices and their exposure to violence; however, 
she is hardly a passive bystander in her narrative. Despite the constraints on her shaped 
by her role in the family and the deaths of key figures who could have provided and 
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assured access to certain rights, she still made choices about where to go and which 
opportunities to take advantage of based on the information available to her.  
However, it is important to consider if Coralie’s experience was typical. In terms 
of how she described her networks and exposure to violence, her account is certainly not 
unique. Babette, a woman living in Bujumbura who was recently widowed by political 
violence in the years after the war, explained, “I never joined any party. I don’t think 
anything about political groups – I didn’t have any time to participate. I never did, but my 
husband did.” She was too young during the war to make her own choices, with her 
mother still looking after her then. In the years following the war, however, she felt she 
better understood the costs associated with it. “War affects me now,” she said, “It’s been 
8 months since my husband died. He was in the CNDD-FDD. I can’t say anything – it’s 
just hard for me. Life is hard without my husband. We rented our house, and my landlord 
kicked me out.” While Babette’s husband was actively engaged in politics, she herself 
was completely disengaged, focused instead on surviving without her husband. She said, 
“Before, I was helping to carry stones and wood. But I can no longer work because I have 
tuberculosis. I got it last year but I tried to keep working… now I came to ask where I can 
build [a house] in Kanyosha.” Her position made her highly dependent on others for 
survival, with few resources to draw upon after his death. Her solution was also to find an 
NGO to help her.  
Even Alice, now an active member of the CNDD-FDD, couched her choices in 
terms of family. She chose to support CNDD-FDD early on, but did not participate in 
public until later on in 2005:  
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In 1993, I was 28 years old and had one child. I have eight children now. I chose 
[the CNDD-FDD] because it was a party that wanted to bring people together. 
Some of my family was Tutsi and others were Hutu. Where can you stand? Even 
before God, there are no ethnic groups. 
 
By 1993, women in Burundi had almost exclusively assumed highly gendered 
roles that were relegated to private space. They had dense community networks that gave 
them few options outside their strong family relationships and those with other women. 
Formally and legally, they had no rights to protect their economic wealth, which was 
linked to their birth family or their husbands. Informally and culturally, the roles for 
women as public leaders had severely diminished, and again women’s lack of protection 
in these spaces from domestic violence and inheritance issues highlighted how little 
power they had as a cohort in public space. Women’s importance in the social fabric of 
communities was instead related to private and personal relationships and backdoor 
influence.  
Private and personal relationships were also cultivated in spaces like markets and 
churches, where women did not have formal roles as “leaders,” but had the opportunity to 
speak to one another about what was happening and support decision-making. These 
public spaces connected women to each other and gave them an outlet to learn about 
options available to them and their families, and to share those options with men. While 
women’s choices were severely constrained and the types of violence they encountered 
starkly different from those of men, they made as much use of their own social networks 
– more often based around private life – to leverage opportunities and make decisions.  
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While there were groups like the CNDD-FDD’s women’s league and a few 
notable women who held political positions during the war, this happened only as the 
CNDD-FDD transitioned into a political party and clear negotiations were underway. 
Instead of exercising regular autonomy in decision-making, the majority of women 
interviewed were attached to men (typically husbands or fathers) who made decisions 
about whether to flee as refugees, go to camps for internal displacement, stay on their 
land, fight, or take another course of action. Almost all of the women who ended up 
displaced had lost this key member of their family or had been caught in an attack from 
which they fled with part of the family, leaving the fate of the rest of the members 
unknown. Family was of utmost importance, firstly because they genuinely valued their 
families and family members above all else, and secondly because family gave these 
women their “place” in communities and afforded them the associated protections.  
Maman Cynthia, a Tutsi woman who was married to a Hutu, depended on her 
husband for protection from rebel groups during the war. As a Tutsi, she was the main 
target of violence and had been attacked early on when violence broke out. However, 
despite her parents being in Rwanda, she stayed with her husband and children in 
Burundi for three years until he agreed to go with her. However, Maman Cynthia may 
have depended on her husband for protection, but she did not revere his opinion more 
highly than her own. In fact, Maman Cynthia did not even believe Hutus to be 
particularly civilized or capable of decision-making. She framed her husband as a simple 
man: 
My husband wanted the war to end, too, so we didn’t have problems. Hutu are 
becoming civilized; they’ve started to learn from the Tutsi. They are improving 
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their minds, but never want to take an opportunity. I see it even in my husband – 
he isn’t finished. For example, sometimes I give him ideas, but it takes him a long 
time to react. He is okay, but when he is with other Hutus it becomes a problem, 
and he starts taking on their ideas. I know he supports my ideas, though. The first 
category is Tutsi. They are smart. Hutus can improve, but they are not very 
reflective on their own. 
The incongruity of Maman Cynthia’s choice to rely on her husband despite her 
assessment of his decision-making skills illustrates the importance of men – not for their 
superior capabilities in affording protection, but for their protection afforded by their 
male positions.  
Similar to Maman Cynthia, Antoinette was both endangered and saved by her 
relationships with men in her family. Antoinette struggled for words to speak about her 
life during the war. A Tutsi woman whose daughter married a Hutu, she now lived in the 
care of her eldest grandson, a local leader of the CNDD-FDD. She spoke of the role of 
men and the loss of social control during the war. “In 1993,” she said, “it was difficult to 
control people… especially young brothers.” Her second grandson, the brother of the one 
with whom she was living, tried to kill their mother (Antoinette’s daughter) during the 
war to prove his worth to the rebel group after soldiers killed his father and uncles while 
he was in elementary school. Whereas her grandsons joined the war, Antoinette and her 
daughter ended up displaced in Ngagara with no one to rely on. Her daughter passed 
away in 2005, and she eventually came to live with her grandson. She explained, “What 
happened – I suffered the consequences of the war even though I wasn’t part of it. I don’t 
care. That’s why I’m okay now.” Antoinette’s role as an actor in the conflict was shaped 
so heavily by her dependence on men that she found she could not survive and maintain 
any political involvement. 
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Christiane also spoke about this pattern, but in a different way. She was young 
during the war and fled at the age of 10 when both of her parents were killed in her home 
in Kayanza. Although she was once one of six children, she said, “Now there are just four 
of us, because of the war. I only know where one is. I heard the others were alive, but I 
don’t know where they are now.” She has a scar on her leg from when she was wounded 
and taken to a hospital in a safe zone. She explains the difficulty she faced surviving as a 
child during the war, and then later as an adult: 
I am the third child. When my mother died, I took my little sister. Someone else 
helped me, and for two years I kept my sister – she was just seven months old – 
with me in a safe zone in Kayanza. But then, someone brought me here to Buja. I 
came to Kanyosha, and stayed inside for three days without going out. The whole 
area was blocked. No one came or left when the military came. 
 
I tried to work for a family, but the payment was barely enough for my sister and I 
to survive. Neither of us could go to school. I asked God to give me a husband to 
help me… to love me. I got married 10 years ago. I met him when we came here 
[to Bujumbura]. He was working as a guard in an office. Then, we could rent a 
house here. Without any family to help, it wasn’t possible before. But I got 
married and now we rent the house. 
 
The pattern here is not that women make choices based on their families and men 
do not, but rather that the private roles of women as mothers, daughters, and sisters 
constrained the choices available to them in unique ways compared to men. Women’s 
roles pushed them into a different set of pathways that made them more likely to travel 
with their families to camps for the displaced and more likely to explain their exposure to 
violence and assessment of risks through the filter of the men in their lives. Wives and 
eldest daughters in particular cited their responsibility as caregivers to family – and 
especially children – in a way that men did not. Additionally, they relied on separate 
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networks for support in navigating these roles in the midst of social upheaval, both during 
and after the war. 
Men and women described different relationships to violence in no small part due 
to separation of gender roles in social life and the comparatively limited role of women in 
public spaces in Burundi. Narratives of crisis rang true to most women interviewed, but 
in different ways than men. Additionally, narratives of empowerment encouraging Hutu 
to stand and fight for their right to education or representation in government did not 
actually resonate with most women interviewed. When describing what guided their 
decision-making during the war, women spoke more about their faith, their experiences 
as internally displaced persons, the role of civil society supporting them, and practical 
challenges that guided the decisions available to them. Men, on the other hand, spoke 
more often about their social relationships, their ethnic identity, experiences as refugees, 
and their access to institutions (i.e. education and government positions). There is, of 
course, overlap between these groups: both heavily emphasized their ethnic identity 
overall, though men attributed more weight to ethnicity as part of their decision-making 
processes. However, these trends overall highlighted the ways in which men and women 
internalized the crisis differently, and how they understood the choices available to them 
through a heavily gendered lens.  
 The limited sample of thirty-six women represented a wide variety of political 
choice and political action. Six women participated in either the FNL or the CNDD-FDD 
rebel groups, fourteen never participated in politics and showed no interest, eight 
participated actively in politics in a non-violent manner (three without ever having 
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supported a rebel group in any way), and eight were active in political space without 
affiliating themselves with a party. Thus, while they are not fully representative of the 
population, they provide a set of cases to better understand the process of political choice 
for women, and how this process differed and overlapped with that of men.  
 Out of all of these women, none claimed their choices were primarily for the 
purpose of “empowerment” in the way that the larger narrative was constructed. This 
trend is prominent in contrast with men, who gave more weight to narratives that 
emphasized Hutu liberation and equal access to power. Empowerment served as a 
secondary driver, and the narrative shifted notably away from formalized equal access to 
public space towards a secondary narrative focused on protection against victimization. 
The ethnic divide in access to education, political offices, and the military, for example, 
were highlighted as ethnic issues, but not necessarily women’s issues. Many of the 
women recognized injustices in the system they were living in, but their choice to support 
the war (or not) was largely driven by other factors linked to the crisis narrative, or 
physical exposure to violence. A minority of women spoke of “empowerment,” and 
described it as an escape from victimhood: a refusal to be victims of the crisis and the 
violence that was taking place. This definition is particularly poignant, given that rape 
and sexual violence became such an important part of the empowerment narrative for 
men (and boys becoming men) in the rebellion who developed a “to the victor go the 
spoils” mentality. Empowerment and opportunity of the war were gendered experiences 
with much clearer benefits for men, but joining the rebellion provided both groups 
protections and a chance for personal gain. Women were later able to create these 
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opportunities for formal political gain as the war came to an end, expanding the 
movement’s objectives of equality and inclusion. 
Private Roles in Public Spaces: the Church, the Market, and the NGO 
For women, public space provided a forum they were able to informally influence 
decision-making outside of overtly political arenas. Of church, Maman Cynthia said, “It 
was hard but we fled in a Christian community where I never had problems. In the 
Christian community it was like a vacation; I could talk to people who came to church.” 
Many women described church like an oasis in a desert – a place to be at ease. Twenty 
percent of the women I interviewed cited church or religious identity as having a major 
influence on their decision-making, either through the people they knew from their 
religious community or through messages they identified with that guided them in 
making choices during the war. Comparatively, only 5% of men cited religion in the 
same way. It is likely that religion and people encountered through religious practice did 
influence men, as many of them referenced church heavily as part of their daily lives. 
However, because men typically had several other arenas they might associate with key 
decision-making moments, such as school, work, and community gatherings, they did not 
distinguish the church or religion as the primary factor in political participation and 
decision-making. Women, whose access to public space was more limited, had personal 
relationships in church and other public spaces that allowed them to obtain information 
during the war and rely on a network outside of their families for support. 
While the church in Rwanda became heavily involved with Hutu leadership and 
eventually the genocide, the same was not true for Burundi. Bagaza, aware of tensions 
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between the church and Tutsis in Rwanda, restricted space for the church to operate. It 
was not until Buyoya assumed power that the church began to operate more freely. As a 
result, few people mentioned the church as a political space. The church message, 
according to most men and women, was one of peace. However unsurprisingly, 
interviews revealed that church leaders (priests and pastors) kept relationships with rebel 
groups operating in the area as key influential figures, yet only one example was given of 
a church in which leaders were believed to be actively involved in the rebellion. Notably, 
the priest of this church confirmed his interests in “Hutu liberation” in a later interview.  
This narrative reveals that women’s descriptions of the church as a place of refuge 
and a place to process what was happening around them without fear of retribution were 
consistent with other descriptions. Women emphasized the function of the church in 
supporting them during these times. Christiane, the woman who came to Bujumbura as a 
young girl, shared the following explanation:  
It was a time to get redeemed. Time to forget. Time to forgive. Time to rest. No 
one can forgive completely – it’s not possible. What is possible is to forgive bit by 
bit, but when someone makes you angry, it brings it all back. Evil makes people 
not to forgive, but the church helps you try. 
Arielle, who refused to participate in any kind of party politics, described church 
as a place where she was able to speak freely without politics interfering: “The Church 
says to avoid politics…Partisan people also come to church, but they don’t bring that 
with them in their hearts. Politics is outside the church.” A pastor in the same community 
echoed this sentiment, saying, “In my church, we debated on and demanded education. 
Democracy was active. It still is active.” While men rarely mentioned the significance of 
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this space as part of their decision-making, a large minority of women found strength in 
the church and the idea that one could focus on what is important without engaging in 
political partisanship.  
For both men and women, citing religion or the church as an influencer of 
decision-making was almost always in reference to their strong rejection of politics and 
often complete apathy for social change. The result was surprising given the fact that 
priests and pastors themselves most often promoted democracy and activism without 
partisanship (noting that most if not all seemed to manage complex political relationships 
and a few did promote Hutu liberation).  
For women in particular, churches were also a resource for escaping sexual 
violence. One priest commented on this particular function:  
If they said you were a “betrayer” on the radio – a betrayer of the government – 
they would come, take you, and kill you. Girls were obliged to spend the night 
with the police. If you didn't go, you were forced to have sex with them. There 
was a man with a wife. They knocked on his door. They said they're going to 
spend the night – told the man to go sleep over there [he gestures towards the 
distance]. ‘The chief wants to spend the night with your wife.’ This is what I 
hated. All the girls had to go slowly, quietly to where [the priests and nuns] slept 
in order to hide. If the people were there for a week, the nuns would stay gone for 
a week. When they could go back to spend the night with their families, the nuns 
would come back. 
 
Church was a safe space for women and provided with them an option to escape 
(literally and figuratively) the violence surrounding them during the war. The 
relationships women developed in church helped them talk about their pain and prepared 
them for the choices and difficulties to come.  
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Markets and NGOs were two other public spaces that were cited more frequently 
by women than men, these mostly linked to decision-making in the later years of the war 
and in its aftermath. Men spoke about the market almost unanimously in an abstract 
sense, or merely in passing. One man in Bujumbura Rural mentioned, “I was at the 
market with my parents, and I saw four or five men with guns.” It was the first time he 
understood as a boy that war was breaking out. However, he did not connect this 
significant event to any choices or decisions he made. Another man mentioned, “I hope 
that in the future there is positive change. Things are going up on the market – I made a 
good choice by staying [in Burundi].” Markets for men marked occupational space, but 
were not commented on as an equally important social space. Women, on the other hand, 
referred to markets as essential to the options available to them for survival on a personal 
level. Francine, who lives as an internally displaced person in Bujumbura Mairie, spoke 
about the market in explaining what it was like to live in a household without men in the 
city, saying, “ I thank God because I eat. There are others who don’t for days in the hills. 
My mother and I work in the market to support ourselves.” 
Marguerite highlighted the market in a different way. She struggled to find food 
and pay for school fees for her children, as she was unemployed with no formal skills, but 
she refused to take a husband in the current political climate, as she felt she could not 
trust anyone. People in the market helped her meagerly survive, but with control over 
who would enter her home. Speaking of recent killings in the community, she said: 
We don’t know about politics today. Maybe the President has charged [CNDD-
FDD] to do this. Nothing has been done about it. I can’t know anyone – a man 
himself can’t never really be shown. You can live with someone without knowing 
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he’s a killer. You can live with a neighbor and never know if he’s the right man. 
It’s a problem: finding food, money for four children, and for soap. It’s a big 
problem. Every day, I wake up and I try to find food. Sometimes I find some; 
sometimes, I don’t. But I borrow money. If people trust me, they lend it to me and 
I pay it back.  
 
I asked her how she managed to get people to lend her money, if it was through 
family or another way. She replied: 
No, I depend on the shops in the market nearby. I have to be a permanent 
customer, and then they will lend to you sometimes. Sometimes I also see friends 
who will give me a copybook for my children for school. I don’t have family lend 
to me. If you want to have family, you keep them out of this. No organizations 
help any more. Churches do not help either normally, but sometimes pastors help 
people who come to the church. 
 
Marguerite sees herself with no options, given her mistrust of others in the current 
political climate. However, loans from people with whom she had longstanding 
relationships enabled her to separate financial and familial relationships and reject the 
idea of finding a husband. The market provided a space for consistent personal 
interaction with vendors, storeowners, and friends that Marguerite could call upon when 
in need of support.  
At the same moment in Burundi, economic struggles factored heavily into male 
decision-making as well. This raises the question of why men did not speak about 
markets. The larger diversity of options available to men for economic security shifted 
their focus to other factors with more direct roles. Chapter Four explores a broader 
analysis of these networks in order to understand their correlation with different types of 
choices. 
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Finally, women also discussed the value of NGOs more than men. Non-
governmental organizations, unlike markets and churches, created connections between 
women from different parts of the country; women connected to NGOs (or who knew 
about their programs) told each other about them, and information passed by word of 
mouth through various avenues: information campaigns, families sending word, and 
women who knew each other through other networks (such as those created at churches 
and markets). Non-governmental organizations provided services more exclusively to 
subsets of the population based on their programs and target groups and constructed new 
networks for those who were selected to benefit from or participate in these programs. In 
fact, the promise of finding support from an NGO attracted women to Bujumbura, where 
many were able to access funds to build homes and obtain skills training or training to 
become advocates for peace. Nevertheless, effects on women’s opportunities for 
decision-making varied widely.  
Outside of demobilization efforts, many of the programs providing support during 
the war either explicitly or inadvertently targeted women. Two Hutu women proudly 
spoke of their certification as women leaders to support democracy; both ran and lost in 
the 2010 municipal elections with the CNDD-FDD in Bujumbura, but have maintained 
political influence in their communities through other roles. Both had husbands and 
remained in their homes (in Bujumbura Rural and Bujumbura Mairie) during the war, and 
both considered themselves to be politically empowered by the NGO. In Kajiji 
neighborhood, a group of internally displaced women expressed overwhelming 
sentiments of isolation and powerlessness. Mostly Tutsi and separated from their families 
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(or widowed), they had heard about opportunities to gain materials and build homes, but 
were unprepared for the ways in which these resources would further isolate them.  
The space reserved for housing internally displaced persons was situated in the 
middle of the neighborhood, which seemed a good location but still functioned as an 
island, as women living there were largely excluded from daily lives of those around 
them. Most women were unable to find regular employment and focused strictly on 
survival, citing the need to pay rent and feed themselves and their families and 
occasionally mentioning school fees. Women clearly expressed gratitude for the support 
to build their homes. Their situations during the war meant that, for many of them, having 
a new place to create a home with other women who went through similar trauma was 
essential to survival. However, an unintended consequence of creating an enclave in the 
neighborhood and providing materials without connecting these women to community 
networks was that this support inadvertently created a group that was living in almost 
complete isolation, with nothing to tie them into the neighborhood. Many of these 
women, without men to support them and without their own sources of income, had little 
to contribute within the established community that surrounded them and therefore had 
difficulties developing important social ties despite efforts.  
Josephine, a woman living in this neighborhood, described her life as one mired 
by extreme poverty and stress related to her economic well-being, saying at one point that 
her “only reason to live is to see if today will be better.” Despite many other interviews 
with people living in extreme poverty and those facing economic insecurity due to 
unemployment, only the women in Kajiji spoke in these terms. Completely focused on 
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survival, nearly all of the women in this area repeated a similar narrative: life was better 
prior to the war, they lost close family members (often several), and came as displaced 
people to Bujumbura. In Bujumbura, life was worse economically, but they stayed for the 
security. They built houses with the help of Swedish funding that provided materials, and 
are now completely focused on survival.  
With only two exceptions, the group fit a specific profile that likely qualified 
them as beneficiaries of the funding. In no other area were the personal histories that 
people shared so similar to each other. However, the funding itself created a new social 
network – an enclave within the neighborhood where this economic and socially 
disadvantaged group depended largely on each other for survival, with no or little 
connections beyond the borders of Kajiji. This linked to another pattern in interviews: all 
but two interviewees mentioned depending on organizations for support and lamented 
that there were not as many opportunities as before to provide continued help. They also 
all expressed a complete disconnect from politics and the present situation, but believed it 
was possible that it would improve. Their focus was on survival was largely because they 
believed it was still possible, and that their situation could change at any moment.  
Francine, a single 33-year-old Tutsi woman living in this enclave with her 
younger siblings, spoke about the tightness of the group: 
I can’t say I rent this house alone. These women help me. If someone has money 
for soap, they can give it to me if I need it. Organizations helped us before, but 
with the [current] President, no one else helps us… I can’t really talk about the 
future, or hope. I just live for today. I can pay rent and buy soap if I make enough 
money, not much. 
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Pauline, an older Hutu woman widowed during the war, seemed less keen to depend on 
other people in the area, but shared similar sentiments: 
I lost my father and my two brothers-in-law. Then later, I lost my aunt and my 
husband. You know, we do trust people. It’s almost like an accident, but we do 
trust each other. Because - it happened, and now it’s ended, even if it’s not 
completely over…  
 
There are organizations that help these days, but they can’t help if you are not part 
of the organization. Not much else exists. In church they used to help, but not 
much. 
I help others if they have problems, but I don’t like to ask for help. I try to do 
things for myself. If you depend on what others are doing, it’s difficult. It’s better 
if you do things on your own. I have many children – twelve – some of them are 
mine, and some are orphans. At the point I am at, I can’t support politics. I don’t 
support anyone [in politics]. I still have many things to do. My children are still in 
school. 
 
Perhaps the single largest indicator that signified the level of separation between 
residents of Kajiji and the rest of the community was their lack of information. Pauline 
admitted later in her interview that she would not know how to determine if organizations 
could help, speculating that “Maybe [her] daughter could find out.” Another woman 
noted, “Before, organizations helped us know what to do. Now, there’s only God. I thank 
God, but in reality, I don’t have a life. I am in no condition for it. God is our shepherd, 
the shepherd of the poor.” Even when an important development occurred, the women 
(and men) living in Kajiji seemed to be the last to hear about it. Many of the women 
spoke about the murders in the city and the uncertainty and fear created by violence 
between the CNDD-FDD and FNL. Three of these women spoke specifically about a 
man who was killed in his home two weeks prior to my first set of interviews in the area, 
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noting they only just heard about his death despite one of the women living directly 
across the street from him on the edge of Kajiji. “Nobody told me,” she said. “Everyone 
knew, and they discussed among themselves, but no one came over to tell us.”  
Men would have often played this role by obtaining information from both formal 
and informal spaces that they occupied. Schools and town halls or community meetings 
would provide these opportunities, as well as places such as cabarets (bar/restaurants), 
where men often develop relationships and discuss events over beer. Women would have 
similarly discussed these events in other public spaces, such the churches and markets 
mentioned above. Kajiji, however, had few men to fulfill this role, and the women were 
intensely private, with incredibly narrow sets of relationships in networks beyond their 
own enclave. The area functioned as an information desert, resulting in a lack of 
opportunities and overall disengagement with issues beyond its borders.  
 Thus, the three public spaces or public resources (church, markets, and NGOs) 
that women utilized for decision-making, support, and networking shaped the choices 
available to them and enabled them to navigate the gendered constraints they faced from 
their experiences during the war. While these public spaces largely served as arenas in 
which women developed private relationships and maintained their roles in private life, 
NGOs in particular had the power to funnel women into specific networks that would 
later catapult them into public roles (though many of the women in these programs 
already had specific profiles that supported their selection). At the same time, the power 
of NGO influence on these social networks serves as a cautionary tale. Support for 
women was desperately needed, and certainly necessary to ensure that women could care 
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for themselves and their families in the wake of such violence. Thus, the housing 
materials that people (largely women) received in Kajiji were essential for their survival, 
but this also meant that women and families with severe social, economic, and physical 
disadvantages were grouped together without any connections to the surrounding 
community or programs for continued support. The program created a tightly knit 
network with minimal connections outside (or to men), consequently reifying private 
roles and even perpetuating and exacerbating the traditional disempowerment of women.  
 
Rejecting the Private Life: Escaping Victimhood in Search of Empowerment 
A smaller subset of the women I interviewed rejected their private roles, as well 
as many of the relationships and spaces they occupied, in exchange for active 
membership in the political movement. Gloria, for example, noted that she did not want 
to “wait to be raped or murdered,” and instead decided to seek out a group that could 
protect her – a rebel group. The decision to join stemmed from the both practical need 
and an emotional drive to change her situation. She recounted her decision to “stand up” 
in the aftermath of Ndadaye’s assassination, saying, “During that time, you would be run 
down or tortured, or they would catch you and cut your throat. I had to stay in a camp to 
protect myself.” This camp was a rebel camp, which provided protection in a situation 
where she could not receive any and an opportunity to shift her role in the events 
happening around her and take action. After attacks near her home in Bujumbura Rural 
following Ndadaye’s death in 1993, she left for the city center, telling no one where she 
was going. Her niece, who introduced her to us, explained, “I don’t know what happened 
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– no one does. Even my mother [Gloria’s sister] does not know to this day. She just 
disappeared one day; and then one day, she came back. She doesn’t speak about it.”  
In some ways, it is not surprising that Gloria never explained to her family why 
she joined a rebel group; in fact, she had little to say on the matter. Gloria was not 
recruited in any traditional sense, but instead was caught up in a moment in which several 
people were leaving at the same time. She joined them, and they were going to the camp, 
so she followed. However, her story echoed a common theme among women who made 
the choice to join rebel groups: refusal of victimhood. Particularly given that Burundian 
women were estimated to comprise only 3% of rebel group members, their experiences 
raise several questions. For example, how did women make the choice to reject more 
traditional roles to participate in the war, and did they manage to escape victimhood by 
doing so? Furthermore, how can we understand the spaces that social upheaval creates for 
empowerment in the context of the larger costs it brings within a demographic group? 
It is important to note that it was possible for women to join rebel movements and 
maintain their private roles. Some women joined along with their husbands, boyfriends, 
or a male counterpart. When discussing the war, the assumption of many people with 
whom I spoke during these years was that this was the norm for women who joined. They 
came attached to someone and did not play “active” roles, but rather served other 
functions in the group, such as cooking, cleaning, and supporting the men who were 
fighting. While this was certainly one way in which women joined, my interviews 
suggested this was not the only way – and possibly not even the most common way. For 
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example, the estimates that ex-combatants offered of how many women were in their 
camps were much higher than estimates based on demobilization data have indicated.  
Because the women I interviewed participated in a narrower cross-section of 
camps, I also asked men about women they knew who joined. One man, who now lives 
in Bujumbura Rural, noted that there were indeed women in the camps. I asked him how 
many lived in his camp and how they participated there, to which he replied, “Well, 
maybe 30? I’m not sure. But it was more than just a few. They did all kinds of things – 
we all had different roles in the bush, and we all had to do our part. Normally, no one 
could do just one thing. Some of them fought with us. Some of them went to get supplies 
and food from the communes.” While some men did not have many women in their 
camps, there were several men who did acknowledge this was part of life in the camp. 
This section explores what it meant for women to make these choices and how they 
experienced active participation in the war. Because is it noteworthy that most women I 
spoke to did not speak about their participation in the war in the same way it is often 
described in academic literature and by members of organizations working on these 
issues, this is the perspective that I have highlighted. 
Francine, a teacher in Bubanza, remembered being tempted to join the war: 
Especially in the last days, people would come and scare you, saying that if you 
didn’t join a certain political group they would kill you, so you felt like it was 
possible. One could join and get killed on the field fighting instead of waiting for 
people to come and kill you in your home with all your family and children. I 
thought about joining [a rebel group].  
 
I felt like the only way to come back to Burundi was to join the rebellion and 
fight. They only wanted people who believed in the government’s ideas – this is 
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under Buyoya’s governance. Buyoya took the governance by force and and all 
people who were Ndadaye’s followers were killed including her aunty who was a 
deputy, so the leaders did not want anyone who don’t agree with them in the 
country. 
 
When asked why she did not go, she offered the following explanation:  
Because my family they did not agree with it. They told me the rebels had lost 
many people. So if I joined, I would die like others did. People who were on the 
field, they didn’t ask for help and you couldn’t help them. They were on their 
own. I realized I could not leave the children. They were my only thought, and 
nothing else. I finally saw that it was a good decision – not joining. I can say that 
my husband, who advised me not to join, helped me a lot. 
 
 Another woman named Gourdance, who was living in Bujumbura Rural, also 
spoke about the role of motherhood in her decision. “I never considered joining the 
fight,” she said. “I had children. People were dying – I wouldn’t leave my children for 
that. No women with children went…it was impossible to bring children to the fight, but 
men did. Men said women would take care of the children.” Thus, while many women 
related to the fear and anxiety of victimhood, not all decided to join. The roles that 
women played in their families factored heavily into decision-making. Most of the 
women that I interviewed who participated in a rebel group were younger (in their late 
teens) and either unmarried or without children when they joined. The role of caretaker 
that mothers and even elder sisters adopted was a driver that guided many to seek other 
forms of protection, such as safe zones or internally displaced persons sites in the city. 
However, the underfunded and overcrowded nature of these sites meant that they 
provided protection, but put inhabitants at greater risk of hunger, disease, and exposure to 
ad hoc violence (such as sexual abuse) within the camps. For women who did not have 
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responsibilities to younger or more vulnerable family members, participation in the 
rebellion seemed like an option for greater security and protection.  
Men also echoed these sentiments in some of their interviews. A few men spoke 
about the violence that women experience, often at the hands of their own cohort. One 
man living in Kamenge noted, “Soldiers would take people secretly and kill them if they 
had information about combatants, and they would rape women.” Another who fought for 
the PALIPEHUTU prior to the war in 1993, and later in the CNDD-FDD said, “In 1984, 
we weren’t supposed to sleep with women or drink too much, but later on everything was 
allowed.” Another participant in the war spoke frankly about the rules regarding rape in 
the CNDD-FDD and FNL, saying, “Before, in the CNDD-FDD – beer, cigarettes, raping 
women… we could do this. But in the FNL, if you raped women you could be killed if 
they found out. We still did it, but it was not allowed, even if you were higher up.” These 
accounts confirm that the fear of rape was real and widespread for women and served as 
an important motivating factor in the search for protection at all costs. 
For Jeanette, a Hutu woman living in Gitaza, the rebellion was part of her life 
even before the war began. In 1988, she was a 14-year-old girl in Cibitoke when the 
PALIPEHUTU returned to the country. She explained, “I was younger then, but I 
remember. They came into the country doing publicity, but it was really to kill Tutsi. 
Hutus fled into the commune, and Tutsis fled for the protection of brigades. Later, some 
Hutus fled back into the hills because they were killed in the communes.” In this context, 
Jeanette fled with her family to the DRC and became pregnant that year. She did not 
explain how this occurred, and the baby only lived for three years. She later returned by 
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herself in the midst of the war, hoping to find her home again: “Coming back, I passed 
through Kibira first, and I found our house had been burned. I was by myself, my family 
was in Congo… and then, they were shooting. A lot. I fled to Fourth Avenue 
[Bujumbura], where they were gathering people. I was living in poverty, starving. I 
couldn’t even go to the main street.” Jeanette lived this way for years, protected by the 
FNL, and eventually joined the group as a fighter in 2000.  
However, the role of a woman was not the only determining factor in the choice 
to join a rebel group. Roles functioned as “push” factors, and particularly the lack of a 
clear role for a woman could push her to externally seek protection in a rebel group if she 
had no one to care for. However, pull factors were at play as well, namely rebel groups’ 
more aggressive recruitment in communities as the war continued. Some of the women 
interviewed felt they had no choice – that it was a matter of time before members of the 
group would take them by force. Family status and having connections shaped this 
perception, but rebel groups also actively created this environment, especially in later 
years. Both CNDD-FDD and FNL, for example, were open to recruitment of both men 
and women during the war. However, once their fight for political power and vision of 
the country put them at odds with one another toward the end of the war, both groups 
recruited more women to take part in the movement in a variety of ways.  
Chantale, a woman living in Bubanza, joined the FNL at the age of 19:  
They would teach us to join, and sometimes they would pick us up when we were 
sleeping and force us to go with them. They used to take people who were young 
and still had the strength to fight. Even if you did not want to go, they would take 
you by force. When you are in war, sometimes people like it. They tell you that 
you are fighting for the country and you are you are sacrificing yourself for 
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others. They would even say, “You see the president has been killed. So what are 
you waiting for? You have to go and save others.” 
 
They came during the night and told me to wake up others and then we left. I took 
some clothes and followed them. My brother also joined – he was 25 years old. 
We were five siblings altogether, but the others were younger. 
 
Chantale mentioned a combination of recruitment tactics by the FNL, but 
eventually she was forced to join along with her brother, who was the head of the 
household. The use of force in this case is slightly nuanced, as she also admitted to 
having attended meetings for FNL recruitment with her brother – a significant connection 
tying her to the FNL. Ultimately, they were forced to leave during the night without their 
siblings. They stayed together throughout the war, and left together when her brother was 
shot in the leg. Women therefore found themselves in rebel groups through different 
paths, though they joined at much lower rates than men overall. While it was more rare 
for a woman or man to say they were forced to join the rebellion, half of these women 
interviewed noted a tension between the idea of joining of their own free will and the 
recruitment and force used by FNL and CNDD-FDD. The majority of the women noted 
the protection that joining a group provided to them, but the people they sought 
protection from were often members of the groups they joined. 
 Once women became involved in these groups, they struggled to survive, facing 
many of the same challenges as their male counterparts. Chantale said, “It was hard. You 
could spend three days and nights, hungry without eating anything. We got trained. We 
learned how to manage a gun and we would go with others to fight. I stayed for four 
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years.” Another male participant explained the difficulties of training, particularly for 
women: 
Joining the rebellion is completely different from how you normally live. It’s 
harsh. Training was hard – especially for women. Too many of them were beaten, 
especially those who joined who did not have husbands. Many others died in the 
training. We had to go through stagnant water with soldiers standing on the side 
throwing mud in your face. You could die if you weren’t quick enough to get out 
of it. Many people died. But it was difficult. During that time, the Burundian 
Military raped many women. They contracted HIV, and couldn’t go to the 
hospital because they were afraid. It was difficult either way. 
 
Angeline, a Hutu woman living in Bujumbura Rural, echoed the difficulties of war, 
some specific to women: 
I joined with friends – some were neighbors. They came to get me because we 
had to flee together from our homes. We had a meeting and decided to take 
revenge because Tutsi kept killing Hutu. When we arrived, two of us died. But it 
was war.  
 
When I went, I thought it would be easy, but I realized it was difficult. Once we 
began shooting, it was hard to ever go back home. We wanted to, but it wasn’t 
possible. Too many people had guns and other weapons – if you ran, you could 
die. We went many times without food or water. At night, you could get cassava 
to chew on. There were other women with me in my group. We were unmarried 
women. Some husbands joined and women followed them – others were 
following them, so they had to join their husbands. Men often made holes to keep 
what they needed and women would go to homes asking for food (or stealing it 
from them).  
Both men and women fought. Before we got accustomed to fighting, the women 
had to be in the front line to see if they were afraid or not. They did that to women 
and the young people, to make sure we could fight. If you died, then you weren’t 
good enough. It was hard for me. We were tired. But if I’d left, I wouldn’t have 
had anywhere to go. 
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Women sought protection in camps and met a distinct reality, perhaps equally 
brutal to other options that internally displaced persons camps and organizations 
provided. However, they felt that they were taking control over their experience in some 
way by joining, avoiding the victimization that many women who had chosen these other 
options would encounter, and taking action to support a movement that had the power to 
eventually change their situation.  
On the other side of this choice was a smaller group of women, who took up 
different roles in the political arena once space developed for the political engagement of 
women. Although some women became avid supporters of political parties by working 
with NGOs or supporting the political wings of rebel groups (focusing on elections and 
community outreach), rather than by participating in violence, this category is fluid in 
that a) it was the option available to the least number of people due to most of these 
positions having being created in the midst of the war, and b) no women interviewed 
emphasized this as their first choice because its existence was so limited at the beginning 
of the war. Every woman who engaged in peaceful politics at some point was therefore a 
refugee, a wife who stayed with her husband, a child who lived with her family, or a 
former rebel soldier. With regard to this category, it is also important to understand that 
there were no women interviewed who participated in politics who did not have living 
family members able to support them or who had not fought in the war. Networks were 
essential to gaining a place as an actor in political space, or even considering the 
possibility.  
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A community leader named Céline in Bubanza Province returned to her 
community after living as a child in the capital city for several years with her parents. As 
a Tutsi, her education and socio-economic status gave her access to skills and 
opportunities, shaping her connection with Burundi’s conflict as an actor who was 
alleviating consequences of the war, rather than as a victim. The war defined much of her 
life that she spent in a military camp for protection. However, she also became connected 
with organizations working to address issues of violence. The victimhood/empowerment 
narrative was absent from her recollections, and her relationship to the war itself was 
almost one of an outsider. Instead, she took an active, public, and formal role, focused on 
alleviating consequences of the war for other people: 
I met different people – many people who suffered from the war, men, women; it 
was difficult know how to treat people. There was also widespread sexual 
violence. Imagine a girl or a woman sexually abused by three or four men. When 
I began my job, I worked with lawyers and the police to fight against these 
atrocities. 
 
In 2003, there was a full war here. I lived in a military camp. Rebels attacked 
people, took women and did what they liked with them. But after the war, we 
began to re-integrate people by counseling them. CARE-Burundi brought 
psychologists to counsel women who had been attacked by the rebels, and the 
medical center treated them as well. 
 
In 2004, rebel activities stopped because the government tried to integrate people 
who had been in the war into the community. It was very hard for them, and for 
the community at large to accept them, because they [rebels] were used to 
violence. The FNL stayed here until 2010.  
 
 Céline’s account of the war is starkly different from those of other women, as she 
received full access to formal education, remained protected from the worst effects of the 
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war, and stayed with her family throughout her experience. Regardless of ethnicity, few 
families could assure themselves this type of safety. Her interview evidenced this clearly 
in that her strongest and most personal feelings about the war were more concerned with 
witnessing the pain of others. She spoke much more comfortably about the greater issues 
at hand and the needs of her community (not for herself). Yet, she represents a group of 
women who became publicly active during the war, and who feel just as much a part of 
the events that took place in Burundi as more publicly recognized men. The war posed 
opportunities to work with and for international organizations to alleviate suffering and 
advocate for vulnerable groups and organizations that wanted women to join their ranks 
and participate in the rebuilding of the country. 
 As part of this, another cohort of women became involved directly in politics that 
was generally identified by political leaders and supported by organizations helping 
parties with the transition from rebel group to political party. The CNDD-FDD’s 
Abakenyererarugamba in particular, which was created separately to mirror the 
PALIPEHUTU’s Movement Femmes du Patriotiques Hutu in structure and purpose, 
became highly politically active and visible in the years preceding the ceasefire. Mama 
Méthode, a leader in the group, was nearly 30 years old when the war erupted, but she 
stayed with her parents, who discouraged her from joining the rebellion:  
I was angry with Tutsis, because it is them who made us what we are. They 
followed us. They made us run. They wanted to kill Hutus. In 1993, I voted for 
Ndadaye. When they killed him, I was angry and frustrated. But my parents said 
to be careful, and I decided to stay with them. I could never vote for a Tutsi. For 
me, Pierre [Nkurunziza] became the image of Ndadaye. 
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Now I can talk to Tutsi. All is calm. I didn’t consider joining the rebellion, but got 
involved in politics. I ran for an office during the elections. This is why I got 
involved. I was just a voter then. But now, I am a leader of the Women of the War 
for the CNDD- FDD. I teach the beliefs of the party.  
 
Alice, a Hutu woman living in Bujumbura Mairie, was married when the war 
broke out. She spoke about the tensions between the two groups in the city and the way 
she understood the war and her participation in a shift towards politics and a brighter 
future: 
With Tutsi [during the war], it was like a game. If you caught a Tutsi and killed 
him, you could get money. I wasn’t part of anything political, but my husband 
managed money for the CNDD-FDD. I was 28 years old and had one child; I have 
eight children now. Eventually, in 2005, I became a member myself. I chose the 
CNDD-FDD because it was a party that wanted to bring people together. Some of 
my family members were Tutsi and others Hutu. Where can you stand? Even 
before God, there are no ethnic groups.  
 
I was a politician, too. I counted elections votes. I was among 140 women who 
were leading the country, and I have a certificate from the UN Representative in 
Burundi. I also competed in the elections in 2010 and got the 11th place. 
 
The CNDD-FDD had programs, right? The aim was to mix the army, the soul of 
the country, and to develop hospitals and schools. At the time you could find 
provinces where there were no schools or hospitals and people lived there. In my 
opinion, the CNDD-FDD changed this. We have to take all facts into 
consideration. CNDD-FDD came to lead this country coming from war. Some 
don’t understand this in the rural areas because they are uneducated. Some people 
won’t change. They want to stay in a war. Even in CNDD-FDD, there are some 
people who make trouble. They don’t want us to go far. 
 
A faithful follower of the CNDD-FDD, Alice and others who worked in elections, 
community leadership, and propaganda often repeated ideas that tend to be hotly disputed 
between parties. However, this is her role: towards the end of the war, women became 
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prominent in organizing public events for the party, generating excitement and utilizing 
relationships in their communities to build knowledge about the party. Angeline spoke in 
a similar manner. Formerly a fighter for the CNDD-FDD and now in charge of 
propaganda in Bujumbura Rural, she faced many challenges while working in an area 
with strong support for the FNL: 
I live with FNL [members] today, I don’t care. I show that what’s in my heart is 
good. If there is tension, I leave and come back in the morning… I still get 
followed sometimes. Today, I don’t have anything against Tutsi in my heart 
either. I just want something for me and my kids. That’s all. 
 
I still support the CNDD-FDD. It’s the party I belong to. I fought for them. There 
is no other party to be in. Many things are said on the radio about us [referring to 
the murders taking place at the time between the CNDD-FDD and the FNL] – but, 
even if you are a member, you can be punished for committing crimes, regardless 
of how wealthy you are. The party does not support people who do whatever they 
want. This is what’s important: Women give birth for free. Caesareans can be 
given without paying. Children study and are treated for free. 
 
After years of fighting for the CNDD-FDD, Angeline wants normalcy and a place 
in her community, which is a challenge for many women and men who have fought in the 
war. She met her husband while she was fighting and now has two children. Becoming a 
CNDD-FDD volunteer (or “doing propaganda,” as she would say) allowed Angeline to 
find a place in the party and a place in the community after the war. However, it also 
meant that she and her family remain targeted as visible and vocal members of the 
CNDD-FDD in the war’s aftermath, when tensions were running high between the ruling 
party and groups such as the FNL following the 2010 elections.  
Notably, the benefits that Angeline shared about the party are all geared towards 
women: free labor, free Caesarian sections, free education for children, and free 
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healthcare for children under the age of five years old. Despite faulty implementation of 
most of these policies at the time, women supporters of the CNDD-FDD repeated them 
like mantras. The party was covering the essentials for women, who remained largely 
responsible for managing private life and caring for children. Women working for the 
CNDD-FDD filled a key public role that made use of and appealed to the challenges of 
motherhood (private life). In addition to organizing events for the whole community and 
cultivating enthusiasm for the party, it was their job to ensure that people (women) knew 
about the essential support the government was providing to help people survive.  
 Women engaging in political space did so within the context of gendered 
relationships to violence, and their paths were constricted by age and family life in ways 
that men’s engagement was not. Opportunities for women to engage expanded greatly 
during this period, but could not be divorced from the acute violence that plagued women 
and the accompanying disempowerment. It is in fact the lack of options available to 
women that propelled young (childless) female combatants to take up arms alongside 
their male counterparts in a space where they still were not spared from gender-based 
violence. Formal spaces in NGOs and politics were created in order to contend with the 
violence women were experiencing and to engage women, as rebel groups recognized the 
need to create buy-in specifically within this demographic. Women who occupied these 
spaces were therefore connected to influential men and, particularly for formal positions 
in NGOs, had access to educational and financial opportunities. All the women sampled 
who were engaged in politics began at a point in their lives when they were living with 
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either their parents or a well-connected husband. Thus, the question of empowerment for 
women is and was inseparable from the disempowerment and abuse of the larger group. 
Conquering the Consequences of War: Women’s Roles in Reshaping Gender Norms 
During a meeting I was running in Cibitoke Province in 2012, we asked people to 
cite the types of armed violence that were missing from a study we had conducted in the 
area, and when they reconvened, several of the groups noted that “polygamy” was 
missing from our analysis. The practice in Burundi happened quite often, but not 
formally or legally. Men would take a second wife, and because only one was the 
legitimate and legal wife, the other woman’s children would not be recognized by the 
state, nor would she have the financial and social protections of the first wife. If the first 
wife was never formally married, she risked being left for another woman. Polygamy had 
several triggers and causes. In Cibitoke, the group explained that armed men (either in the 
state or in groups resisting the government) would force themselves on women, 
threatening to kill them and their families. Once a woman became pregnant, families 
often resolved these issues by arranging a second or informal marriage to assure the 
woman would receive basic support and avoid further conflict in the community. In view 
of this, it is clear how polygamy was a result of armed violence.  
Burundi’s sustained violence over such a long period of time influenced an entire 
generation of people who only knew the norms of social upheaval. While not new to 
Burundi, rape became widespread, and an entire set of rules and expectations developed 
around the issue. Polygamy, which also existed prior to the civil war, adapted to account 
for the systematic and sustained violence against women that developed as a result of 
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armed conflict. In an interview with Guillaume, a member of the FNL in Bujumbura 
Rural, our conversation turned to the subject of legal protections for women in cases of 
sex outside of marriage. He asked if I thought it was right that men do not have to be 
responsible for children conceived out of wedlock, a topic that became a subject of 
debate between us for a full hour. He believed it was fair, stating “A man isn’t thinking 
about children when he wants to have sex with a woman.” 
The rule Guillaume cited was not a formal rule – it is an unspoken expectation 
that the community broadly follows, and each case is negotiated between families. In 
further discussions with Guillaume, he admitted that often even without a weapon 
present, many women do not have the power to refuse a man who wants to have sex 
because she never knows could happen. This threat is often, even if it remains tacit. Yet 
still Guillaume, like many others interviewed, believed it was the responsibility of the 
woman to care for children, regardless of the circumstance. 
Informal rules also intervened in laws and formal consequences. The most 
common reason women entered in prison in Burundi during the years this research took 
place was “infanticide.” Thereby, men had the power to hold women entirely (legally) 
responsible for the lives of children they bore (and did not bear), regardless of their own 
financial support or engagement. While rape is illegal, there are very narrow means to 
hold men accountable for rape, due in no small part to slow progress in laws providing 
women access to economic and political power. Furthermore, outside of rape, there are 
still no laws formally holding men accountable for children out of wedlock. For now, the 
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combination of laws and the ways in which they are interpreted ensures that Burundi can 
continue to hold women solely responsible as caretakers of children and families. 
In addition to polygamy, other unwritten rules have evolved in the context of 
violence to allow communities to continue to function, resulting in challenges for 
communities moving forward. Men and women both have learned to operate by these 
rules, and stability does not naturally or independently yield the progress and protection 
that many women hope to find. The people and government of Burundi have yet to 
address the issue that an entire generation of people came of age in a time when sexual 
violence was traded in as a spoil of war. Rape, sexual abuse, and even abuse of children 
and adolescents became commonplace, and boys who became men during this time 
(some of whom engaged in violence and sexual violence themselves) are now back in 
society with different expectations about how they should relate to women. Claver, a 
former combatant who joined the CNDD-FDD and later the FNL, spoke about these 
expectations and differences between the two groups with regard to their treatment of 
women. In the FNL, Claver was the leader of one group of youth that he recruited from 
secondary schools. He explained, “In the CNDD-FDD, when you have power, you can 
show women the gun and they will do what you want. This is why the FNL and CNDD-
FDD didn’t get along. The FNL would tell us: you can’t do the work well with a baby on 
your back.” Thus, while men in the CNDD-FDD were encouraged to consider rape – and 
women generally – as spoils of war, they were not expected to consider any responsibility 
for their actions. The FNL, still with many loopholes, enacted a different approach to 
social responsibility and rape in their teachings. 
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The only group that consistently felt empowered by their experiences during the 
war was comprised of women who engaged in formal public roles in political 
organizations and NGOs, also the most socially exclusive group requiring access to 
education and resources. However, the gendered consequences of war and the limited 
progress along these lines led many women, even those in in public roles, to question the 
value of the struggles faced during the war. Angeline, who spoke of her loyal support to 
the CNDD-FDD and the benefits for access to healthcare and education, also doubted the 
value of this new role and the results the war had brought her: 
What happened in the war was a lot. We stole and fought – stole livestock, and 
also clothes so that we could dress. We could climb on the roofs to take positions 
in the hills. In the end, didn’t get revenge at all. I just wasted my time. If went to 
cultivate somewhere and didn’t get any harvest, it would be a waste of time. 
Maybe if I could get a salary or a [formal] post, it wouldn’t be a waste of time. 
But we fought a war and the war is over now. 
 
Angeline’s frustration stems from the fact that she does not see herself as part of 
any real change personally or societally, despite participating in a war to make gains 
for herself and her family. She volunteers for the party, which gives her a more 
prominent role as a public figure; however, she also offers her labor for free in order 
to keep this role. After fighting for a movement with roots in the communist and 
revolutionary movements of the second half of the 20th century, it is a point not lost 
on her. The level of sacrifice did not match the gains achieved. 
Other women who fought talked openly about the strained relationship between 
their own personal sacrifice and what they received in return. Jeannine, who joined the 
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war and now serves as a leader in her community, referred to her time fighting as “killing 
and nothing else.” She notes that much of the system remains unchanged for women: 
We were young soldiers. If they ordered “do this,” we did it; “do that,” we did it. 
They told us some of us would get posts and others would become leaders. So, if 
they ordered us to kill, we did it. It was hard. If you didn’t kill, you would be 
killed. It was like self-defense. 
 
Coming back from the war, they fear you. They push you out. It’s also how we 
continued to behave. If you talk to people and keep saying you fought, this creates 
fear. But if you show you are like them, they see you changed and don’t mind. 
 
So, before the war ended, rebels would rape women. Four or five men could rape 
one woman in a day. Now, that happens less, and some do go to the doctor for 
treatment (although others still don’t go because they’re ashamed). But, our 
husbands bring other women here. We don’t have anywhere to go and ask for 
justice. If you do, a husband can talk to the police and the process is stopped. 
There’s still corruption. Even here (in Gitaza), there are no hospitals or doctors to 
treat us. We have to travel far away for treatment. 
 
Regardless, she supported the party because she saw a change in opportunity for Hutus 
and greater unity between ethnicities, and believes that the CNDD-FDD is the right 
government to continue leading. She reflected on this dynamic, saying, “Tutsi were in 
power for a long time. But this separation doesn’t exist anymore – now it’s mixed. 
During that time, it was a question of interests. Everyone was doing what was best for 
themselves. Now, they share the same army. It’s different.” Without a shared piece of the 
gains made from the war, she recognized the overall value of the political transition into 
CNDD-FDD’s power and the indirect benefits of new power-sharing. 
While all women who fought in the war struggled with how to reintegrate in post-
conflict years with little to no support from the government, only two of the women who 
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were interviewed went through the formal demobilization process, whereas others 
avoided it or were unable to qualify for it. Several scholars have noted that the formal 
process of demobilization often does not support female combatants to demobilize, 
including in Burundi (Mazurana and Cole 2013, Maiden 2014). In many countries, the 
narrow definition of “combatants” and lack of support for different needs of men and 
women has left female combatants less likely to formally demobilize. Maiden (2014) has 
noted that, in Burundi, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement committed to 
considering the “special needs” of women soldiers, but without ever defining these. In 
addition, UNICEF found in a 2005 study that women frequently cited the safety of the 
demobilization process as not as secure for women, thus requiring them to stay in a 
military camp during reintegration in the same space as men. Furthermore, because 
women were not clearly defined as a separate demographic of soldiers and often 
considered dependents of men, the same benefits were not extended to all of them.  
Angeline tried to demobilize, but did not qualify: 
I thank God for being alive. The FNL kept following people asking if they wanted 
to join or be killed. If you joined CNDD-FDD and were in the hills [in Bujumbura 
Rural], they would kill you. I fought for 3 years, but I wasn’t able to demobilize, 
because I couldn’t get the card. For a little while, I worked with some of the other 
fighters in my group in the containment camp with with the police, but I couldn’t 
be part of the program. I thank God to be alive today even if I wasn’t a 
demobilisé. 
 
A 2010 World Bank report on the results of their demobilization, reinsertion, and 
reintegration (DDR) program noted the challenge of ensuring support for women in the 
demobilization process (Pitman, 2010). The report states, “Women had some difficulties 
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because of the unwillingness of government to classify them as ex-combatants and they 
were frequently reintegrated as part of family units with spouses.” It notes the necessity 
of providing separate living accommodation at demobilization centers for women with 
access to “specialized medical screening via gender-sensitized implementing agencies, 
promotion of female associations and, where applicable, involvement of spouses.” 
Female status, therefore, relegated women’s reinsertion largely to private space, with the 
addition of introduction to women’s associations.  
Given the challenges associated with defining women as combatants, the World Bank 
program successfully demobilized 516 women out of a total of 26,283 ex-combatants – 
likely a gross underrepresentation of women, given the number of ex-combatants (both 
male and female) who spoke candidly about women’s participation as fighters in their 
rebel groups. The demobilization training provided money and access to job training, as 
well as training for reinsertion into communities. Claver, a fighter in Bubanza Province, 
noted, “I was lucky to be among those who were demobilized. I got money to support 
myself, colored flip-flops and a pot. They also brought me back home and gave me 
money to come back. We did training to teach us how to love. It was in Gitega in July 
2009 and they brought me back here [to Bubanza].”  
 The years between the first ceasefire agreement in 2003 and the elections in 2010 
marked an important time for the rebuilding of Burundi. The DDR efforts, the 
development of the Arusha Accords, and transitional government planning all set the 
stage for investment in Burundi’s peace process. The testimonies women offered about 
their experiences during and after the war indicate that the meaning of these events and 
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processes and their impact on the lives of socio-economically disadvantaged groups carry 
different meanings.  
However, the question still remains of whether women were able to recognize 
progress made by the shift in political power from the war. After all, following the 
Accords, there were significant political gains for women. Significant changes to the 
constitution went into effect in 2005, including Article 19, which included a section on 
the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Articles 129 and 164 also 
guarantee 30% of positions to women in the government and in national assembly. One 
human rights lawyer working in Burundi has explained, “Burundi has good laws. The 
constitution affords everyone human rights, and the Accords allow for a free society. The 
problem is that we don’t follow them.”  
The gendered experiences of war left most women either completely indifferent to 
politics – a system that did not work for them – or ambivalent about the consequences of 
the war. Few believed it had an empowering effect, regardless of their ethnicity, social 
class, or their choices made during the war. Only about half of the women who took 
political positions believed the war had truly given them new freedoms and opportunities, 
despite believing in their party and continuing to support its platform. Josephine, one of 
the women in living in Kajiji, said, “I have no hope for the future. I don’t have any hope. 
I have no hope of living well again. The future is for the young, not for me. It’s like I’m 
going under the earth. Even now, there’s just still no peace.” Another woman in the same 
site said, “It’s like we’re closed off. We only hear what happens, but can never know for 
real. Across the street, it’s not the condos déplacés [the site for the displaced]. Meetings 
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can happen without any of us knowing.” Many women spoke about their lives today as if 
nothing had changed since the war; they continued to feel disempowered and vulnerable 
in the aftermath of war, frustrated by a lack of options and lack of protection for 
themselves. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 The experiences of women in Burundi beg the question: how do movements 
meant to empower also disempower at the same time? In the midst of social upheaval, the 
concept of sacrifice and struggle is particularly important. Harsh realities of war may be 
unavoidable once in motion, but the promise of opportunity can encourage members to 
persevere through hardship. Although it is not the first to do so, Burundi’s case 
illuminates another dilemma of social movements related to the empowerment narrative – 
one that may partially explain the cyclicality of war. Empowerment narratives foster 
expectations that, if unmet, risk further dividing movements and promoting cyclical 
discontent.  
Women continue to operate as a political and economic minority, despite having 
made deep sacrifices (often not by choice) as a consequence of the war. Political parties 
have incorporated women into positions of representation at higher rates than in the past, 
and they have greater access to higher education and positions in the army and police. 
However, the legal protections for women against sexual violence have remained weak 
after more than a decade of violent conflict, and laws supporting women’s economic 
autonomy have scarcely improved in practice across the country.  
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Thus, the move of women from private into public space has been slow and open 
only to a few, and the effects of these political and public shifts have yet to trickle down 
to many of the daily challenges that define gender in Burundi. Instead, the social 
upheaval the war created has exacerbated the disadvantages that women face societally in 
many ways, normalizing abuse among a generation of both women and men. In the long 
term, the more prominent role of women in systems shaping law and governance is likely 
to have a more pronounced effect. However, the violence that created this opportunity 
also yielded new challenges and forms of disempowerment that must be reconciled in 
order for women to truly feel part of the liberation sought by the war. 
 Women may not fight at the same rates as men, but the government and those 
supporting demobilization efforts have largely underestimated their participation, 
typifying women as “dependents” despite many women who had joined actively rejecting 
this role. The underestimation of women as political actors has limited our understanding 
of their influence and role in political mobilization, both violent and non-violent. It has 
also severely restricted our analysis of women’s political choice, constraints, 
opportunities, and networks.  
Women are considered actors only inasmuch as they are acting entirely alone, and 
the inherent assumption is that while men and women both engage in relationships, 
women’s attachment to men somehow nullifies their actions. On the contrary, women 
engage in decision-making regardless of their relationships, though the roles they play as 
mothers, spouses, and daughters do influence their choices. Their growing role in 
political space, combined with acute disempowerment and consequences of the war, have 
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actually shifted the political awareness of women who critically analyze their place in the 
fight for liberation in the past 20 years. While some recognized their own personal 
empowerment in this process, most were discontent with the trade of sacrifices for gains 
achieved. Even those supporting the CNDD-FDD found that the narratives of crisis and 
empowerment did not serve them as women. In fact, the more politically engaged women 
became, the more they struggled with these questions in the post-conflict period.  
These dynamics must be considered as part of how empowerment and crisis 
narratives shape perceptions of individuals in the post-conflict period, particularly as 
roles of political minorities (like women) shift and become more influential in the 
conversation about what liberation is, and what should be expected. Women are in fact 
highly engaged in these conversations, and in addition to their own choices, their 
influence on others’ decision-making needs to be recognized for clarity in understanding 
post-conflict dynamics. Marie Rose, a teacher in Bubanza, shared her thoughts while she 
sat in desk in a schoolroom in the center of the town. Her role in society as a teacher 
working with today’s youth made her words all the more poignant: 
The virus is coming back again. During the night, there are shootings. How can 
we live? Now is it the politics of war, or people just killing those in other parties? 
Can anyone actually be good at politics? That’s what we are dying to dream. We 
hope it will get better, but it doesn’t get better. It’s still a dream. 
 																																																								
xvii Ugali is a dough made from cassava, typically served with sauce and other sides in Burundi.  
 
xviii While the king held official power in Rwanda and Burundi, the queen mother influenced 
political decisions and was widely recognized as a powerful public figure. In Burundi from 1908-
1917, the queen mother ruled with extensive power and was influential during the early years of 
colonization (Émile Mworoha, 1991). Around the same time at the turn of the century, 
Inamujandi served as one of a long line of prophets invoking omens on behalf of past kings. In 
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1934, she challenged the legitimacy of King Mwambutsa IV as a ruler due to his preference for 
Catholic customs over indigenous spiritual beliefs. She became the spiritual leader of a revolt that 
ultimately failed, but her power and example was revered long after death (Akyeampong and 
Gates, 2012).   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EFFECTS OF GENERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Introduction 
After establishing the history of collective action and activism in Burundi, 
examining the ways in which different groups utilized rhetoric to influence decision-
making, and assessing how networks influenced decisions and effects of the war for 
unlikely actors such as women, there is a basis for understanding that political action in 
Burundi is both varied and highly affected by networks. This chapter now elaborates on 
these concepts within the largest demographic recognized for participation during the 
Burundian war: youth. Youth were a significant cohort to participate in the war, and yet 
only a small percentage of these youth actually joined. The reasons for both phenomena 
remain under theorized, leaving questions of how and why youth and children played 
such a significant role in the Burundian Civil War, which mechanisms were used to 
attract youth to join the war, and how to account for the different choices made by youth 
as political actors during this time. 
 In 1993, approximately 49% of Burundi’s population was under the age of 15 
years old, 14.5% were between 15 and 19 years old, and 20.5% were between ages of 20 
and 35 years old. Demographically, the country was (and remains) young, suggesting that 
youth were also likely to comprise a significant number of those participating in violence. 
However, Burundi’s war was widely recognized to have specifically recruited youth and 
children to fight in an attempt to acquire and command large numbers of people for 
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greater political power, diverging from neighboring Rwanda where the largest cohort of 
participants was not youth or children, but rather married men (and women) with their 
own homes and dependents.  
This chapter builds on the understanding of narratives used in Chapter Two to 
examine how different generations related to them. It situates these trends in the context 
of Karl Mannheim’s theory of the problem of generations, building on our understanding 
of how youth become mobilized to examine the fluidity of mobilization and the factors 
that influence participation in various groups. Beginning with an overview of 
Mannheim’s theory and other relevant literature on youth participation in movements, the 
chapter then defines youth and different generational locations in Burundi’s context, as 
well as a typology of political participation. These definitions help define the various 
relationships that interviewees had to political action in Burundi, necessary to identify the 
ways that different generations relate to key moments in Burundi’s political history 
(particularly moments of violence). The third section of this chapter explores how 
respondents from different generations made choices about violence and the factors that 
pulled them into participation in rebel groups, moving into the fourth section where 
generational differences in non-violent participation are outlined. Finally, it develops 
conclusions about how participation in violence affects the resilience of ex-combatants in 
the post-conflict period, and important unit that experiences unique political pressures 
because of their previous relationships to violence.  
I argue that generational interaction is what enables political mobilization over 
time, with smaller groups developing narratives that build and resonate with later 
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generations as new opportunities present themselves in key historical moments, further 
clarifying mechanisms for political mobilization that were outlined in Chapters One and 
Two. The concept of generational units developing unique relationships to political 
activism is relevant for Burundi, and further explores questions around subgroups within 
a movement that were outlined in Chapter Three. However, while women as a subgroup 
relate to this chapter in terms of the importance of generational interaction and new 
avenues for political participation, this data allows for an opportunity to examine how a 
generational unit may also face unique pressures to participate in violence and display 
political loyalty in the post-conflict era, leading back into a cycle of violence. 
 
 
Child and Youth Participation in Violence 
 A May 2002 report from the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the 
World Bank cited an estimate of 300,000 children participating in armed conflicts around 
the world, with the trend continuously increasing (Verhey, 2002). Thus, there has been a 
marked response to ensure demobilization and reintegration of children from armed 
groups. The report states the following: 
Although advocacy efforts aiming to enforce international law will contribute to 
preventing future involvement of children in armed conflict, prevention must be 
considered more broadly. For example, education and other youth activities, food 
security and ensuring the security of refugee camps can help to prevent the 
recruitment of child soldiers. Children growing up within the context of conflict, 
and their families, feel they have no choice about participating. Preventing 
recruitment requires that awareness of child rights be expanded. Best practice now 
recognizes the importance of incorporating child rights into humanitarian 
advocacy. 
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Yet, without obtaining a deeper understanding of the mechanisms for recruitment and 
identifying the specific appeal of armed conflict for youth, the context for intervention 
remains unclear. This leads to uncertainty over whether groups should be encouraging 
youth to invest in school, providing better quality education, or using institutions like 
school to discourage violence, as well as over which youth activities might be most 
effective in preventing youth from joining.  
 To understand the political participation of children and youth, Mannheim’s 
theory of the problem of generations shifts the focus to the generational and temporal 
experience of historical events. The period between approximately 15 and 30 years of age 
marks the essential formative years wherein individuals develop identity, understandings 
of morality, and a sense of public participation. Thus, generations are molded to 
experience certain moments in history collectively in a way that separates them from 
other groups experiencing those same historic moments. Mannheim’s theory highlights 
the collective experiences that propel intellectual thought and debate forming collective 
action (Mannheim, 1927).  
 From this perspective, the generation is not specific to the establishment of a 
formal or concrete group. So, it is not equal to the formation of a youth movement, for 
example, in response to an historic event. Rather, Mannheim focuses on the collective 
experience of generations the way other sociologist focus on class; it is a phenomenon 
from which no one can extract themselves, neither with an increase nor a decrease in 
social standing. In fact, generational location, according to Mannheim, actually precedes 
any type of social mobilization. Generational location functions as the stage on which 
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movements of thought and collective action are set, influencing the knowledge that actors 
use to make meaning of experiences and form decisions based upon that meaning. 
 Mannheim’s theory clarifies how different groups within a population may 
uniquely relate to historic events, deconstructing historical linearity and demonstrating 
how various cohorts in the population experience these events based on the knowledge 
they have to understand it. His work suggests that the dissonance between cohorts drives 
social change, as younger cohorts question elements of society that other cohorts may 
have grown to accept. However, Demartini (1985) has critiqued this premise in a study of 
social movements in the US between 1965 and 1973 that has examined whether 
generations truly stand apart from their parents’ generations and, if they do, the ways in 
which they reject the socialization of their parents’ generations. He has determined that 
there is virtually no difference in shifts in political beliefs in response to historic events 
(i.e. both older and younger generations shift in similar directions during a given 
timeframe). However, there is a marked difference in the starting point, which supports 
Mannheim’s theory. Therefore, if this shift encourages a more liberal society, the 
younger and older generations may both move in this direction politically, but younger 
generations will be more liberal overall than older generations.  
The question then becomes whether this divergence in political opinion can then 
translate into political action. Here, there is less evidence to support the theory. Activists 
in Demartini’s study did exhibit greater divergence from parents’ beliefs among those 
who were activists, but this does not necessarily indicate that generational locations 
explain the rise in political action. Pilcher (1994) has noted the difficulty of studying 
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generational locations, as there are few guidelines for how one would explore these 
phenomena in an empirical sense. For example, Pilcher has highlighted a lack of 
definition around age and generational cohort, as well as a lack of information about 
differentiating one generational location from another (in terms of knowledge and 
viewpoint). Mannheim’s work emphasizes a key dynamic that should not be ignored, and 
which underscores how historical events are experienced and how social change is 
catalyzed, but these questions remain largely unanswered.  
The question of generational location remains relevant to the case of Burundi as 
well, in no small part because the agency of young people who joined the war remains 
unclear. The data on age and participation of youth is narrow for three main reasons:  
1. The challenge of counting those who participated in violence was enormous, and 
a main focus of peace processes during the war. Activists and international actors 
supporting demobilization and peace processes largely overlooked youth who did 
not join violent groups in order to ensure efforts to demobilize children. 
2. The concept of “youth” has a variety of meanings and is used in multiple ways, 
resulting in data that cannot be analyzed together. There are World Bank statistics 
on “child soldiers” demobilized, who are under the age of 18. Those demobilized 
at age 18 or older were considered adults, and there is no disaggregation of these 
data (despite the fact that many likely spent their youth fighting, given the 
duration of the war). Youth are defined in Burundi as under the age of 35 years. 
Population data available from the time disaggregates by different age groups (0-
4, 10-14, 14 and under, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, etc., and 15-64). These age data do 
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not line up with categories for child soldiers, though the World Bank measures 
both sets of statistics, so participation of child soldiers and youth cannot be 
measured (and have not been measured) against their percentage of the overall 
population. While there are recognized developmental differences between the 
participation of adolescents and children under the age of 14 and those who are 
18, the data available do not allow for an understanding of this.  
3. The relationships between those who experienced past violence (massacres of 
1972 and during the 1980s, for example) and those who experienced violence in 
1993 are unclear. Many of those who fought in 1993 already belonged to armed 
movements that developed out of previous waves, but were never considered 
“youth” because there was no way to count them at the time.  
Thus, Burundi’s case can support an improved comprehension of the problem of 
generations. This study in particular parses out some of the theoretical assumptions about 
youth and their motivations for joining rebel movements compared to those who joined at 
an older age. It deconstructs the stages of youth: children (under 18, for example) and 
youth that are above the age of adolescence (19-35) but have yet to reach important 
milestones for adulthood (employment, marriage, and children, for example). Age 
conflation has led to an overemphasis on youth participation as a single phenomenon and 
has reduced space for theorizing agency and assessing the constraints that this group 
faces.  
The case also provides a more nuanced understanding of the types of political 
action available to youth and the factors that influence how youth perceive these choices. 
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The problem of generations discusses how younger generations propel political action 
and social change, but it does not differentiate between the types of political action 
chosen. Here, Burundi’s case responds not only to Mannheim’s theory of generations, but 
also to literature on youth participation in violence that focuses heavily on violence 
without theorizing about underlying choice. Our narrow understanding of participation of 
youth has led to an overemphasis on violent tendencies without attention to other forms 
of social change and political choice that youth navigate, particularly during times of 
crisis. 
 
Defining ‘Youth’ and Generational Location in the Case of Burundi 
Widely recognized as a cohort that participated in political violence, youth have 
still not been uniformly defined. In Burundi, youth are legally considered to be anyone 
under the age of 35 years old. However, Sommers and Uvin (2011) have noted that, in 
the region, more pertinent indicators of having reached adulthood are social: “In both 
Rwanda and Burundi, adulthood is defined by marriage and the possibilities of providing 
for a family. Movement toward manhood and womanhood are linked, and achieving them 
relies on the ability of male youth to meet their first challenge. To marry, a male youth 
must first provide housing for his future wife and children.” This aligns with the way 
many academics have conceptualized youth, and particularly in Africa (Bazenguissa-
Ganga, 1999; Durham, 2000). However, this conceptualization does not account for 
developmental differences between youth and adults. The term “youth” can refer 
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specifically to the cohort ranging from mid-to-late teens to early thirties, but may also 
include younger children.  
 Given the complexity of defining youth, the first step to understanding their role 
in Burundi as political participants is to note that the use of younger children to 
participate in violence was uncommon historically, but the broader and slightly older 
cohort of youth has been an integral part of political violence in Burundi for several 
decades. Mobilized as a supplemental force to the military in response to a Hutu uprising, 
armed (Tutsi) youth during the 1960s were accused of the assassination of the country’s 
Hutu prime minister and hundreds of elite or literate Hutu citizens, solidifying the 
conflict along ethnic divisions (Weinstein, 1974) and laying the groundwork for the 
larger massacres to come. The tactic of using people who were integrated into 
communities to exercise social control likely drove many Hutu male youth to join rebel 
movements, as the risk of being accused of participating seemed inevitable (Taylor, 
2010). Rebel groups like the PALIPEHUTU, and later the CNDD-FDD. would 
incorporate youth wings into their movements as well, mirroring the political structure of 
familiar groups and blending the divide between rebel fighters and the community.  
Van Acker (2016), who has studied FNL participants in Bujumbura Rural, echoed 
the idea of having youth participants play a vital role, living in communities and teaching 
ideology of the FNL. He has also written about the emerging Imbonerakure youth league 
of the CNDD-FDD, a product of the transition from rebel group to political party that was 
(and is) becoming increasingly reminiscent of UPRONA Tutsi youth leagues, “policing 
public space” and keeping it from being occupied by opposition party activities (p.16). 
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While it is true that a significant number of participants in the rebel groups were children 
(under 18), the majority likely fit into this broader category of youth – attracted by the 
prospect of new opportunity and, in the wake of Ndadaye’s assassination, the promise 
that fighting for their rights would ensure they could maintain them.  
Taylor’s study on fighters in Burundi during the civil war has also revealed some 
unexpected demographic characteristics of participants. She writes, “While students of 
civil wars are likely accustomed to picturing revolutions fought by uneducated, 
desperately poor farmers, in Burundi, the more sophisticated an individual, the more 
likely they were to fight.” Pre-war education increased the likelihood of joining the war. 
Men who had finished primary school were twice as likely to join a rebel group as men 
who had never finished primary school, holding other variables constant, and high school 
graduates were three times as likely to join as those who only finished primary school. 
Similarly, those with greater wealth (in the 65th percentile or higher) were three times 
more likely to fight than those with less wealth (25th percentile or lower). She has also 
noted that people who believed they could get a job in the military were four times more 
likely to join than others, as this was a main draw for individuals who already had access 
to some type of education (and likely connections, in order to have the opportunities they 
did). 
The evidence that Taylor presents stands in stark contrast with accounts of NGOs 
and bilateral organizations working on these issues at the time, which noted the 
prominent role of child soldiers in the war. It also counters literature on participation in 
violence and rebellion in Africa that has suggested that most actors have low levels of 
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education and interconnectedness (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). However, due to 
the lack of real estimates, much of our understanding about who actually participated in 
the war is limited. Further complicating estimations, a combatant’s status was not 
stationary throughout the war. Many joined one party, then left for another later on; some 
became refugees, and came back again later. Thus, demobilization statistics capture a 
snapshot, but not a clear picture, of those who joined the war and how or why they did so. 
Taylor’s study allows for a more complex image of those who joined and provides 
estimates on how many were educated, wealthier, etc. This still does not reveal, though, 
whether there is any variation between generations surrounding the mechanisms used to 
recruit youth, the value recruits saw in joining rebel groups, and the ways that they 
derived meaning from historic events during this time. 
 Of the people I interviewed, those who completed their secondary education or 
were in secondary school when they joined comprised almost half of the group of people 
who had participated in a rebel group. People in secondary school made up a much 
smaller percentage of the population, so the fact they are so well represented in the 
sample supports Taylor’s point. While the ages of respondents were recorded, these data 
were less useful because each person made different political decisions at different times. 
One person’s first time joining a rebel group might have been in 1986 (as a young 
person), but then they joined the war in 1995 as the head of their household. To explore 
the generational effect, we asked people their current ages and worked backwards based 
on the stories they shared. This also appeared to be a more accurate way of analyzing 
generational and social groups, as the markers for adulthood were socio-economic and 
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not based on a linear timeline. Thus, to further explore the question of generational 
location and the role of youth during the war, we identified two main points of inquiry: 1) 
the age at which people who joined rebel groups first joined and 2) any differences 
between those who joined before 1993 and those who joined after 1993. 
Because of the method used to collect data, determining the age at which people 
joined rebel groups required an indirect approach. As people told their stories, they gave 
information regarding experiences such as being in school, being at home with their 
families, being a mother, or being the eldest daughter. We used these markers in each 
person’s history to determine the stage at which they joined the war. Sometimes, markers 
like age were obvious, and people clearly remembered their age upon joining. Other 
times, people struggled to remember the year or their specific age, but could recount the 
events associated with it. We then worked backwards to place people into the following 
categories, which include markers for age as well as social markers that would place 
them correctly in a group: 
Table 2. Definitions of Generational Locations within Burundi’s Context 
AGE 
GROUP DEFINITION 
Child 
Under the age of 15, a dependent, still in primary school. While 
the World Bank and other statistics use the age frame “less than 18 
years” to define child soldiers, children above the age of 15 are 
realistically no longer seen strictly as children in Burundian society. 
Many other organizations now differentiate between needs and 
developmental stages of children under 15 years old and those in 
adolescence. While it is possible to enter secondary school by the 
age of 14, secondary school is an important marker for adolescence, 
as children often lived at the schools themselves, separating them 
from their families.  
Youth 
(Adolescent) 
15-19 years old, possibly in secondary school, often self-
described in relation to other siblings. When people describe 
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themselves in adolescence with respect to the war, they may talk 
about being the eldest sibling, or the third eldest, or the youngest. 
They often did this to denote certain responsibilities that went along 
with their role in the family. At this stage, it is possible to be in 
secondary school, but most of the population would still be in 
primary school or no longer enrolled in school. 
Youth 
(Young 
Adult) 
20-34 years old, no longer in school (or in university), 
unemployed or unable to support oneself, unmarried. Youth 
might also be referred to as  
“young adults,” but the term used in Burundian society is “youth.” 
These individuals were at a stage in life where they had not reached 
key milestones for adulthood, such as marriage and the ability to 
support oneself. At the same time, they were also moving out of 
adolescence – out of school, and out of an age where they are 
expected to be taking care of their brothers and sisters. Even if they 
are not able to save enough at this point to buy their own house or 
land, they are expected to be working towards these goals. 
Adult 
35 and above, has been married, has had children, owned land 
or property. This is the only group not referred to as “youth” more 
broadly in Burundian society. They have reached one, if not all, of 
the key milestones that propel an individual into adulthood, and are 
generally financially or legally responsible for others. 
 
While the Adolescent and Young Adult cohorts involve quite a bit of overlap, a 
key difference between them is their schooling experiences. Therefore, in this analysis, 
“youth” is grouped as one category in order to understand relevant generational 
differences, and is separated where relevant differences are found. I use 1993 as a point 
of reference, as this was the one specific point in time that everyone in the sample was 
asked to speak about. 
For clarity on the types of choices that people made during the war and to capture 
a range of political activism, I defined broad categories that outlined a relationship to 
violence and relationship to political groups: Apathy, Ambivalence, Non-violence, 
Violence, and Military Service. 
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Table 3. Typology of Political Participation 
CATEGORY DEFINITION 
Apathy 
Rejection of all political parties and disinterest in the 
political system and elections. Many people in this category 
believe that no matter who is in power, the political game 
will never benefit them personally. This group may have 
supported political groups they knew to be engaging in 
violence, but it would generally be described as something 
they were forced to do. 
Ambivalence 
Engagement with the political system and close following of 
elections and other political developments, but refusal to join 
a political party. Members of this category felt that politics 
were important and that they could have an effect on political 
systems; however, they exercised caution in choosing a 
political party or belonging to a group. This group may have 
supported political groups, but it would be described as 
something they did to manage relationships, or that they were 
forced to do. 
Non-violence 
Direct engagement with a political party or active political 
organization, but no participation in violence. This group 
may also have supported political groups they knew to be 
engaging in violence by providing food, resources, etc., but 
the emphasis is on their perceived level of choice in the 
matter. 
Violence 
This group actively participated in political violence. The 
testimony they gave evidences that they “fought” actively 
during the war as full members of a rebel group. There is 
some distinction here between those who were full-fledged 
combatants and those who were associated with the group, 
but did not engage in direct fighting. The definition here is 
based upon respondents’ own testimonies and their 
descriptions of their experiences. 
Military Service 
Those who joined the military. This is a separate category 
from violence because they did not have the same 
experiences in terms of demobilization and reintegration, and 
motivations for joining the military were often directly 
related to careers, since military service was treated as such. 
Thus, one could not join the military in the same way a 
person could decide to fight.  
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 The categories defined are fluid, and therefore bound to oversimplify any single 
individual’s experience. However, they offer the ability to directly compare those who 
participated in violence to those who did not. Beyond this, non-violence can also be 
analyzed for different typologies in relation to political activism. A person who rejects 
politics altogether and a person who engages in politics without violence have not made 
the same set of political choices and are likely influenced by key factors in drastically 
different ways. These typologies allow us to fully consider the wave of political activism 
and the political decision-making of those who did not engage in violence.  
 Individuals who participated in violence at any point in time were coded as such, 
given the extreme acts they were required to commit in order to be part of this group. 
However, most who participated in violence, if not all, also fit into other categories at 
different points in time. While each respondent was marked as one of these categories, 
their interviews were also coded for other types of participation to permit fluidity 
between a variety of relationships to politics and violence.  
 
Participation in Violence across Generational Locations 
Those sampled ranged from 20 to 64 years old, and participants in violence 
ranged from 24 to 59 years of age. The sample was split into the three generational 
categories based on who would have fit these categories in 1993 and yielded the 
following results: 39 were children, 43 were youth, and 10 were adults at this time. From 
this small sample, it is not possible to determine if one group was more likely than 
another to participate in violence, but we can infer if there are major differences in how 
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these groups experienced Ndadaye’s assassination and their choices for political action 
from the ways that people in the different sample groups spoke about politics and 
violence and the ways they made choices during this time. One important detail to note is 
that while participation in violence was oversampled to ensure selection of both CNDD-
FDD and FNL, youth had the highest levels of participation (20 joined and 23 did not), 
while children had the second highest levels (14 joined and 25 did not) and adults had the 
lowest levels (1 joined, 9 did not). This breakdown echoes some key patterns noted in 
other research on the Burundian civil war, namely the high rates of participation of youth 
with significant participation of children (though children did not comprise a majority of 
those involved as fighters).  
Furthermore, the types of non-violent activism differed between generational 
groups. Children exhibited higher levels of ambivalence and non-violent participation 
than youth, and adults displayed the most apathy, with a much smaller group that 
identified as ambivalent. Of course, these trends are not perfectly representative overall, 
the ways that members of each generational location spoke about how they made choices 
mirrors these generational differences. In general, respondents who were children or 
adolescents at the time the war broke out spoke extensively about the influence of their 
friends. Children were also the group that spoke about class distinction the most, and the 
one for which political party was one of the most important identities. Young adults and 
adults emphasized poor governance, the influence of family members, and the 
importance of their role within the family. Adults again referenced class issues and 
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emphasized an aspect that the other groups spoke about less: the moral significance of 
political participation. 
Members of all three generational locations spoke about the influence of distinct 
identities and experiences, such as ethnicity, religion, or being an internally displaced 
person or refugee. These did not vary by generation, and while all of these elements 
factored into decision-making, none of them typically was the instigator for violence 
(non-violent respondents brought them up just as often as factors in their decision-
making). In fact, religion and personal faith was almost exclusively associated with 
apathy and ambivalence when discussing how faith factored into decision-making. 
Several members of FNL mentioned the group’s religious practices, but not as part of 
their own identities.  
Education, on the other hand, differed between generations. Most respondents 
who were children during the war had only made it through primary school. However, 
there was a smaller group that made it through to a university. This split was likely a 
consequence of conflict. During the war, secondary schools in particular were dangerous 
for students, as the students themselves would engage in ethnic violence. However, many 
also lost access to primary schools during this time. As children, many of them would 
likely have had limited access to school during the war itself or difficulty proceeding 
through primary school into secondary school without delays. A smaller subset of this 
group may have prioritized and remained in school or accessed opportunities to study as 
they moved with their families. For children during the war, those who participated in 
violence all had less than a secondary school education, aside from one student who 
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eventually went on to study in a university. All other university students were actively 
engaged in politics in a non-violent manner (categorized as “non-violence”).  
For youth (adolescents and young adults), however, 13 out of the 20 who 
participated in violence were in or had completed secondary school. A smaller group 
completed primary school (4) and never attended secondary school, and three had not 
completed primary school. Only two people in youth and adult samples went to a 
university, one who was ambivalent about politics (youth) and one who was apathetic 
(adult).  
This cursory analysis reveals that, overall, older adults in 1993 were much less 
educated than young adults and adolescents, and much less likely to participate in 
violence. While Chapter Three established the importance of the role of the “caretaker” 
as a deterrent to violence, the data here supports this again, even with men included. The 
older generation was much more likely overall to assume this role and to discuss it as a 
reason they could not join.  
This cohort had already been targeted in 1988 in a massacre of approximately 
20,000 Hutus under Buyoya’s rule. Although many were children at the time, they also 
clearly remembered the 1972 genocide, where higher estimates cite 210,000 Hutu deaths. 
While that seemed to have discouraged the majority of this generation from participating 
in another uprising (given the swift and harsh reaction of the government), several 
scholars have noted that this cohort was also responsible for the PALIPEHUTU 
movement that eventually fed into CNDD-FDD and FNL rebel groups. Liisa Malkki 
(1995) has written about the specific experience of those who left as refugees during this 
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time. Tracing the trajectory of different refugee communities, she has explained that 
those living in the camp (compared to those who lived in a more urban area) chose to 
guard their Hutu identity and maintained strong attachments to the idea of one day 
returning to Burundi. Other refugees attempted to immerse themselves in new 
communities in Tanzania and leave behind their Hutu identity.  
Malkkis’ work explains two key elements about the importance of generational 
location. First, refugee status alone is not a predictor of one’s interest in joining violence, 
because the way a refugee experience is structured has a profound impact on the 
development of narratives about history and return to one’s former country. This supports 
Mannheim’s concept of generational units, whereby he acknowledges that, within a 
generation, common experiences may create separate groups with diverging ways of 
making sense of historical events, though they may not realize it. Second, this subset of 
the adult population influenced future generations by bringing this Hutu cosmology into 
the forefront for future generations. 
Elyas, the only respondent who was an adult in 1993 and chose to fight, was 
immersed in these discussions before the war. He was not a main leader in the war, but 
did recruit young men to join, including his own son. The day Ndadaye was killed, he 
joined a group to revolt: 
The first day, we took arrows. We left because nothing was going well in the 
country; by that time, even the whole army supported the former government. 
They used our ethnic differences to divide the population – and we wanted to 
bring unity back to the country. That is what pushed us to fight. I hugged my 
wife, and she said, “Go, so that our country can have what it deserves.” We both 
wanted this to happen so no one would stop us to go because it was already in our 
minds. It was our will. 
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 Elyas met with a group in the forest for years before he joined a group to fight in 
1993. He donated food and other goods, and spoke about the situation. He knew this 
group was coming from outside of the community, but did not say where they came from. 
These were also the people with whom he got in contact when he made the choice to join. 
He highlighted an important element noted in earlier chapters about the social 
organization of the war, which led to seemingly spontaneous yet planned massacres in 
response to Ndadaye’s death. Adults, and even young adults, were organized to believe in 
the possibility of democratic success and primed to react as a collective when Ndadadye 
was killed. The group who participated in this type of violence was much smaller than the 
rebel groups that eventually formed, but was highly motivated by principle.  
Agathon and Simeon, two brothers in Cibitoke, recounted their experiences as 
refugees who fled after the 1972 massacre. Agathon, now 63 years old, was only 23 when 
he left with his family to the DRC: “We didn’t take anything in the house, we just ran to 
Congo and stayed there for four years. The conflict began years ago. The history between 
[Hutu and Tutsi] became bad after the country was created.” Agathon remained between 
the DRC and Burundi during these years. He returned again shortly after Ndadye was 
elected, only to leave again following his assassination. “Life in Congo was better,” he 
explained, “You could find a place to live. There was land. I knew people and UNHCR 
helped us. I helped my family by doing masonry.” Agathon focused on supporting his 
family and surviving, and although he remembered people in the camp teaching others 
about the importance of returning to fight, he was not drawn into it himself: 
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I was born in 1949. In 1972, my elder and younger brother were killed. All eight 
of my uncles were killed. Two of my cousins were murdered in their sleep. My 
house was burned down – many other people’s houses were burned down, too. It 
angered us, but it didn’t push us to join the uprising. All our land had been taken. 
Then my father died and I had to take care of my brothers and my sister’s son. My 
sister also died. During war, no one gets to be with their families. I couldn’t join 
the war, though. It was just not my way of being. I saw enough from our fight for 
independence.  
 
Agathon’s brother, Simeon, was 39 years old – not quite born in 1972. As a 20 
year old who grew up in the DRC without the experiences of previous wars, he fully 
bought into the Hutu cosmology that Malkki wrote about. While he noted that he had 
opportunities in the DRC, he never intended to stay there:  
What I missed in Congo was citizenship. We would never be protected, and 
people knew we were mostly against the [Burundi] government in Congo. Life 
was… you lived with fear in the refugee camp. Politics were always changing, but 
to me the politics was a bit separate. The problem was that Hutu could not trust 
Tutsi, and vice versa… My generation joined the fight, and now many of them are 
in the Burundian Army. Others I know went, but they died.  
 
Going to the field, I saw two things. First, killing: there is no good in killing. I had 
the same beliefs as some of my friends, and we joined because there was no other 
place to flee. But many of them found themselves in the Rusizi [river].xix Second, 
there is no future. It’s just the past repeating itself. Religions get along – if you 
aren’t in a political group, no one will bother you. There might be trust 
eventually, but it will take a long time. Maybe our grandchildren will see it, but 
not us. 
 
Agathon and Simeon directly mention the issue of generations and the ways in 
which Simeon’s lack of exposure to the violence of independence and the 1972 genocide 
shaped his relationship to the same messages and recruitment tactics differently from that 
of his brother. Adults and young adults who were not able to remember the violence of 
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1972 did not have these memories to influence their interpretations of the utility of the 
movement. While of course not everyone joined, a slightly younger generation was 
recruited on a much larger scale. In fact, men like Elyas (though a much smaller group) 
actually joined with their eldest sons and recruited other young men into armed groups. 
Elyas was one of two respondents in my sample who joined the war with one of his sons, 
and one of four in the sample who recruited others into the war. Several others took on 
this role as they moved up in rank later on throughout the war.  
Adolescents, many of whom were in secondary school during the war, were 
specifically recruited as young, able-bodied participants who would be highly dedicated 
to the causes of the group. In Rwanda, génocidaires were mostly adults and young adults 
who had been introduced to increasingly radical ideology for decades that eventually 
promoted genocide in order to protect Hutu people from a potential Tutsi overthrow. The 
state was the organizer, and heads of households were the main participants. The 
narrative was vastly different, despite seemingly present similarities (given the ethnic 
divides between the two groups). In Burundi, adolescents who saw that they were 
consistently targeted as potential threats to the state found a sense of agency and 
opportunity in the idea of joining the war. Salvator, who joined the CNDD-FDD at the 
age of 18 years old, explained: 
The idea [to join] came because of what was happening in the country; by that 
time no one was free because of differences in ethnicity. We were tortured often. 
Then, we got angry and decided to fight. They first killed our president, Melchior 
Ndadaye. We elected him, and they assassinated him. War broke out, and we ran 
away, and that’s when I decided to join the rebellion. 
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Salvator fled to a rebel group with friends, who decided to join together. Olivier, who 
was 20 years old, had recently returned from being a refugee in the DRC with his family. 
He similarly joined with a group of friends from school who were recruited early on 
during the war, and noted the odd relationship that developed between them as the 
expectation to join the movement intensified. Olivier in particular befriended the leader 
in Kamenge, who called himself Major Savimbi in reference to the famous Angolan rebel 
leader, Jonas Savimbi: 
What made me join at first? It was not a hard life, it was just influence. My friend 
had a gun, and he told me to follow him he would teach me how to use it. Many 
of my friends were my schoolmates in the quartier – there were a few of them. I 
remember there was a Tutsi lady, and one of my classmates wanted to kill her. I 
tried to speak on her behalf, but he said he would kill me, too. He said he would 
blow me up with a grenade. He didn't even consider that we were classmates. 
Some of them were crowded behind some stalls in the market talking, and I knew 
they were getting people for the war. A few of them had guns.  
 
And the rebellion – I hadn't really been in the rebellion. I was just helping at first, 
but I was not officially a rebel. If my friend wanted me to bring him something I 
could get in their base and brought money for him. If my friend wanted to sleep I 
could watch over him with his gun and next morning gave back his gun. Savimbi 
was the chief, and they [CNDD-FDD fighters] knew I was his friend. I was with 
him all the time. I had no problems. Savimbi was a terror – you could not look 
him in the eyes.  
 
I don't have parents, but I have a sister. She is 25 years old – she is married, now. 
At the time, she was ten years old when my parents died. My mother died of an 
illness in February 1993. I am 34 now, and in 1993 I was fifteen. When I joined, 
my sister went to stay with our grandmother. I didn't choose the group to join, you 
know? I joined because of my friend. The Maquisxx was the rebel movement at the 
time. The other movement [FNL] came later, but I had already left the rebel group 
by then. 
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Olivier described an important process of recruitment – the incremental nature of 
gaining trust, and the ways that multiple moments and experiences build together to 
convince a person to join. No single moment felt like a choice, but many moments felt 
like different choices, each entrenching him further in the network. He stayed silent as his 
friends beat a Tutsi woman, he followed a friend from school with a gun to talk about 
joining, and he was befriended by an important and older member (one of the key 
organizers) of the rebellion in the quartier, for whom he would do small favors and stand 
guard. Eventually, he joined the rebellion. Olivier also mentioned his education, 
explaining that it added a bit of pressure to join because the movement in Kamenge was 
also anti-intellectual: “They would follow you if you were educated. You were never 
really safe until you joined, because they would think that you could be pro-Tutsi.” Thus, 
not only was it important for them to gain Olivier’s trust, it was also important for him to 
gain theirs. 
Targeting people who were in school – especially those who finished primary 
school or were in secondary school – made it possible to recruit quickly and effectively. 
School friends created both push and pull factors, shaping decisions to join the war by 
pressuring each other to join and emboldening each other to do so. The recruitment of 
youth at the time created a fierce divide between ethnic groups, with the city completely 
split and controlled by groups of youth across the city. Thousands had fled the 
neighborhoods, and Kamenge in particular, in the hopes of escaping violence and the risk 
of being targeted.  
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 The experience was not specific to Hutu youth either. Paul, a musician in his 
forties, met me in a café to speak about his participation in the Sans Échec, one of two 
Tutsi youth groupsxxi that were well known for gruesome killings of Hutu people during 
the war, including killing for sport and collecting payment from spectators. “I’m not sure 
why I joined,” he said. “I am different now; but then, people around me were doing it, 
and it really seemed like if we did not go after them, they would come for us. At first I 
was helping them – I wasn’t killing anyone.” A classmate also recruited Paul, which was 
particularly poignant for him because they believed Hutu militias were targeting the 
educated. Even between groups that were completely socially separated, the tactics for 
recruitment of youth across groups exhibited striking similarities. Education was a central 
element of youth recruitment, both in how they were recruited and in the narratives they 
shared.  
Children, on the other hand, were less likely to be recruited in school, though 
many who joined later in the war once they were older spoke about the mechanisms 
described above. One stark difference here was that education did not factor into the 
narratives of those who were children during the war in the same way. Education likely 
seemed less significant, or more abstract to them; given the lack of security, many parents 
pulled their children out of school and the importance of education may have been less 
salient.  
One respondent, who was in primary school in Kamenge when Ndadaye was 
killed, noted, “Many people dropped out of school. Every three or four days, people were 
running from their homes. I couldn’t go to school because of the fighting.” He moved 
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between neighborhoods so frequently that it was impossible to re-enter school during the 
war, and eventually went with his family into the stadium, where the government had set 
up containment camps for those not engaged in fighting. “They were trying to show the 
international community that they were protecting people,” he said, “ but there were no 
toilets, no doctor, no medicines. It rained on top of us. The soldiers had their own shelter, 
but they would come into the shelters at the stadium. It was like a new form of 
elimination.” When he left the stadium, he found protection with a group fighting in the 
war. Many children, similar to people in other generations, spoke of their anger and 
frustration about ethnic tension and the injustices they saw around them. They 
acknowledged the history of this injustice, but it was based much more heavily in the 
violence they were seeing during the war itself.  
Epitace, who joined the war at the age of 13 years old, explained: 
It was very possible to join in a group. Teenagers would tell you to come with 
them. During that time, the war kept going on. Rebels were fighting against the 
Burundian army. They tried to fix our problems by fighting against the Tusti and 
for the citizens. We fled when our house was burned. We lost some of our family 
– when war breaks out, you always lose track of some family. I thought about 
what was happening – if I had the power to take revenge, I would do it… and 
there were people from the CNDD-FDD around. They told me I was right. I 
didn’t stay very long, but I saw that we did something good. They showed us how 
things needed to change. 
 
Another important element of child participation was that they often joined fairly 
late in the war, and many joined with the goal of getting demobilization money. At least 
initially, many youth perceived it as a mutually beneficial exchange, as both CNDD-FDD 
and FNL rebel groups recruited heavily to have larger numbers as they began 
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negotiations with UPRONA. Youth, in turn, believed they would qualify for 
demobilization, which would give them and their families important advantages as the 
war came to an end. The potential money was not insignificant, especially for most 
Burundians: the program consisted of at least $515 (US) distributed over an 18-month 
period, during which combatants received training and support in preparation for 
reintegration, and more money was provided to those higher in rank. Successfully 
demobilized combatants then received a reintegration grant of $545. Those who were not 
fighters, but instead considered dependents or supporters of fighters, received 100,000 
Burundian Francs (the equivalent of $91 US). These people often organized logistics or 
performed other tactics as part of a rebel group (D’Aoust et al., 2016). 
 At 30 years old, a man living in Kanyosha named Rene joined rebel groups three 
separate times during the war – twice the CNDD-FDD, and once FNL. He was first 
recruited as a student. Then later, after joining a second time, he was sent into school to 
recruit others. The last time Rene joined as a fighter in 2004, he was 22 years old, but the 
same school friends convinced him to go with them with the promise of demobilization 
funds at the end of the war: 
Just like in any political group, there is something called recruitment. No one 
takes you by force. At school, I didn’t know about political groups, but we all 
talked. I talked to people I knew, but also people I didn’t know. We would talk to 
anyone. If we heard news, people would interpret it how they wanted to. The first 
time, people who I went with all died; they stayed, and I came back. 
 
The second time, the people who joined with me all lived. I met them because of 
debates we would have at school. You would talk with someone… hear about 
their ideas and beliefs. Most of the time they knew I was there in secret. 
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The last time, I didn’t join because I wanted it. I joined because of others. They 
told me to join because there was money to be made. They had to be people I 
could go with because of their influence. We were from the same school. In 
CNDD-FDD, they told us they wanted people – said they wanted a huge number 
of people to get their people into the Burundian Miltary, and others could be 
demobilized. 
 
Rene also spoke about why did not tell his family about joining the rebels – 
another common theme among youth and children: 
In a family, if they have someone who joined the rebellion, they fear this. They 
think of him as someone who has seen terrible things – someone who has 
completely different values. That’s why my family could not advise me. I could 
see that joining the rebellion would be bad, but the miracle was that none of my 
friends advised against this. If someone walks with a gun, you can imagine that 
even if you shared a bed with him when he was home, you wouldn’t be able to 
trust him as he did then. 
 
There was an understanding among the vast majority of youth who joined that these 
decisions could not be discussed with family. Rene’s memory reveals that they got this 
idea from one another; those recruiting him told him that families would not understand, 
and they would fear people who want to join the rebels. Gerard, who was 16 years old 
when he joined the CNDD-FDD in 1997, similarly recalled, “Talking with my family 
was out of the question. They knew we were going to die.”  
 Gerard is now a member of the Imbonerakure. At 31 years old, he was still a 
member of the party’s youth wing, but his recruitment was a slow process, and even in 
the camps he was not always so confident:  
In 1993, I was 12 years old. Life was good. My parents had guards to work for us. 
Now, we don’t have anything. We had so many things stolen from us by the 
rebels and the Burundian Army. So many people were dying…day after day. I 
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kept having fear about this… dying among others. My neighbors died in the war, 
and I was scared about this. At that time I didn’t see a possibility of the war 
getting better. I just saw what was happening to my friends and thought the war 
was bad. At that time, I saw only bad thing – I wasn’t a member of the CNDD-
FDD yet. As I grew up, the war continued, and it got worse. I learned more and 
my opinion began to change. The rebels would explain their reasons for fighting. 
They would find us where we were and explain to us. At the end of the day, I 
thought I had to join. 
 
When I first went there, I wasn’t used to war. You get used to war by being in 
war. When you are there, you change. There are two possibilities. You are scared 
and run, or you shoot the opposition. My first reaction was to shoot the 
opposition. 
 
They [rebels] would say, “You can come back when you have laid traps and 
thrown grenades. You can come back when you’ve brought something to show 
you have killed someone. 
 
Gerard and Rene both felt they could not rely on family to help them make the 
decision about whether to fight. In fact, the only two youth that spoke to their families 
before joining left with a family member: one with an older brother, and one with a 
father. Otherwise, all youth who participated in violence said they never could have 
spoken to their family about this choice because they knew they would be told not to go. 
Furthermore, youth rarely spoke with family members about the political situation, nor 
with anyone outside these groups, which seemed to make them enticing for many who 
joined rebel groups. The recruitment tactic provided youth, who had very little ability to 
speak openly about politics in other spaces they occupied, with a forum to discuss the 
frustration and humiliation they felt from being targeted by the Burundian Army.  
For the adult generation, it seems that refugee camps created a safe space wherein 
ideas could be channeled into movements. For youth and children, school became a 
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particularly effective safe space because it separated them physically from other groups, 
and they could speak about these issues among peers. Eric, who was 16 years old when 
he joined, was adamant that it was “his decision” to go to war: “It was just your decision, 
something your body and your soul wants. You would tell yourself that you want to go 
there because it is better than staying here; it is your own way, your own decision.” I 
asked him to explain what convinced him: 
Many of us joined together. I met some of them in school, others in training. 
Many of them were my friends; we would go to the meetings together. I attended 
many meetings and that’s where they convinced me. We were being tortured. The 
Burundian Army would stop us and beat us if they thought we were one of the 
rebels. We were never safe… 
 
I couldn’t tell my parents about it, because they would have tried to stop me. They 
didn’t understand. They thought it was like going to die. Once you were 
convinced to join, you would not go home – you would go straight from the 
meeting. I took pants and a pair of shoes with me to my last meeting. 
 
The experiences of youth who participated in violence highlight two important 
elements for consideration. First, the pull of narratives was much stronger as a whole for 
youth who had not experienced the violence of 1972 or 1988 firsthand. Second, a theory 
of generations is only functional in Burundi’s case if we conceptualize the mechanisms 
by which adults, youth, and children obtain different knowledge and develop different 
relationships to the war as occurring through interaction.  
The fact that these differences in appreciation corresponded with generational 
divides supports Mannheim’s problem of generations. In particular, key differences in the 
information these generations had about violence informed their decisions in distinct 
ways. The adult generation was largely influenced by the consequences of uprisings in 
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1972 and 1988, and thus reluctant to participate in violence. However, this also became 
the catalyst for some to cultivate movements in refugee camps. With little access to 
opportunities, pockets of the population (generational units) in refugee camps developed 
highly ethnicized narratives, both encouraging and pressuring others to join the 
movement. Young adults in these camps then joined at higher rates, and some aligned 
these movements even before the war itself. The genocide of 1972 was a greater 
motivator for this cohort, which had less direct exposure to the violence during the 
genocide. Adolescents, then, were recruited during the war, highly impacted by the 
events of 1993 coupled with narratives shared by those fighting at the time. Young adults 
and adolescents provided the largest cohort of participants in the war, due in no small part 
to the role of isolating environments in creating spaces where these groups could explore 
ideas about politics and ethnicity – space they rarely occupied within the family or in 
other networks. Children often joined later as they grew into adolescence, though some 
did start earlier. This group had few memories from before the war and was more heavily 
focused on opportunities for demobilization and immediate protection from violence 
during the years of the war. 
The clear generational variations, however, do not arise only from differences in 
worldviews. Instead, the differences we see between generations are informed and 
influenced by previous generations. It is the small group that moves to refugee camps 
who set up a narrative that rings true for the next generation. The next generation (of 
young adults) becomes adults who share this narrative with each other and those in 
Burundi as violence begins again. The smaller group of adults and young adults who had 
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previous exposure to these narratives and the associated movement are the ones who took 
immediate action following Ndadye’s death, participating in massacres of Tutsi across 
the country. These people then shared this narrative and actively engaged groups of 
adolescent youth, who in turn shared these messages in school. Each generation believes 
on a larger scale that change is possible. For children, the idea that change is possible was 
all they knew – a stark divergence from adults, many of whom believed that nothing good 
could genuinely come from a war. Children also grew up knowing only a country in war, 
with a narrative to drive them and no time of peace to compare to their experiences. As a 
result, many of them focused on escaping violence and preparing for a time of peace in 
the ways they felt were possible. 
These generational differences and the interaction with and influence of previous 
generations on subsequent ones gradually shifted attitudes about engaging in politics. The 
older adult generation exhibited large levels of apathy in relation to political groups (with 
a smaller highly motivated group that organized political movements), but younger 
generations expressed increasingly complicated relationships with political institutions. 
Children (today’s young adults) had the most even split between different types of 
political participation and expressed ambivalent relationships with political groups to a 
greater degree than any other cohort.  
Thus, the power of generational location in situating the experiences of children, 
youth, and adults during the war is central to understanding different types of 
participation and the various meanings attached to participation in violence. However, 
Burundi’s case allows us to identify key elements missing from this theory, namely how 
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decision-making is supported by a combination of personal experience at the time and 
purposeful interaction between groups that passes on and reshapes narratives for the 
development of a movement over decades. This narrative shifted from a rebel movement 
outside the country to an organized group with a network inside the country to a 
fractionalized collection of movements within the country, which later became a 
consolidated set of rebel groups, and then eventually transformed into political parties. 
Generational location and the feeding of narratives from one generation into the next 
made this transition possible. Mannheim’s problem of generations still applies here; in 
fact, one of the strongest ways that the case of Burundi supports this theory is apparent in 
how youth made decisions without speaking to their families, precisely because they 
knew that they would be discouraged from participating in violence. However, Burundi 
allows for a further breakdown and examination of the mechanisms behind these 
relationships and reveals how generational units may interact to propel political action in 
new directions over decades. 
 
Political Choice: Beyond Violence 
As discussed above, the majority of respondents did not actually participate in 
violence. However, non-violence was not synonymous with apathy or a lack of activism. 
While decision-making during war and conflict often surrounds violence, literature 
conceptualizing political action has rarely extended beyond the choice to fight. This 
under-theorization of the options outside of violence limits our understanding of political 
participation. This section focuses on conceptualizing how people thought about non-
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violence by deconstructing types of non-violent engagement into separate categories: 
apathy, ambivalence, and non-violent participation. It again examines the differences 
between generations to understand non-violent actors’ relationships with politics and the 
experiences of younger generations. 
 During the war, non-violent participation was comprised of many types of action, 
and the opportunities increased as the war continued and rebel groups transitioned into 
political parties. The sample over-represents violent actors in order to theorize about 
them, with only about 55,000 participants estimated between the rebel groups at any 
given time (D’Aoust et al., 2012). Another important note about participants in violence, 
however, is that their choices are temporal; no person interviewed engaged in violence 
throughout the entire war unless they were a high-level organizer in the war itself. The 
real numbers of those who joined are therefore higher than estimates during 
demobilization, which captured only a snapshot in time. Additionally, nearly all who 
joined had other relationships to violence and political participation throughout the war. 
Instead of analyzing non-violent political action by people who neatly fit into categories, 
all interviews were coded for these types of participation throughout subjects’ political 
histories. In this way, the data encompass the flows of participation and account for 
moments in which violent participants also engaged in other types of action.  
 To conduct this analysis, interviews were marked with descriptors once for 
overall participation. Anyone who participated in violence was marked as such, and 
others were categorized based on their overall involvement with politics – the most 
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dominant type of engagement in their stories. Each interview was then coded for content, 
marking types of non-violent and violent engagement.  
 Apathy represents complete disengagement from politics, social movements, or 
collective action of any kind related to social change. This category was not created to 
denote whether a person cared about political developments, but rather to denote whether 
they felt they had the political space to act on how they felt about politics. Respondents 
would often say they needed to stay focused on other priorities, such as making sure their 
children went to school or that they had food for the next day. Some respondents 
explained they did not feel their actions would create any kind of change because politics 
have been designed to work for other people. Thus, rather than framing apathy as 
indifference to the situation, it is instead framed here as indifference to one’s own 
engagement in the political context. 
 Apathy presented as an important dynamic within political engagement among all 
generations, but was most common for adults. This group displayed much lower levels of 
diversity in political engagement, and there were smaller pockets of people relating to 
politics through ambivalence and non-violence (and violence, which has been discussed). 
Again, the experiences of 1972 seemed to impact the adult generation’s understanding of 
space to engage in social change. Adults also spoke less of shifts in political engagement 
over the years, suggesting that they stayed more consistently apathetic to political 
participation. The older generational cohort expressed heavy doubts about the efficacy of 
trying different approaches, implying that the smaller pockets that did engage in politics 
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(violent or non-violent) were likely to continue on these paths much more consistently 
than younger cohorts. 
 Only two adults discussed multiple types of participation, each shifting only once 
in the types of political engagement that they chose throughout their narratives. One 
participant moved from peaceful participation to apathy, and the other from ambivalence 
to apathy. Antoinette, a woman living in Bubanza who was an adult in 1993, spoke about 
her shift from peaceful participation toward apathy; the transition took place specifically 
because she did not agree with CNDD-FDD’s targeting of other Hutu groups:  
We thought they were fighting for Hutus who were oppressed, but later on it took 
another direction, because Hutu killed Hutu, and Hutu put other Hutu in prison. 
Now, it is about political groups – if you are not in the same political party, they 
will harm you. They don’t care if you are a Hutu or not. You find those who are 
not in the same political groups torturing each other. You don’t have any rights; 
even when you want a job, they tell to first join the party. Now it is even harder 
than before. You can’t find a job if you are not in the party or bribing someone. 
 
I supported the CNDD-FDD in 2005, and I was a member of the party. But by 
2010, I didn’t vote. We had been on strike for a month without being paid, and I 
said to myself, “There is no point in voting.” I did not even vote against them 
because it was the only party I liked. But, they were such a disappointment, and it 
discouraged me from voting again for another party. 
 
Elyas, whose story was mentioned earlier, joined with his son in 1993. While he 
no longer participates in violence (and has thus technically transitioned into a non-violent 
role), this seemed to be more a function of age (now 64 years old) and the war ending 
than a shift in the way he related to politics. “We continued our work,” he explained, 
“and when things got better in 2005, we came back. Because my son was still young, 
they placed him in the military. He is still in the military today.” In terms of current 
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politics, he remains a supporter of the CNDD-FDD, but has transitioned out of any kind 
of active engagement. His relationship to the party seemed almost like that of one in 
retirement after service to a company for many years. While he did vote in 2010, he did 
not speak of participation in politics in any way to indicate he felt part of current debates, 
and his way of relating to current politics was to reflect on his contributions in previous 
years. When I asked him what he thought of what was happening in the political situation 
today, he replied, “Looking at how the country has changed, I don’t regret having joined. 
There are no ethnic differences put forward today.” While he clearly stopped fighting 
along with the rest of the CNDD-FDD, his relationship to the party remained that of a 
combatant (now ex-combatant) whose loyalty was based on this participation. 
In the later generations of youth and children, political participation was portrayed 
as shifting concept that could change quickly and often. Respondents most often cited at 
least two major shifts in participation, and up to four. The trend evidences a steady 
increase in variance of participation, with adults having lowest rates of variance, youth 
having much higher rates, and variance in children becoming almost commonplace (with 
much higher rates of people noting more than two or three major shifts in their types of 
engagement). 
Robert, a 28-year-old man in Kamenge, explained his own dynamic relationship 
with politics, highlighting some key differences between young people and the older 
generation in Burundi. Of the elections in 2010, he said, “I can’t understand it, because 
when I went to vote I had my voice; but when I went in there [in the voting booth], I had 
no voice. I can’t understand it.” He spoke about his shift between peaceful participation 
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in politics and ambivalence – a shift he made several times throughout the war and in the 
post-conflict period. Loyal to the CNDD-FDD, he believed in their message and 
supported them (though never joined a rebel group). However, following the elections, he 
began to question the election results. Eventually, he quietly left the party and remained 
independent, and then eventually became a (non-violent) supporter of the FNL before and 
again becoming independent: 
Many of the people that helped protect me are now in jail. I even know some 
people in Kamenge who were killed for being FNL members. Some wanted 
revenge, but this isn’t a good thing. Even I was suspected. There was a guy I 
knew who was in FNL before, but switched to CNDD-FDD He told the party and 
we were all caught by CNDD-FDD supporters, who took us to a private house. 
They asked if we were in the FNL, but I told them I was done with politics and 
that I didn’t do that anymore. Eventually, though, I began to think: before the 
CNDD-FDD, there was the FNL. They wanted equality for everyone, and this is 
what touched me about them.  
 
Robert continued to explain that after joining for some time, he decided it was too 
risky to be associated with them, and is now independent: “The government does not 
agree with the FNL, and if they catch a member they will accuse him of collaborating 
with the others who are resisting government. I want to feel safe; I want to feel secure.” 
He explained his decision to break from both groups, saying. “They are going to jail me 
for this – but, if you are a leader, you can’t let your people die. The people who caught us 
and took us, they were on the phone with people in government posts. There is an issue 
of human rights – the government should not be giving guns to people. Now, I just have 
my friends and my priest.” His experience was emblematic of a shifting relationship with 
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political participation and loyalty to political groups that did not exist with the sample 
who were adults during the war. 
 Ambivalence and active non-violent participation increased throughout the war 
and in its aftermath. Even those who participated in the war itself often expressed 
complicated relationships to violence, questioning their actions even as they took part in 
them. One example of this self-questioning and its resulting political choices came in 
Cibitoke from a 33-year-old man named Melance, a Tutsi who fought in the military:  
I lived with my two brothers and two sisters, I was the second oldest. I only had 
my mom left, though – my father and brothers were killed. I stayed at the 
seminary in Bubanza and lived in the secondary school. Some of us were Tutsi, 
some Hutu. Some of the Tutsi could not leave the school because they couldn't 
find anywhere else to live. I was kept there until the fighting diminished. The 
parish wasn't able to pay for everything for us, and my home had been destroyed, 
so I never went back. When I left the parish, the government sent me into military 
service.  
 
I didn’t like the military – I went by force, because they helped me get permission 
to attend university. I got my degree in 2004 and began teaching in 2005 at a 
secondary school here in Bubanza. We all lost some members of our families, and 
we all know how regrettable it is. In war it’s so difficult to work after you lose a 
member of your family; it's difficult to support yourself. No one could have 
helped me pay the school fees for university. I wanted to do other work, even 
while I was in school I spent time working for someone else in order to gain some 
money for copy books, for example. No one thought that what happened was 
what could happen. We did not think we could defend ourselves without 
considering the part of ourselves that we share with the other group. But the party 
that’s now in the government… what happened in Bubanza… it is difficult to talk 
about because we know each other. It is difficult to talk about politics today. 
 
 During the war, three main elements framed the frequency of shifts in political 
engagement that youth and children chose. First, the rebellion (that organizers framed for 
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over a decade as the main force of social change) incited disillusionment and 
dissatisfaction among youth and children, who were enticed by promises of a better and 
more just society. Young adults expressed this first point more frequently in terms of the 
values of the movement, while children tended to frame it in terms of the hardships 
during war. Second, the gradual shift of the CNDD-FDD, FNL, and other rebel groups 
toward political groups opened up new opportunities for engagement with which younger 
generations were better prepared to engage. Third, children specifically were more likely 
to discuss practical barriers and constraints that shaped their political choices and which 
related to their lack of autonomy as members of society.  
Jean Paul, who fought for the CNDD-FDD, joined the war at 16 years old. He 
continued to support the CNDD-FDD later on, but left the war and later rejoined the 
CNDD-FDD as a recruit for the political youth wing. He explained why he left:  
In a few words, war is not good. We lived through shootings, and it was not easy 
for us. I fought for eight years, and I have been demolished after eight years. With 
the long time I stayed there I thought that I would never have anything left. I had 
to start a normal life right from the bottom of it, tried to find a way to live a 
decent life. 
 
The war was difficult. We had no food, and we would walk for long periods, 
carrying luggage on our heads through rivers and through the forest. We were 
starving. I wanted to run, but I knew they would be able to catch me.  
 
These types of functional barriers (“I wanted to run, but I knew they would be 
able to catch me”) fostered a sense of helplessness about the situation of children who 
joined the war that young adults were less likely to mention. Young adults were actually 
more likely to mention switching between rebel groups on the basis of morality or vision, 
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a key piece that maintained loyalty for many of this generation. As a comparative 
example, Patrick, who was 20 when the war broke out in 1993, explained that when he 
joined, he believed in the CNDD-FDD’s mission, but increasingly lost confidence the 
longer he stayed in the group: 
When you are in the camp, you work under orders. If someone orders you to do 
something, you have to participate. I was doing the right thing, the correct thing, 
but when you enter in the rebellion, you lose your liberty. That is the thing I regret 
the most. The second thing I regret is that being in the rebellion didn’t give me 
anything. 
 
When I was fighting, I left CNDD and joined FNL. In the FNL, I was like a 
commander. After watching the CNDD-FDD, we were supposed to be fighting 
for liberty, and standing up. But the CNDD-FDD, they raped, they stole from 
people. It was not like in the FNL. The FNL was hard. We prayed every day, and 
if you raped or stole, you could be the one that was killed. It was even harder than 
the CNDD-FDD, but I felt better about it. 
 
Mannheim’s problem of generations again serves as a model for understanding 
key differences not only in choice, but also in relationships to types of political action 
perceived by people from different generational locations. Here, we see how acutely the 
information available to certain groups and the unique relationships that each generation 
has to historical events can shape conceptions of political action. Adults, whose most 
formative moments were shaped by the massacre of 1972 and an environment in which 
there were few groups with whom one could align, did not make substantial shifts 
between political groups and types of political action. Youth and children, on the other 
hand, evidenced increasing trends towards political variance, with higher levels of 
engagement and lower levels of loyalty to any one group or type of engagement. First, 
during formative years, they had different options (and growing options) available to 
them, many of which were created and popularized in the later years of the war. Second, 
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as a younger cohort that entered maturity during the war, their limited roles in society 
also shaped their relationships to political engagement.  
 
Political Participation in the Post-Conflict Period 
 The data in the above sections focus largely on the war itself. Because analysis 
generally included all of the data, the post-conflict period has not been fully understood 
as a significant and separate historical phase. Thus, a remaining question about these 
generational differences concerns their relationship to politics in the post-conflict period. 
It is possible that once groups shifted fully from rebel groups to political groups (and out 
of a transitional government towards a fully functioning state), generational engagement 
in politics also shifted. As the war came to an end, tens of thousands of people who 
previously supported violence found new roles in society. However, these roles have not 
been identified, nor have difficulties in transitioning from previous roles into new ones. 
This section examines generational theory of social action, as this same group 
transitioned out of one key set of historical events into an important new phase: the post-
conflict period. 
 Regardless of the historical transition during this time, adults remained consistent 
in the ways they described their relationships with political participation, having changed 
political parties less frequently and maintained their types of engagement more strongly 
than youth and child cohorts. On the other hand, these two younger cohorts did express 
variation. With regard to the post-conflict period in particular, they spoke about 
transitional government and reorienting their relationships to political action. 
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 The elections served as a pivotal moment for social change and were perceived 
both positively and negatively. While specific controversy between parties centered on 
the legitimacy of the elections themselves, respondents more often discussed this event as 
an indicator of the virtue of the government and the change that has been achieved. These 
narratives about CNDD-FDD governance shaped how people justified their choices. 
Emmanuel, who was 50 years old (classified as an adult during the war because of 
his role as the head of household), spoke about his own choice during elections: 
At that time, every citizen’s heart was as if it was out of their bodies. The strength 
of CNDD-FDD and FNL was too hard on the citizens. One chooses a party 
beforehand and decides to stick with it. I refused to join politics, but I did vote for 
CNDD-FDD. FNL never loved CNDD-FDD. Even when they were in the forest 
they fought. CNDD-FDD did a good job on some things, but not on others. They 
built hospitals, schools, gave land for cultivating. CNDD-FDD did a lot for 
organizations, gave land and helped them rebuild. They didn’t continue to 
demobilize, so we can say that there wasn’t complete peace. However, there are 
some groups that were also making trouble – like political groups – but the 
government can only do what it can do.  
 
 Emmanuel’s description serves as just one of many examples of respondents who 
spoke about elections in analyzing the right of the CNDD-FDD to be in power based on 
their ability to provide services and deliver on promises. In short, the perceived validity 
of the election had very little to do with the election itself. Respondents instead 
emphasized the quality of governance and the deterioration of relationships between the 
ruling party and opposition parties. These narratives did not differ greatly between 
children and youth, but did diverge from Emmanuel’s explanation that “one chooses a 
party and decides to stick with it.” While adults echoed the idea that their choices were 
set long ago and expressed that they have not considered changing them, youth were less 
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likely to voice this idea. Some youth also spoke of party loyalty or sticking with their 
decisions, but a larger proportion of youth – even those loyal to a party – described a 
more tenuous relationship with the current government that was framed solidly by current 
events. For example, Jean Baptiste was active in politics but had supported movements 
openly before, and still believed he could later on as well. He lived in Kamenge, but 
taught in the hills of Bujumbura Rural. He explained how intertwined his work and 
political life had become, and how he viewed the political system in the post-war period: 
I’m living here, waiting to rise again, but I see so many problems. I suppose that it 
is the duty of the government to protect the population, but they do not seem to be 
able to protect us. Why? We have the army and the police, and people can still kill 
in cold blood with no intervention. All of the political opposition leaders are in 
exile, and now the CNDD-FDD is the only political party. They do not want to 
negotiate, and they do not want the opposition leaders coming back into the 
country.  
 
Political parties feel like a waste. They show you their plan for the country, you 
support them, and the day they are elected you wait for them to achieve their plan 
in vain. I’m not a member of a party, but I’m interested. I listen to what people 
say, I give my own opinions, we discuss. One day I could be a member of a 
political party, but right now I don’t see which one. FNL are always thinking, but 
as long as Agathon Rwasa is outside the country, they don’t have a party. … We 
have elections again in 2015 and those who support him are expecting him to be 
there. If he came back to create a party I might support him, but they could never 
kick out the CNDD-FDD using violence. Most people say violence is not good, 
but at a certain time they live in a situation where they have to use violence. No 
one uses it because they like it. I say I would never use violence, but I don’t really 
know if I’m able to or not.  
 
Even active supporters of CNDD-FDD began to reflect as the elections incited 
heavy controversy in some areas. Claude, a 35-year-old former CNDD-FDD supporter in 
Bujumbura Rural who supported the CNDD-FDD until the elections, explained, “We had 
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hope that this would bring peace in the country. Then in 2005, we had political parties 
and FRODEBU lost the elections and the CNDD-FDD governed. During the first 
mandate, I appreciated the way they ruled.” However, during the elections, his view of 
the party began to change: “FNL was elected first in Rumonge commune. But there was a 
dispute, they had a recount, and then CNDD-FDD won. Elections were not transparent, 
and as a result the parties of opposition gave up on elections and they continued elections 
with one party. So in my opinion, the political opposition is right. The CNDDD-FDD 
continues their divide and conquer strategy and continues to steal.” 
 These quotes exemplify the ways in which youth oriented themselves to political 
choices in the post-election period. There was a constant negotiation of facts and 
information about different events and achievements involving political parties, with the 
election being one important one. Regardless of party affiliation, youth spoke more often 
and in greater depth about elections and other current events, and they were more likely 
to discuss the information that made them hesitate or consider changing their current 
form of political choice. While both Jean Baptiste and Claude were largely ambivalent 
about politics when I interviewed them but leaning toward supporting the FNL, youth 
who supported the CNDD-FDD displayed similar thought patterns following current 
events and focused on the divide between the CNDD-FDD and opposition (of course, 
with different conclusions). In Bubanza, Thérènce was a strong supporter of the CNDD-
FDD who communicated similarly about political choice. Political decision-making was 
more a negotiation over issues and how they affected him, and less a question of loyalty. 
The war has since long ceased but there is a high rate of unemployment and a lot 
of problems. You confront reality – what is always said is not always done. I have 
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a diploma, but no job. I cultivate in my association, I buy and sell telephones from 
Leo.  
 
It is hard for citizens when we hear that CNDD-FDD is still in power and we do 
not have development. No one has the motivation to do anything; they do not give 
jobs. But CNDD-FDD works a lot in schools, hospitals, roads, and community 
works. It’s not a lot, and it’s not a little. It’s just kind of half way.  
 
During the elections, CNDD-FDD won, and FNL was second. Everything was 
okay here in Mutinda. I heard on the radio that elections had been stolen, but 
nothing happened here. Everyone was represented here and the vote counting was 
done together. We heard that there were some boxes containing votes that had 
been found elsewhere but I do not think that is true. Each province had to be 
represented by a minimum of eight people so it is hard to imagine the elections 
had been stolen.  
 
 Thérènce’s reference to confronting reality was a key theme of CNDD-FDD 
youth supporters, who largely acknowledged that CNDD-FDD had not done fulfilled 
every expectation, but who believed that they made important strides as a nation during 
their rule. The idea of a cake or a plate that had to be shared was also mentioned several 
times to explain that, in reality, the resources and opportunities were limited, and 
opposition members had unrealistic expectations.  
Overall, the engagement with party narratives and opposing narratives (and the 
shift in decision-making around these) was significantly more present among youth and 
children cohorts than in the adult cohort. There was a clear shift in the diversity of 
political engagement following the war, and generational cohorts were divided on this 
point. Variance in political choice was greater among the war’s generation of children, 
who have become today’s young adults. Youth displayed greater variance in choice than 
adults, but less than the cohort comprised of children from the war. Thus, there appeared 
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to be a growing trend of political participation affected by both time and generational 
location. In the post-conflict era, networks of youth and younger adults were able to 
explore emerging and reemerging resources and networks that were weakened or less 
prominent in narratives describing the time during the war, specifically civil society 
organizations and government, which adults rarely mentioned.  
In addition, ex-combatants in particular faced circumstances specific to the war’s 
youth, who were largely adults by the time the research took place. They faced unique 
pressures to formally align with a political party and to return to violent youth groups 
during the post-war period, forcing ex-combatants who did not want to return to violence 
into delicately negotiated relationships with those in the community who were expecting 
declarations of loyalty. In addition to this pressure, many faced severe disillusionment 
with their time during and after the war.  
In Bubanza, ex-combatants faced this pressure to maintain loyalty to the party for 
which they fought. At the time of the research, FNL was suspected to be living in Kibira 
Forest, and people in Bubanza were under particular pressure from both FNL and CNDD-
FDD to express their loyalty. Military and police were highly present, and interviews 
were much more difficult to secure than in other provinces as a result of the dynamic 
between the two parties. Wilson, who was fully demobilized and received the normal 
stipend, fought as an adolescent during the war. In his interview, he spoke about his 
frustration with the treatment they received and the difficulties his family is now 
experiencing: 
We fought in political groups, and we were sent home as demobilized soldiers. 
We live badly; we eat food without oil. We are starving. We thought we would 
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integrate into the Burundian army. Instead, with the money we got we tried to do 
something that could help raise our families. I built a house from the small 
amount of money I received. There is no harvest because the sun is so strong. 
Getting money by working for others helped us a lot. When we came back we 
found others expropriated our lands. We build on the little that we received.  
 
Both the CNDD-FDD and the FNL ex-combatants felt they had joined with many 
false promises, and without fully realizing the consequences that joining the war would 
have on their lives. With regard to this, the narrative of losing land after fighting was also 
important to people. Blaise, who lives in Cibitoke, echoed this disappointment in 
recollecting experiences during the war: 
I told you before that the former army’s soldiers made my life difficult, and I had 
to move as a result. I met people who told me that my life being as it is, with no 
other alternative I should join the rebellion. It took a long time for me to get 
convinced – like a whole week. 
 
It was terrible in the camps. We were starving, we had no food, and the worst part 
was the diseases. There was a time I left and went home, but they came to fetch 
me and took me back. I was lucky those who came to fetch me were friends; 
otherwise it would not have been easy for me to return. They spoke in my favour.  
 
All I can say about it is that we had problems when we returned from the war. 
Some people were not welcoming. We had been away for too long. There was a 
bad atmosphere within the community, with so many families lacking food. One 
of the major issues we had upon arriving home: we would find out that the family 
had sold our portion of the land, so we weren’t motivated to cultivate, and we 
failed to find jobs. 
 
 While many ex-combatants found jobs, seniority in the rebellion translated to 
priority in job selection as the CNDD-FDD built up the government. Consequently, 
thousands of younger ex-combatants did not have the opportunity to recover from these 
experiences. Many children who joined during the war, for example, either did not fully 
qualify for demobilization or had a particularly difficult time transitioning. Pascale, a 
	 201	
	
young adult rebel soldier who demobilized with the CNDD-FDD in Bujumbura, noticed 
these challenges, and particularly the challenges faced between Hutu/Tutsi and CNDD-
FDD/FNL: 
We saw there was no way to bring people together – we were still living in 
isolation. Because I was coming from war, I wanted to help people to help put a 
stop to this. That is when I thought about creating the football team. In teams, we 
could play together. We found twenty-four people from four different quartiers in 
the city. When we played on the field, we were good and bad people together. It 
helped us to regain confidence. I left the rebellion, and I wanted to make people 
stop and think. Even if I took a side, I wanted to show other people they needed to 
take time to think – just put down the war, and be together. I put everything into 
soccer, because I like soccer. 
 
Nevertheless, continuing to resist this violence was not easy. As the war came to 
an end, pressure to join groups and pledge loyalty to CNDD-FDD and opposition groups 
prompted the rise of ambivalence, especially among this cohort. Some, such as Gerard, 
decided to become part of party youth wings, which mobilized a subset that were 
expected to intimidate targets in the population. He explained that he was selected to play 
this role as a member of the CNDD-FDD rebellion during the war: 
I’m among the group who participates [in violence] today. I didn’t return to fight, 
but you could say that I returned back to it, in a way. I’m in a committee that is 
known by the commune and by the government. I’m known. We are called the 
Urukoti.xxii It’s a word that means a long coat. People in opposition call us this 
because they don’t want peace –just trouble. It’s a way of saying we are bad. 
 
There’s a committee selected to work in every commune, and the committee is 
supposed to fix the killing that we face today. I’m here to watch what is 
happening. The commune asked me to decide if I could do something like this – if 
was able. Then I volunteered and got elected. 
 
Gerard was recruited for the position as an ex-combatant. He explained, “We work under 
order of what the citizens say. If we see where we come from and how peace is being 
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restored, we can’t accept people ruining that. We worked hard.” Most ex-combatant 
youth, however, rejected membership in violent groups, maintaining a delicate balance to 
avoid becoming targets of any political group, namely CNDD-FDD or FNL. In order to 
do so, most remained ambivalent, still connected to political life but under the radar of 
both groups. Janvier, a father of two living in Kanyosha, described his predicament as 
“terrifying.” Because of his involvement in the FNL during the war, he was under heavy 
pressure from both groups to make a decision about joining one or the other, each seeking 
his loyalty. “There is nothing I can do,” he said:  
They come and they ask me questions – they wonder what decision I will make. I 
haven’t joined any group, but they harass my family. They approached my wife 
the other day while she was shopping. I hide in the house and sometimes sleep at 
other houses to avoid them. It’s hard – there is no way out. One day, they will 
come for me, and they will take me, and they will shoot me. My wife and 
daughters will be alone, but there is nothing I can do. I can’t become that person 
again, so we have prepared for the worst. 
  
Janvier’s fears were later confirmed when we saw him being followed on two 
separate occasions. Ex-combatants struggled to maintain balance in this arena of their 
lives, and the younger cohorts faced even greater difficulty avoiding this track. To many, 
resistance felt like a death sentence; therefore, factors such as poverty and age alone were 
not the main drivers of violence in the post-war period. Instead, we understand that youth 
are specifically driven to analyze politics differently from adults based on their 
relationship to the war itself and a new understanding of possibilities for political 
participation, which accounts for the greater likelihood of youth to participate in politics 
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peacefully and to participate in violence compared to adopting total disengagement (or 
apathy).  
Again, generational theory supports a more complex understanding of the 
knowledge and information guiding each group. However, ex-combatants in this later 
period may serve as a generational unit with distinct pressures and unique relationships to 
political choice. In the aftermath of elections, younger ex-combatants were heavily 
encouraged to choose a political party and be ready to offer their support again, with the 
expectation that they would engage in violence if necessary. Because of their past 
political decisions, this pressure became inescapable for many of the respondents. 
Burundi’s context created an important dynamic for consideration among the younger ex-
combatant cohort; with limited economic opportunities and minimal space for economic 
risk, people could not leave their communities easily, but those who were well-known 
during the war also struggled to avoid violence because they could not separate 
themselves from these key peer networks. The targeted re-recruitment of ex-combatants 
funneled young (mostly) men who fought during the war back into violent networks in 
the post-conflict period, regardless of genuine loyalty to the party itself. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 This chapter has examined Mannheim’s problem of generations over a 20-year 
period featuring two major political “events” to parse out how generations a) experienced 
these events and b) understood their own space for political participation in response to 
these events. In both cases, adults, youth, and children from 1993 displayed considerable 
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differences in narratives and their decision-making processes, evidencing that 
relationships to political participation varied heavily between these cohorts. However, 
this alone could not explain why the groups differed from each other. The key to 
interpreting the differences and similarities between generations is in tracing interactions 
between generations and examining the mechanisms for these interactions and for 
political mobilization. The findings have revealed three key elements for further 
consideration, and particularly for understanding the cyclical nature of conflict.  
First, generational interaction encouraged the growth of political movements over 
time in Burundi, and the mindsets of newer cohorts who were not present during the 1972 
massacre meant there was greater openness to historical narratives encouraging violence. 
Interaction between generations and targeted approaches to recruitment that encouraged 
participation in these groups allowed for reemergence of violence in 1993, with a 
sustained smaller cohort of adults that spread messages to youth at the beginning of the 
war. 
Second, spaces that isolated these target groups (youth, in this case) from other 
networks that might discourage violence were key to recruitment processes, explaining 
why not all youth were recruited to join or even saw it as a possibility. Specifically, rebel 
groups took advantage of peer networks, most notably in secondary school and some 
primary schools, but also within communities. Rebel groups sent young participants who 
could pass as students into schools and other community spaces to encourage groups of 
friends to join the movements. The rebel movement in Burundi relied on mass 
mobilization, but these data offer insight into which mechanisms were actually used and 
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how rebel groups capitalized on generational differences to ensure successful 
recruitment. Furthermore, we understand how mass mobilization did not work at random, 
but rather through specific key networks, so that peers often supported each other in 
decision-making processes. 
Third, the chapter has explored those who did not actually join through these peer 
groups in order to assess other options that were available during the war, as well as how 
these have shifted over time. Here, data supported a theory of generational location, 
which evidenced growing diversity in each cohort, both in terms of variance seen among 
the cohorts (representation of different typologies of political participation) and the 
variance or shift in individual political decision-making (the number of times an 
individual has changed their own participation) within the cohorts. The generational 
locations of youth and children from 1993 prepared them to think about political groups 
in an arena of choice, whereby the events and actions of political parties could impact 
their loyalty to them. Adults, on the other hand, were much more likely to be disengaged 
(or apathetic) overall, but those who did participate in political parties hardly remarked 
on current events, instead approaching political choice as something that had already 
been done in the past, and they most often maintained this relationship to political parties 
in the post-conflict period. Most importantly, non-violence – apathy, ambivalence, and 
non-violent political participation – are fluid, and can often be chosen by people who 
have participated in violence in the past.  
However, a key piece to understanding how violence evolved in the aftermath of 
the war was again in the networks occupied by different groups. Peaceful participation in 
	 206	
	
politics was a realistic option for many in this generation, but peer networks continue to 
shape dynamics around violence and non-violence. The war’s children and younger youth 
were particularly targeted for loyalty, and this applied to particular to pockets of 
government employees (such as teachers) as well, whose livelihoods were often tied to 
their allegiance to the ruling party or their ability to pay bribes. However, because of the 
peer networks they occupied, ex-combatants faced acute challenges in escaping these 
dynamics in the post-war period. While elections triggered a new wave of thinking about 
the political system, networks that guided participation in the past continued to function 
in the present, and youth who had fought previously found themselves caught between 
recruitment groups. Ex-combatants, because they were being watched closely and their 
economic opportunities were heavily tied to their support for the party, had minimal 
ability to avoid violence if they were asked to participate. 
Thus, analysis of the networks and generational units that operate within a 
generational location is needed to better conceptualize the cyclicality of conflict and the 
growth of violent and non-violent movements, often in conjunction with one another. 
Burundi’s youth currently occupy a political space with less apathy and greater 
ambivalence and peaceful participation. Given the historical narratives that respondents 
provided and the fact that democracy is still budding in the country, it is likely that these 
levels are higher than ever before – particularly at a collective level as citizens of a 
nation. However, generational interaction between cohorts that grew up during the war 
and those that grew up during the birth of this new democracy require further analysis to 
conceptualize potential developments in years to come. Most will probably choose non-
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violence, but violent political groups and subgroups continue to persist in the post-war 
period, and the narratives that these groups construct (and how they share them) will 
shape the political future of Burundi.  																																																								
xix Being thrown into the Rusizi River was referenced several times as a euphemism for being 
killed. Bodies were regularly found floating in the river, or in Lake Tanganyika, during the war.  
 
xx Kamenge, a Hutu stronghold during the war, was peppered with references to famous 
rebellions. Le Maquis, a reference to France’s rebellion during World War II, was the name the 
rebels in Bujumbura gave themselves as the stronghold of the movement. 
 
xxi The Sans Échec (translating to “without failure”) and Sans Défaite (“the undefeated”), were the 
two Tutsi groups known for targeting and killing Hutu civilians during the war. Reports often 
referenced a lack of military action to stop them. 
 
xxii Outside of this interview, Urukoti (or “long coats”) were referred to as a group that operated in 
Bujumbura, intimidating the Tutsi and opposition populations. The name referenced the long 
coats they were said to wear at night to shroud their identities. People used the term 
interchangeably with Imbonerakure, which was the name of the CNDD-FDD’s youth wing of the 
party. Urukoti was understood as a violent subset of the Imbonerakure (that may have also 
included unregistered people engaging in intimidation in exchange for opportunities and 
economic advantages), though most did not differentiate between them by name. In late 2014, the 
Urukoti entered more central neighborhoods in Bujumbura and engaged in a series of attacks. 
Several people claimed that ex-Interahamwe from Rwanda (speaking Kinyarwanda) were seen in 
these groups, but the controversy diminished as the 2015 elections shifted focus away from the 
Urukoti themselves. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM IN THE POST-CONFLICT ERA  
AND THE MOVE BEYOND PARTY MOBILIZATION 
 
Introduction 
In August 2016, Gwladys Nicimbikije, my research assistant, reviewed the events 
of the past four years with me. She said, “Looking back at all of these interviews, it’s like 
you could see what would happen.” Burundi was caught in the same conflict trap that has 
plagued so many “post-conflict” societies, and it seemed to have come about right under 
our noses. At the same time, Burundi has served as an example of the contingency of 
conflict traps; far from inevitable, the country avoided a civil war despite highly 
contested elections, violent suppression of citizen demonstrations, an attempted coup 
d’état, attacks on military and police bases, and countless murders and disappearances of 
citizens in protesting neighborhoods. The uneven progression of conflict incited an 
overwhelming desire to hypothesize and predict if (or when) the country would break out 
into war once again, but it never did.  
 This chapter examines the utilization of violence as a political tool in the post-
conflict period and the relative resilience of Burundian citizens to this method of political 
mobilization. It draws upon Alexis de Tocqueville’s conceptualization of the freedom of 
association to explain the dual role that associations have played in Burundi’s political 
trajectory. The chapter begins with a brief overview of events leading into the 2015 
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elections, followed by key theories that explain some of these developments in 
burgeoning democracies.  
I argue that political and civic associations, and media in particular, have served 
as key symbols of democratic freedom in the post-conflict period. Associations propelled 
political engagement in Burundi across ethnic and party lines, encouraging skepticism of 
strict party loyalty, which further fueled tensions between political groups as they sought 
allegiance to their respective groups during the election period. While all chapters thus 
far have referenced the post-conflict period, this chapter directly engages with this 
timeframe to document a clear history of political action and review it with an 
understanding of the shifting use of political and ethnic rhetoric, generational 
mobilization, and the experiences of subgroups in Burundi’s newly formed democracy. 
Because of the importance of these factors outlined in other chapters, new forms of 
political participation must be considered if we are to understand the potential for 
violence (and peace) effectively in the coming years.  
 
A History of Political Participation in Burundi’s Post-Conflict Period 
 Several important developments took place between 2010 and 2015 that must be 
considered in an analysis of civic space and the role of associations in Burundi. Many 
prominent associations protecting civic space and human rights in the country were well 
established by 2010 and supported documentation of a contentious election period. While 
the CNDD-FDD won by a large margin, opposition groups in the country claimed that 
election fraud altered the results. Even during this time, all groups seemed to recognize 
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the importance of media and civic associations, as both groups sought to maintain control 
of political narratives. Political activists supporting the opposition openly criticized the 
government’s targeting of opposition party leaders and members at the local level.  
Opposition groups also engaged in attacks against police and prominent CNDD-
FDD members. As a result, hundreds of people were killed during and after the election 
period, and the leaders of all major opposition groups fled the country or went into 
hiding. During the elections, the government banned all activities by parties not taking 
part in the presidential elections – thereby limiting political activity to the ruling party 
alone. In 2012, interviewees spoke widely about members of the Imbonerakure, the 
CNDD-FDD’s youth wing, engaging in intimidation of community members and targeted 
killings. They also spoke of opposition members retaliating by killing prominent 
members in the CNDD-FDD. Nearly all the murders referenced were of mid-level leaders 
– prominent in communities and well known as members of their parties, but not at the 
highest strategic level within them. The period was characterized by “tit-for-tat” killing 
between parties.  
With opposition leaders in hiding or outside the country, the FNL was no longer 
recognized as a political party, despite the election of local FNL officials in Bujumbura 
Rural. A government-recognized FNL party was established, but it garnered little 
legitimacy in the eyes of FNL supporters. As Burundi seemingly returned toward a single 
party state, with youth supporters whose presence in communities rivaled UPRONA’s 
youth leagues in the 1980s, concerns developed about the country’s ability to maintain a 
stable democracy. Following the 2010 elections, violence seemed to be a tool that parties 
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might use once again to secure their interests. Even the leader of the Mouvement Pour la 
Solidarité et la Démocratie (MSD) was reported by the UN to have links with armed 
groups in the DRC. The shift for this party in particular was notable, as Alexis Sinduhije, 
the party’s leader, was known as a champion of civil society and media – he had not 
fought in the war. 
In late 2012, members of the military and FNL militants were in a bar in 
Gatumba, just outside the capital, that was widely known to be frequented by CNDD-
FDD members. The bar was ambushed, resulting in nearly 40 deaths, but the reason for 
the attack was unclear and the political affiliation of those who were killed remained 
unreported, despite the government’s public blame of FNL leaders. The government took 
a militarized approach to combatting these groups and assuring security, searching for 
FNL hiding in Kibira forest and jailing citizens suspected of having ties with militant 
political wings. However, their strength appeared to weaken, and by 2013, rumors of 
FNL building armed groups in the DRC and fighting in Kibira subsided. The effects of 
violence on these communities were still pervasive, but community members’ main 
concerns regarded militant youth wings of the ruling party and police abuses of power, 
rather than the opposition. It appeared the government successfully had pushed back 
opposition in the countryside. 
 However, political groups unable to organize publicly also maintained other 
avenues of influence that proved to be equally contentious. Van Acker (2016) 
documented the informal yet important role of the imboneza. The imboneza were leaders 
in the community who served as spheres of influence to mobilize governance and the 
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population, and who were under considerable pressure to support the CNDD-FDD. Those 
who were not supporters of the CNDD-FDD continued to mobilize the population against 
the ruling party, often through subtle forms of resistance, such as boycotting public 
meetings or participation in public works (Van Acker, 2016).  
During the years leading into the 2015 elections, public demonstration would 
prove a key tool for all parties: the government, opposition, civil society, and media. In 
2012, Burundians in the capital organized a strike to protest the rising prices of goods and 
lack of service provision from the government. The strike only lasted one day and 
appeared to have little impact on its surface, yet it proved to be a significant moment for 
political resistance. The strike included people who had limited freedom to engage in 
protests, including teachers, bus drivers, and merchants in the central market, and several 
interviewees who were not able to participate upcountry paid close attention to the move. 
It was the first public demonstration of its kind in Burundi’s new democracy. The 
government responded quietly to the strike, dismissing the move in a public statement as 
a manufactured political move by a civil society that wished to regain power. The 
depiction of the strike as one controlled by “civil society” already contained ethnic 
undertones, as Tutsi leadership maintained a heavy influence in civil society after losing 
control of the army and government. However, the statement also included a warning to 
the people to “Remember what civil society has done for you.” With this statement, the 
government solidified their message that many interviewees took to mean: Do not allow 
yourselves to be manipulated by a Tutsi civil society. Remember who fought for you.  
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 Concurrently, the government exercised new policy changes that limited the 
freedom of media, citing security concerns as justification. Hassan Ruvakuki, a reporter 
who had covered the emergence of a rebel group forming against the government in 
Ruyigi (along the country’s eastern border) in 2013, came into the limelight when the 
government arrested him for refusing to reveal the sources of his interviews. The highly 
publicized case resulted in his release, but the government passed a law shortly afterward 
requiring reporters to reveal sources when matters of national security were at stake.xxiii 
Civil rights activists and members of the media condemned the law as a dangerous 
restriction on freedom of the press. Around this controversy, several opposition leaders 
also advocated against government restrictions on speech, but the law persisted.  
The developments during these years highlight the importance of formal party 
representation, but also of informal party mobilization. Leadership in the ruling party was 
equally aware of this second layer of democratic freedoms and understood the threat that 
freedom of association posed to structures and systems they had put in place. By Rwasa’s 
return to Burundi in 2013, FNL’s political and armed wings both seemed relatively weak; 
however, despite efforts to curb attendance, such as halting buses coming into the capital 
and recording the names of those entering town, his return was met with over 1,000 
demonstrators. FNL support proved to be much stronger than expected considering that 
Rwasa could not return as the leader of the officially recognized FNL party. By then, a 
government ally named Emmanuel Miburo had become the head of the party, 
neutralizing the FNL’s impact as a political opposition group within the government.  
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 Protest and public demonstration, which had been extremely uncommon in 
Burundi’s political history outside of election rallies, became a heavily used tool by both 
the opposition and ruling parties. The public protested Rwasa’s inability to speak on 
behalf of the party, and did so again when Rwasa was brought in for a hearing on crimes 
committed during the war, resulting in crowds so large the hearing was cancelled. Civil 
society actors also organized protests against taxes that were unaccounted for in the 
country’s budget. The government countered with peace marches, whereby Imbonerakure 
and other CNDD-FDD supporters came together in a visible display of government 
support. While strikes and protests were highly visible in the capital, communities outside 
of Bujumbura almost never engaged in these demonstrations.  
Instead, media functioned as a communicating tool for the messages and ideas 
being shared through public demonstration, much of which was followed regardless of 
party affiliation. The lack of anonymity in more rural parts of the country (and smaller 
urban centers) and the smaller size of possible demonstrations in rural towns made 
political participation in these areas much more difficult for people to manage. Thus, 
people in the rest of the country did not employ political demonstration as a tool, though 
many followed demonstrations in the capital with great interest and a small minority did 
travel to the capital for key events. Only highly organized pro-government 
demonstrations garnered broad participation in areas outside the capital and Bujumbura 
Rural. However, the media covered these demonstrations and shared information about 
them across the country, thus inadvertently becoming a communicator of the messages of 
a multitude of political groups simply by reporting the news of these events. Both the 
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CNDD-FDD and opposition parties used this mode of political participation to maintain 
momentum and popular support. The primary goal was to use public demonstrations to 
openly send a message to others. Party affiliation was secondary to the popularization of 
key narratives and ideas that transcended party lines. Although there were clear ties 
between these narratives and certain political groups, party identity was actually 
secondary and was not included as a key element of all demonstrations.  
In addition to demonstrations, which were overtly political, arts and theatre 
performances in the capital often spurred discussion with highly political undertones. In 
the years between the 2010 and 2015 elections, Bujumbura hosted artists across the 
region pushed boundaries by using photography, videography, comedy, drama, and music 
to contribute to social and political thought. Photographers documented electoral violence 
with an overtly political message, and the question and answer sessions following theatre 
performances often delved into surprisingly political topics. Comedians, some of whom 
came from neighboring Rwanda, made jokes about political leadership in Burundi and in 
the region; their mere presence on stage was in itself a political statement about freedom 
of speech, given that they were not allowed to perform the same skits in Rwanda. A team 
of Burundian artists also started the weeklong event Buja Sans Tabou (or, “Buja without 
taboos”) in 2014, using art to tackle political and social issues in the country like 
abortion, domestic violence, ethnic divisions, and corruption. The performances were 
organized in the city center at the Centre Culturelle Français (later known as the Institut 
Français du Burundi) and at the Centre Jeunes Kamenge to encourage visibility among 
different populations in the city. The tradition of using the arts to push these boundaries 
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was not brand new, but artistic freedom was being used in new ways, and again outside 
any defined party lines. While the artists toed a delicate line, the use of unconventional 
mediums allowed them to share poignant critiques of society and government and 
generate discussion without targeting one political party. This balance became much 
more difficult to maintain as elections neared and space for political speech and 
demonstration continued to close. 
By the end of 2014, serious concerns arose about electoral preparations. None of 
the opposition groups had registered, unable to decide if and how they should unite to 
form a coalition against the government. The CNDD-FDD also had not announced a 
candidate for the elections set to take place in June and July, and rumors abounded that 
the party would nominate President Nkurunziza for a third term. The government fell 
under international criticism for delaying the nomination. Their reluctance to announce 
the decision came at a time when the CNDD-FDD was also being accused of using 
ethnically divisive language and failing to address a rise in attacks on citizens living in 
Bujumbura by youth who called themselves urukoti, who were understood to be a violent 
subset of the Imbonerakure that intimidated opposition.  
At the beginning of 2015, several more events quickly evolved, intensifying the 
atmosphere and threat of violence. Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa, the founder of a prominent 
human rights organization Association Burundaise pour la Protection des Droits 
Humains et des Personnes Détenues, called APRODH, was imprisoned for speaking out 
against the government and accusing them of human rights violations that they said were 
false. As a form of resistance, civil society organized mardi vert (Green Tuesday), 
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whereby people wore green to evoke the color of the prison uniform Mbonimpa wore 
until he was released due to health concerns. In Cibitoke, the Burundian military caught 
and killed a group of people entering Burundi from the DRC. Several witnesses claimed 
the group did not fight back, but was instead massacred by military who found them off 
guard. In view of these events, the CNDD-FDD appeared to be splitting from within. 
Several prominent party members felt that leadership was becoming increasingly radical, 
and they considered leaving the party. The government, anticipating this decision, 
announced a restructuring of government leadership posts, which essentially neutralized 
the threat that this rift posed to party legitimacy. 
During the same timeframe, Bob Rugurika, the Director of Radio Publique 
Africaine (RPA), oversaw the research and communication of a groundbreaking story that 
implicated the ruling party in the murder of three nuns in Kamenge who were believed to 
have ties to the FNL. He had interviewed the person who he suspected was paid to kill 
the nuns, but would not reveal the source. After releasing the story, Rugurika was 
imprisoned as an accomplice to murder and placed in solitary confinement for his own 
protection. His treatment in prison was followed closely not only by the international 
community, but also by the Burundian population. Citizens religiously followed 
developments in the case and his treatment. They followed his movements in real time, 
using radio and Whatsapp as sources of information. Rugurika’s release marked a 
momentous occasion in Burundi; it was one of the few events in the country’s history in 
which citizens engaged in spontaneous, non-violent public demonstration both in and 
outside the capital. Upon his release and transport back to Bujumbura, people celebrated 
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in the streets and followed his car from the prison back into the city to make sure he 
arrived alive. Whether the people believed Rugurika or not, citizens were unwilling to 
surrender the freedom to operate of the most popular radio station in Burundi. 
 As elections neared, demonstrations in the city (both for and against government 
policies) became regular events. In April, the CNDD-FDD announced their nomination 
of Nkurunziza to run for a third term (which they were calling his second term, since his 
presidential mandate in 2005 was voted on by the legislature of the transitional 
government at the time). Opposition parties condemned the decision and refused to 
participate in elections with Nkurunziza as a candidate, and citizens began protesting the 
“third mandate” in late April under the slogan “sindumuja” (I am not a slave).  
The energy surrounding protests and public demonstration that civil society and 
political organizations had harnessed seemed to take on a life of its own during the next 
two weeks. Amidst rumors of an impending coup d’état, demonstrators filled the streets 
of neighborhoods surrounding the city center, starting with Ngagara, Nyakabiga, Musaga, 
and Kanyosha. Violence ensued between protestors and police, who were sent to keep 
protestors in their neighborhoods, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries at 
demonstrations. While political parties spoke out against the government for abuses of 
power, none of them claimed leadership of the protestors. Protestors seemed to be 
engaging in political demonstration against a third term because of its impact on the 
democratic system, regardless of their affiliation with a political party. Furthermore, 
leadership emerging from protests derived from unexpected pockets of society. A group 
of women artists led one of the most successful (and peaceful) demonstrations during this 
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period, reaching the city center for the first time since the sindumuja movement began. 
They later continued to organize efforts from Rwanda. Others taking leadership roles in 
demonstrations were youth themselves, not officially affiliated with any party. Protests 
continued until May 13, 2015, when Godefroid Niyombare finally launched the long 
expected coup d’état, announcing a successful coup that morning on the national radio 
station.  
Later that day, however, the government announced the coup’s failure on the 
national radio station. The failed coup marked a series of violent neighborhood raids and 
disappearances of countless youth who were thought to support the coup. The attempted 
coup had another key consequence: all major radios operating in the country were 
destroyed, leaving much of the population without access to credible information about 
political developments. Elections moved forward without the participation of opposition 
parties, who refused to accept elections they deemed illegitimate. The political climate 
during elections crushed the spirit of the demonstrations that had marked the early 
months of 2015, with regular neighborhood raids occurring to find and capture 
“insurgents,” and the establishment of community security groups in opposition 
neighborhoods that targeted CNDD-FDD supporters. “Security groups” often served as a 
misnomer for groups of people who took advantage of the instability to operate as gangs 
within neighborhoods.  
Over the next two years, over 300,000 refugees left Burundi for neighboring 
Rwanda, Tanzania, and the DRC, and the government focused on maintaining an air of 
stability, with strict militaristic regulation of youth suspected of having links with the 
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opposition or any perceived organization of opposition groups. Rwasa, who received 
votes during the election despite abstaining from the campaign, joined the government as 
an opposition member, cutting off the FNL’s traditional leadership. In the five years 
between 2010 and 2015, opposition parties lost the majority of their local leaders to 
arrests and assassinations, leaving them structurally weak and without clear leadership. 
Rumors concerning the formation of several different armed groups ignited concerns of a 
return to civil war in the country. Some groups within the city engaged in regular acts of 
insurgency, such as bombing police wards with grenades. The tension culminated in an 
attack in December 2015 in which armed militia stole weapons from a military base. 
Within hours, the government led a crackdown targeting youth in opposition 
neighborhoods, leaving an estimated 300 dead and hundreds more in jail or missing. 
Again, civil war seemed eminent, but rebel groups did not appear to have amassed 
enough power to contend with the government. 
Still, Burundians continue to engage in small forms of peaceful demonstration. 
While space for public support of government has expanded and regular demonstrations 
continue in their favor, other groups have also continued to organize. Reminiscent of 
Pierre Claver’s mardi vert, citizens began to participate in lundi noir (Black Monday) by 
wearing black clothing every week in remembrance of those who lost their lives during 
2015. Some of Burundi’s radio stations have returned, and new media organizations have 
developed both in and outside the country. Though many artists and musicians left in the 
wake of strict limitations on speech, others have continued to work in the country, and art 
festivals returned in 2016 with new artists and performances, once again supporting 
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freedom of expression. During the discussion session following one of the events in the 
series, one performer spoke candidly about art as a catalyst for social change after an 
audience member commented that he believed Africa was falling back into a period 
without hope and without freedom. He said, “I believe in micro-resistance, at the smallest 
level.” 
Popular engagement in Burundi’s young democracy has hinged on forms of 
political participation that extend far beyond party politics. The elections themselves 
served as an important marker, testing the institutions that uphold key tenants of 
democracy, such as freedom of speech and freedom of association. However, 
overemphasis on elections and the political leadership of Burundi has caused people to 
ignore the rich evolution of political participation during this time. Informal leadership at 
the community level was key to groups maintaining influence without formal platforms, 
and targeting those in these positions led to weaker parties in a way that affected their 
power just as much (if not more) than a lack of formal political space. Popular exercise of 
speech and demonstration also help to explain why Burundian resistance to political 
oppression did not end when formal political representation was neutralized, as well as 
why media were so crucial for a Burundian vision of democracy. While the overt political 
clashes between government and opposition took place in the capital, citizens across the 
country had begun to identify democratic progress, and the possibility for peace, with 
institutions and people they connected with directly on a daily basis.  
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Associations in a New Democracy 
“Let us imagine a nation not perfectly used to freedom or one in which deep-
seated political passions are seething. … If, alongside ruling powers, a power 
happens to be established whose moral authority is almost as great, can one 
believe that in the long run it will merely speak without acting?  
 
Will it always come to a halt before the abstract consideration that the aim of 
associations is to direct but not force opinions, to recommend but not enact the 
law? 
 
The more I observe the main effects of the independence of the press, the more I 
am convinced that this independence, in the modern world, is the principal and, as 
it were, the governing element of freedom.”  
 
– Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
When I first arrived in Burundi, several interviews with leaders in NGOs echoed 
the same idea: political opposition largely existed in the country’s capital and in 
Bujumbura Rural, but the CNDD-FDD had overwhelmingly garnered popular support 
outside these areas. In a similar (but more controversial) vein, another narrative echoed 
that opposition was mostly located in Bujumbura, and that most Burundians did not think 
critically enough about political leadership to make use of a democratic system. One 
person I asked about the formal and informal institutions that might support stability 
replied, “You won’t find any institutions in Burundi besides churches and schools,” 
suggesting that Burundi’s institutions were too weak to provide any real kind of stability 
to the population. The government’s failure to secure development and the safety of 
citizens stood in stark contrast to its northern neighbor, Rwanda, and these failures have 
no doubt fueled opposition movements in the country.  
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When judging the strength of a democracy based formal political organization and 
stability during elections, the assessments of Burundi’s weak institutional framework and 
strong support for the ruling party would appear to be true. However, democracy – and 
particularly a young democracy – is not necessarily best judged by these measures alone. 
In particular, there is a large difference between the strength of governing structures and 
the strength of popular dedication to those structures. Weakness in the former does not 
necessarily indicate weakness in the latter, and vice versa. Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
analysis of democracy notably takes into account the important role of associations in 
new democracies and the risks they pose if they are not managed correctly (1835).  
Burundi’s political groups transitioned from a period of conflict into a contentious 
and difficult post-conflict cycle and the institutions surrounding and supporting this 
transition have become a lynchpin, providing the population with confidence to continue 
investing in this system. The events described above all directly link to forms of political 
action and demonstration in which citizens took part. While a sizeable portion of the 
population maintains an apathetic relationship with political engagement, the majority of 
those I interviewed, both in Bujumbura and outside of it, remained connected to the idea 
of democracy. In particular, younger generations who grew up during the war wanted to 
see the new government succeed, despite skepticism about the CNDD-FDD’s ability to 
lead. The explanation for this seemingly paradoxical high level of political engagement 
and low level of party loyalty was found in the broad role of associations during the post-
conflict period.  
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Supporters of the CNDD-FDD both in and outside of Bujumbura did not find it 
incongruous, for example, to vote for the CNDD-FDD while being heavily invested in 
political reporting on government corruption. Some CNDD-FDD supporters and 
ambivalent participants also believed fervently that public demonstration was the key to 
political change. Associations, and the media in particular, provided a space for citizens 
to invest in political developments outside ethnic or party identities. Francine, a teacher 
in Bubanza, tacitly supported the CNDD-FDD, but was frustrated by the trap she felt she 
was living in, with little way out. She spoke about Burundi’s strike in 2013: 
I’m glad they did it, and I hope they do it again. They should keep going until the 
government hears them. I wish I could join them. They said on the radio that the 
strike lasted one day, and that is good; but it isn’t enough. We need to keep 
pushing the government to respect us and listen to our needs. Right now, they take 
everything.  
 
 Tocqueville writes, however, that although associations may begin non-violently, 
they can pose a risk to stability as their moral authority develops further. The role of 
associations is to represent those who are not represented in the government in order to 
push the government to consider points of view outside its line of vision. If the purpose 
simply becomes centered on challenging the legitimacy of the current government, 
freedom of association could endanger the security of the political group in power. 
Burundi’s case reveals how freedom of association can both strengthen and threaten 
stability, and how this functions in the period directly following the war. In the post-
conflict cycle, informal leadership and forms of collective action provided the space for 
political engagement that could support a democracy, even while formal political groups 
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were deadlocked in the exact battle for moral authority about which Tocqueville had 
written.  
 The competition for moral authority in the years immediately following conflict 
has been widely referenced as a risk of Burundi’s consociational democracy, albeit in 
other terms. Difficulties in power-sharing consensus building have presented important 
barriers to stability (Jones, 2013; Walter, 2002; Licklider, 1995). However, Burundi’s 
settlement in the Arusha Accords may have been one of the best chances for stability 
negotiated in the region, despite these uncertainties (Lemarchand, 2006). The accords 
themselves advanced the representation of multiple ethnic groups and parties, balanced 
by clauses protecting freedom of speech and freedom of the press. They also built in 
protections for political minorities, such as women and children.  
The accords set the stage for positive political engagement and peaceful transition 
into democratic rule, but Burundi’s parties did fall into the traps that previous scholars 
have outlined. The tensions between these groups resulted in difficult periods of 
negotiation with little incentive on behalf of either side to compromise, each believing it 
had the right to rule the country properly. In the midst of an almost complete breakdown 
of political collaboration, theories focused on the results of the negotiation (such as the 
accords) provide little room for understanding how peace can be continuously negotiated. 
Tocqueville’s analysis of the freedom of association and freedom of the press expand the 
notion of democracy beyond the formal institutional and political groundwork of 
democracy and into the enacted liberation of its people.  
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Institutional Impact on Stability 
There is some calm right now, but not a lot. When politicians speak on the radio, 
their speeches don’t release us. I, as a citizen feel they should put something on 
the radio to promote getting along. This way, we can be released instead of being 
suppressed. When they just do propaganda for their parties, it doesn’t release us. 
I’m in the party that won. People said we stole the elections. That’s not a release 
for us. And then, regardless of how it was well watched, the group who lost the 
vote will always be wounded. On the radio, my party terrorized people that 
weren’t in their camp. 
- Jeanine, Bujumbura Rural, CNDD-FDD member 
 
 Non-state actors have shaped the evolution of stability in Burundi in two key 
ways: a) their provision of space for popular political participation and b) their 
relationship to state actors. These groups supported citizens’ lived freedom of association 
and freedom of expression by organizing events and binding people together across party 
and ethnic lines; however, the government’s reliance on identity politics to justify its own 
legitimacy rendered these types of political engagement incompatible with its own goals. 
The government encouraged competing forms of association through such acts as 
mobilizing within the party youth wing, which stifled or intimidated other groups. The 
freedom for this less formal, but equally important space was negotiated in parallel with 
formal political demands of opposition parties.  
 While the local associations and community leaders targeted in recent years may 
have had limited impact, the radio serves as an institutional bedrock for freedom of 
expression across the country. Credible and open media sources to provide information 
on a national scale and support representation of diverse voices across the country have 
been essential to growing political mobilization and engagement without party affiliation. 
However, government and political parties have also used media to pull citizens into 
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battles for group loyalty. Because political participation and political interests of the 
population have shifted away from identity and party politics, state actors (both 
opposition and government) have had difficulty with engaging audiences through more 
traditional means. Jeanine’s comment above reflects the fatigue that communities faced 
in hearing politicians’ outreach, but also a continued engagement and desire for a 
different type of political message focused on mutual support and understanding.  
 Independent investigations led by media and voices given to non-state actors 
provided messages that contrasted with those of politicians and garnered the interest of 
the population. For citizens such as Simeon in Bubanza who had fought in the war, media 
and associations provided much-needed space to exercise their freedoms (or feel that they 
was exercising them in small ways) and avoid returning to violence: 
We don’t know what the future holds, but I talk with people I know and we 
discuss between us in the community. We hear rumors that war could come back, 
but I don’t see where it would come from. We don’t want that. We want to 
breathe. We are tired and need something to change the hopelessness we feel. I 
listen to the radio to know what is happening.  
 
Simeon relied on the radio and informal community relationships for information; these 
seemingly small details in narratives were actually mentioned overwhelmingly by those 
actively engaged in non-violent politics (ambivalent or belonging to a party). Those who 
engaged in violence in the post-conflict period (a very small minority of my sample) and 
those who identified as politically apathetic did not mention media or other types of 
associations (aside from economic dependence on NGOs and churches). Rene, living in 
Kanyosha, echoed the impact of freedom of expression on the stability of the country and 
spoke of his own support to civil society in working to protect this space:  
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In the government today, when people try to express their opinions, they kill you, 
they jail you… they make life very difficult. But, we all have problems - the same 
worries. We don’t all have the same ideas on how to fix our problems, but 
because of that people are killing each other, jailing each other, following each 
other. We have to keep trying to make them act like they should, though. 
  
Concluding Thoughts 
Burundians today do not use their ethnicity to relate to politics in the same ways 
that they have in the past. Thus, demands for simple negotiations between parties cannot 
resolve the differing political goals and assessments that are shaping violent conflict in 
Burundi today. The nature of associations (non-state actors) must be considered if we are 
to understand how peace is continuously negotiated between the state and its citizens in 
the post-conflict period. Associations have the power to maintain peaceful political 
engagement of citizens and exacerbate tensions between the government and potential 
threats to party power. The CNDD-FDD has co-opted many of these measures in an 
attempt to provide other methods for association that could function in support of 
government, but state co-optation of traditionally non-state roles is viewed as a 
concerning development for peace and stability, even by CNDD-FDD supporters.  
While this analysis does not predict when and where violence may take place (or 
if it will take place at all), it argues for a reframing of the discussion that may provide 
clarity on the question of cyclical violence. In being told from the perspective of citizen 
engagement in demonstration and the role of associations, the history of the five years 
between elections in Burundi ceases to be one of limited political space, instead 
developing into one in which unprecedented demonstration and citizen engagement 
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across party lines were apparent. In the areas sampled, freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press were met with popular support both in and outside the capital – not because they 
were anti-government, but because they were pro-democracy and pro-liberation.  
 My research demonstrates that citizen engagement across the political spectrum 
has relied on associations to provide information and support freedom for all Burundians. 
These accounts stand in stark contrast to accounts of actors focusing on political 
mobilization at the state and formal levels who have emphasized party loyalty and a lack 
of critical thinking among Burundians. Thus, these are new debates to be analyzed 
separately from old conflicts concerning Hutu and Tutsi gains for power, or CNDD-FDD 
relationships with opposition. My analysis of associations as functioning actors with 
evolving strategies shifts from traditional assessments of associations as weak or strong, 
and instead emphasizes their impact on state stability and political freedom.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
FROM THE CASE OF BURUNDI 
 
“One day, Africa will begin to write its own history, and it will be a story of hope.” 
- Artist, Buja Sans Tabou 
 
 
Review 
In this dissertation, in order to shed light on mechanisms of political participation 
during and after conflict, I aimed to answer the following question: What explains 
citizens’ choices about political participation as they experience the turmoil conflict and 
post-conflict periods? This dissertation therefore unpacks the phenomenon of 
mobilization from a conflict period straight into a transitioning democracy. While the 
country possesses many of the indicators that suggest an inevitable return toward violent 
conflict, and may continue to evolve in that direction amid growing political tension, the 
range of political participation documented in this study demonstrates that recurrence is 
far from inevitable. 
By conducting repeated interviews with a subset of individuals combined with 
participant observation across a variety of both informal and formal political spaces, I 
address these questions for Burundi’s case. Instead of confirming macro-level trends and 
theories about violent conflict, the research highlights how and why those contributions 
remain limited in explaining conflict recurrence. I identify how social networks and 
social ties guide political participation during conflict, laying the groundwork for 
mobilization in the post-conflict period. 
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First, mobilizers employ narratives that link to identity by developing goals and 
values associated with that identity. Subgroups have different relationships to political 
mobilization because of their generational experiences, social networks and roles, which 
limited political choice. Ethnic narratives, evoked by almost everyone in my sample, did 
not explain the decision to participate in violence relative to other options people faced. 
Rather, interpersonal connections shaping mobilization proved key to the different 
options and pressures presented to individuals. Social roles and relationships to other 
historical events funneled subsets of the population into different sets of choices relating 
to politics. This explanation differs from several theories about conflict by 
conceptualizing non-violence and violence as a range of political choices. Furthermore, 
analysis of individual historical narratives allowed for in-depth understanding of how and 
why groups like women and youth can be mischaracterized in violence. This approach 
allowed for better traceability of decision-making during the war and for isolation of 
variables (like friendships) that are often difficult to trace back to participation in 
violence. 
Second, not only is generational location significant to Burundi’s historical 
progression, but the research outlines the importance of interaction between generational 
units to the evolution of political participation over time. The theory of generational 
locations and units supports deeper understanding of the interactions that took place 
between units to support violence, but also help to explain why children and youth 
(particularly those that were adolescents or younger at the onset of the war) present a 
much wider range of participation (both violent and non-violent). Non-violent 
		
232 
participation is generally under theorized, resulting in conclusions that tend to over 
represent youth as violent political actors.  
Last, this dissertation outlines the informal and non-state actors that influence 
democratic participation. These actors play a particularly important role in the post-
conflict period, encouraging political participation that extends beyond party identity. 
This role played by actors in civil society, media, arts and other groups, embodies 
political freedom through freedom of association. However, the role also necessitates 
careful relationships between these actors and political groups, as they may enhance 
conflicts between parties or encourage government actors to see these types of political 
action as a threat to their own legitimacy. Thus, these findings are a step towards clearer 
theorization of the processes by which conflict recurs or is avoided. Citizen engagement 
with non-state actors can shift public loyalty away from political parties in the post-
conflict era, while governing parties previously organized via group loyalty begin to limit 
or overpower other actors to quash challenges to their legitimacy.   
This work presents an alternative explanation for currently weak predictors of 
conflict recurrence, tracing the processes of political mobilization and the development of 
new (and in some cases reemerging) forms of political engagement in the post-conflict 
period. It fills a gap in the literature connecting mobilization efforts to social roles and 
networks that funnel political choice and create generational, gender, ethnic and other 
subsets of experiences that shape the meaning of political events for individuals. It also 
responds to enduring questions in the literature about the ways that youth may shift 
toward or away from violence, presenting a dynamic typology of political participation.  
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Limitations 
 While this study has several methodological strengths and contributions to our 
understanding of conflict, it also presents some limitations. First, the case of Burundi 
cannot be extracted to represent conflict around the world, though it may provide insights 
to be considered in other cases. Burundi was chosen as a case that could provide lessons 
learned about a broader understanding of conflict, but the specific mechanisms outlined 
here guiding political participation need to be considered in further study across other 
cases.   
 Second, there were several risks and challenges associated with speaking about 
conflict and politics altogether for many participants. This resulted in many questions 
posed by respondents about how we were able to manage that risk, but some participants 
still admitted avoiding the truth about certain details in order to hide their identity. One 
respondent responded almost entirely using metaphors and popular Kirundi proverbs, 
making it challenging to pull out his personal story. Snowball sampling allowed for a 
higher level of initial comfort, since we were introduced by people who already had 
confidence of those we were meeting. Furthermore, the method of returning back to the 
same respondents over an extended time, however, helped to mitigate this challenge. 
Respondents who had lied about part of their story often had trouble keeping it consistent 
over time, and ended up relaying new information as they became more comfortable.  
 Third, while the sample has its merits, and allowed for an analysis of the diversity 
of cohorts, it cannot be considered representative. Respondents were chosen in order to 
maximize understanding of subgroups and different types of political participation; 
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therefore, comparisons that show the existence of greater diversity in type of participation 
among one cohort compared to another are strong analyses. However, the actual 
percentages of these groups cannot be determined from this sample. In order to mitigate 
this, other studies that did sample quantitatively were referenced where possible, or a 
discussion of the lack of demographic information about participation levels was 
included. 
 Another aspect of this study that limits its applicability is the case of ethnic 
violence. While the case was chosen to highlight the inconsistencies in our understanding 
of how ethnic violence functions (one of the strongest predictors), it also poses 
limitations to understanding other types of conflict that function without identity-based 
narratives. Economic conflicts and younger conflicts that have shallower roots in 
historical divisions may pose different types of diversity in political participation that 
have not been discussed here. Similarly, Burundi’s very new democracy shapes the way 
that conflict is evolving to a degree that further research would be needed to understand 
how post-conflict participation functions in countries that have much older and 
established democratic systems or have other political systems altogether. 
   
 
Implications for Future Research and Practical Applications  	 	
The post-war context from Burundi’s case and the longer history of conflict 
proceeding it provided a unique window where I was able to show the diversity of 
political action and the factors that shifted it throughout this time. While this dissertation 
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certainly does not cover an exhaustive set of factors shaping participation, it makes the 
case for further analysis of non-violent political participation alongside violent 
participation. This work has shown the diversity of political action that, when only 
violent actors are studied, does not appear as part of the theorization of conflict. 
However, more research like this is needed to parse out motivations and networks that 
influence those who join and those who do not, and to make stronger theories about how 
people shift in and out of violence, particularly during post-conflict eras. 
An examination of post-war political violence requires the inclusion of micro-
level social factors that shape the decision-making processes of people, but this research 
only highlights a portion of these factors. Generational location, for example, is a classic 
theory that provided grounding for this research, but there were actually very few cases in 
the literature on conflict where generational experiences were separated from age. This 
research has posited one methodology that could be used in other contexts for further 
theorization around generations, but the case itself remains limited. To make claims about 
the collective experiences of youth or differences in age groups, further research is 
needed across different cases. Similarly, women and other minority subgroups are often 
characterized as victims or reluctant participants in war, yet they make up a significant 
percentage of participants in violence. In the post-conflict era, this research argues that 
conflict has created new spaces for these actors, meaning the group able to wield 
influence in politics also changes. While this theory is not new on its own, and much of 
social movements theory underlines this idea, current models explaining post-conflict 
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dynamics still lack the ability to account for these social dynamics and social movements 
literature needs further research on minority subgroups to showcase this dynamism.  
In particular, international actors utilizing knowledge about conflict to make 
decisions about interventions are in need of more accurate explanations for conflict and 
peace. Theories that gear these actors towards questions about how and why citizens buy 
into (or do not) emerging democratic systems will provide missing information on how to 
design interventions to encourage stability. Importantly, they will also shift a theoretical 
focus away from macro-level and institutional-level measures, which remain relatively 
weak predictors, towards process-focused measures that may allow us to understand 
important shifts in populations and strengthen predictions about conflict in the future. 
This research provides a step in that direction, but there is much more to be done that can 
support practical intervention.  
Last, in order to think more dynamically about interventions, international actors 
need to shift towards a conceptualization of participation in violence that is fluid. Non-
violent group membership and political participation are often overlooked in cases of 
conflict. Opportunities for peace is a growing field of study, but tacit support and group 
membership without direct participation in violence remains understudied and, given the 
role that informal networks and relationships play in shaping citizens’ options, may play 
a large role in shaping whether political violence spills into conflict or not. At the 
moment, this remains a black box for many actors, though the lessons are pertinent 
beyond Burundi. 
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Burundi, relatively understudied compared to other nations that have experienced 
conflict on the same scale, reveals important lessons that can be used both theoretically 
and practically. Particularly in literature on Burundi, the theoretical assumptions that 
conflict literature provides about recurrence fell short, showing a need for new 
perspectives. This research does not provide all of the answers, but contributes key 
concepts for further study in order to better conceptualize political action and the 
potential for conflict and peace that lies within. 
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APPENDIX A: CASE SELECTION FROM UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 
Acronym Mission name Start date Closing date 
UNTSO  United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization 
May 1948 Present 
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer 
Group in India and Pakistan 
January 
1949 
Present 
UNEF I First United Nations Emergency 
Force 
November 
1956 
June 1967 
UNOGIL United Nations Observation 
Group in Lebanon 
June 1958 December 
1958 
ONUC United Nations Operation in the 
Congo 
July 1960 June 1964 
UNSF United Nations Security Force in 
West New Guinea 
October 
1962 
April 1963 
UNYOM United Nations Yemen 
Observation Mission 
July 1963 September 
1964 
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus 
March 
1964 
Present 
DOMREP Mission of the Representative of 
the Secretary-General in the 
Dominican Republic 
May 1965 October 1966 
UNIPOM United Nations India-Pakistan 
Observation Mission 
September 
1965 
March 1966 
UNEF II Second United Nations 
Emergency Force 
October 
1973 
July 1979 
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement 
Observer Force 
June 1974 Present 
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon 
March 
1978 
Present 
UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices 
Mission in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan 
May 1988 March 1990 
UNIIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq Military 
Observer Group 
August 
1988 
February 
1991 
UNAVEM I United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission I 
January 
1989 
June 1991 
UNTAG United Nations Transition 
Assistance Group 
April 1989 March 1990 
ONUCA United Nations Observer Group 
in Central America 
November 
1989 
January 1992 
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission 
April 1991 October 2003 
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MINURSO United Nations Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara 
April 1991 present 
UNAVEM 
II 
United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission II 
June 1991 February 
1995 
ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission 
in El Salvador 
July 1991 April 1995 
UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission 
in Cambodia 
October 
1991 
March 1992 
UNPROFO
R 
United Nations Protection Force February 
1992 
March 1995 
UNTAC United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia 
March 
1992 
September 
1993 
UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in 
Somalia I 
April 1992 March 1993 
ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique 
December 
1992 
December 
1994 
UNOSOM 
II 
United Nations Operation in 
Somalia II 
March 
1993 
March 1995 
UNOMUR United Nations Observer Mission 
Uganda-Rwanda 
June 1993 September 
1994 
UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission 
in Georgia 
August 
1993 
June 2009 
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission 
in Liberia 
September 
1993 
September 
1997 
UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti September 
1993 
June 1996 
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda 
October 
1993 
March 1996 
UNASOG United Nations Aouzou Strip 
Observer Group 
May 1994 June 1994 
UNMOT United Nations Mission of 
Observers in Tajikistan 
December 
1994 
May 2000 
UNAVEM 
III 
United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission III 
February 
1995 
June 1997 
UNCRO United Nations Confidence 
Restoration Operation in Croatia 
May 1995 January 1996 
UNPREDE
P 
United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force 
March 
1995 
February 
1999 
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
December 
1995 
December 
2002 
UNTAES United Nations Transitional 
Administration for Eastern 
January 
1996 
January 1998 
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Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium 
UNMOP United Nations Mission of 
Observers in Prevlaka 
January 
1996 
December 
2002 
UNSMIH United Nations Support Mission 
in Haiti 
July 1996 July 1997 
MINUGUA United Nations Verification 
Mission in Guatemala 
January 
1997 
May 1997 
MONUA United Nations Observer Mission 
in Angola 
June 1997 February 
1999 
UNTMIH United Nations Transition 
Mission in Haiti 
August 
1997 
December 
1997 
MIPONUH United Nations Civilian Police 
Mission in Haiti 
December 
1997 
March 2000 
  UN Civilian Police Support 
Group 
January 
1998 
October 1998 
MINURCA United Nations Mission in the 
Central African Republic 
April 1998 February 
2000 
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission 
in Sierra Leone 
July 1998 October 1999 
UNMIK United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in 
Kosovo 
June 1999 Present 
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone 
October 
1999 
December 
2005 
UNTAET United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor 
October 
1999 
May 2002 
MONUC United Nations Organization 
Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
November 
1999 
June 2010 
UNMEE United Nations Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 
July 2000 July 2008 
UNMISET United Nations Mission of 
Support in East Timor 
May 2002 May 2005 
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia September 
2003 
Present 
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte 
d'Ivoire 
April 2004 Present 
MINUSTA
H 
United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti 
June 2004 Present 
ONUB United Nations Operation in 
Burundi 
June 2004 December 
2006 
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UNMIS United Nations Mission in the 
Sudan 
March 
2005 
Present 
UNMIT United Nations Integrated 
Mission in Timor-Leste 
August 
2006 
Present 
UNAMID African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
July 2007 Present 
MINURCA
T 
United Nations Mission in the 
Central African Republic and 
Chad 
September 
2007 
Present 
MONUSCO United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
July 2010 Present 
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